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Preface and acknowledgements 
The origins of this dissertation lay in three interrelated concerns that have preoccupied 
much of my professional life over the past decade. First, as a participant in the non-
government campaign that helped to establish the National Framework for Protecting 
Australia’s Children 2009-2020—Australia’s first-ever national policy to reduce rates of  
child abuse and neglect—I observed how policy change resulted from the complex 
interplay of short and longer-term factors, such as agitation for policy change from the 
non-government sector, the accumulated weight of research findings, and compelling 
media coverage (Babington 2011, pp. 11-20). Building on my involvement with 
policymaking at the national level, I wished to know more about how and why change 
occurs in national public policy, especially with regard to social issues.  
 
The second impulse behind this research project lay in my involvement with a campaign 
to assist a group of adults who, as children, had been placed in orphanages and other 
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and often tragic, stories alerted me to the plight of children in institutions and the range 
of possible adverse consequences for them in later life. I found myself asking: Why did 
official government policy that supported these institutions change only decades after 
high-profile scientific studies had demonstrated the detrimental effects of 
institutionalisation on many children? Why did government policies to end the use of 
children’s institutions, or to ‘deinstitutionalise’, take so long to be put in place by 
Australian and other governments? As discussed in this study, I realised that the 
literature on the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions had not developed 
satisfactory explanations about why, how and under what conditions governments made 
policy changes in this area. 
 
Finally, my involvement with children’s rights advocacy at the international level 
alerted me to the fact that, while almost all large-scale children’s institutions had been 
closed in countries such as the US, UK, Ireland and Australia by the 1980s, in the 
present day millions of children live in orphanages and other forms of institutions away 
from their families in many other parts of the world.  
 
A number of questions arose for me from these experiences. For example, in the face of 
research findings about the adverse effects of these places for many children, why had 
policy change taken so long to accomplish in some countries? What explained the 
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Abstract 
It is estimated that between two and eight million children live in orphanages or other 
residential institutions in the developing world (the Global South) and in the former 
Eastern Bloc. In recent decades the UN and international non-government organisations 
have called upon governments in these countries to develop and implement policies to 
‘deinstitutionalise’, or reduce substantially the number of children who live in 
institutions. 
 
Despite this heightened interest, research into how and why deinstitutionalisation policy 
change occurs remains in its infancy, especially with regard to the Global South. Using 
a discourse analysis methodology advanced by Hajer this dissertation sheds light on 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking in Indonesia. Specifically, it asks: What factors led 
Indonesia to adopt a policy during the 2000s to reduce reliance on a type of children’s 
institution known as panti asuhan? 
 
The prevailing explanation for Indonesia’s policy change has been that it decided in the 
mid-2000s to comply more fully with the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child which opposes the separation of children from their parents except in special 
circumstances. Through field interviews and other analysis I show, however, that 
political, economic, cultural, and religious discourses—rather than concerns about 
children’s rights only—predominated in shaping new policy.  
 
I identify three phases in developing the new panti asuhan policy. First, from the late 
1990s, a pro-reform group (or ‘discourse-coalition’) began to agitate for policy change. 
Second, in the mid-2000s, a ‘status quo’ discourse-coalition which supported panti 
asuhan opposed prospective policy change. Finally, the Indonesian Government’s wish 
to signal its adherence to international children’s rights standards, align policy with 
changed national economic, social and administrative directions, and avoid conflict with 
pro-panti asuhan forces generated the final policy outcome under which panti asuhan 
would continue to play a central, if somewhat changed, role while appearing to comply 
with Indonesia’s children’s rights obligations. Rather than designed only to benefit 
children, final policy thus attempted to appease both pro-reform and pro-panti asuhan 
groups.    
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The study provides important messages for practice and research. For policymakers and 
advocates, employing Hajer’s methodology can improve understandings about factors 
that impede or advance progress on deinstitutionalisation policymaking in other 
countries of the Global South. The study also contributes new understandings to 
literatures on deinstitutionalisation, public policy, and on panti asuhan themselves. It 
extends research into the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions by being the 
first to apply Hajer’s methodology to understand how this type of policymaking 
occurred in the Global South. As well as shedding further light on Indonesian social 
policy in general, it also provides new understandings about attitudes towards, and the 
operations of, panti asuhan.  
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Chapter 1:  Context and overview 
 
Overview 
Today, millions of children across the globe do not reside with their parents for a variety 
of reasons, including the death of their parents (that is, by becoming orphans), conflict, 
migration, natural disasters, detention, disability and child trafficking. The issue of 
children being raised in residential institutions has become a particular focus of 
international public, governmental and academic attention over the past few decades. 
Within that broad subject area, the UN and numerous international non-government 
organisations (INGOs) have called on governments, particularly in the former Eastern 
Bloc and in developing countries (or the Global South), to phase out children’s 
institutions.  
 
At its most general level, this dissertation contributes to understandings about factors 
that shape deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Global South. It does so 
specifically by examining recent Indonesian Government policymaking using a 
discourse analysis methodology to provide detailed understandings of policymaking 
processes.  
 
1.1 Children living without parental care 
Today, millions of children are growing up around the world without direct parental 
care. They live in a wide variety of settings, such as in orphanages and other types of 
residential institutions, with relatives or kin, with individuals to whom the child is not 
biologically related (in the form either of adoption or foster care in family settings other 
than the children’s own family), with employers, with other children, or on the streets. 
The precise number of children in these categories on a global basis is unknown due to 
the lack of accurate and timely data (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child 2006, p. 10). A sense of the significant numbers of children involved can be 
gleaned, however, from the most recent estimate by UNICEF (2005) that there are 143 
million orphans in 93 countries of the Global South (p. 39). 
 
Children who live in institutions, such as orphanages, comprise a significant sub-set of 
children who live without parental care. The number of children who live in institutions 
worldwide is also unknown due to the paucity of data (United Nations Committee on 
13 
the Rights of the Child 2012a). Yet, an idea of the significant numbers involved (as well 
as the problem of accurately determining numbers) may be gained from the estimate by 
Save the Children UK (2003, p. 1) that eight million children live in institutions and 
UNICEF’s (2009, p. 19) more recent, but lower, estimate of two million children. 
 
The situation of children who live in institutions in the Global South and the former 
Eastern Bloc has been the subject of growing public, governmental and academic 
interest over the past few decades. In the late 1980s, the international media began to 
report on unfavourable conditions for babies and children living in Romanian 
orphanages (Kaler & Freeman 1994, Carlson & Earls 1997, Marcovitch et al. 1997, 
Beckett et al. 2002). At around the same time, the international media began reporting 
that increasing numbers of children were being placed in orphanages as a result of the 
HIV/AIDS-related deaths of their parents and relatives in sub-Saharan Africa (Hunter 
1990, pp. 681-90, Gaines 2006, Meintjes & Giese 2006, pp. 407-10).  
 
The issue of children living in institutions also received international attention through 
the development and adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
While the international community had expressed general concerns about the situation 
of children deprived of their family environment as early as in the 1924 Geneva 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) highlighted specific duties of States Parties to the Convention concerning the 
institutionalisation of children (Cantwell & Holzscheiter 2008, p. 2). Amongst several 
Articles of the Convention that concern the situation for children who are raised without 
parental care, Article 20 stated:  
 
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in 
that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance 
provided by the State.  
2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative 
care for such a child.  
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, 
adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of 
children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the 
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desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, 
religious, cultural and linguistic background. 
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) also affirmed that children 
should be raised by their parents wherever possible. Article 18 stated: 
 
1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle 
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and 
development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, 
have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the 
child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.  
 
In order to provide more detailed guidance on the subject of children living without 
parental care, in 2009 the UN General Assembly adopted Guidelines for the alternative 
care of children (2009, p. 2) which encouraged States ‘to keep children in, or return 
them to, the care of their family’, limit the use of institutions only to cases where it was 
appropriate for the child, and work to prevent the need for alternate care by measures 
such as family strengthening services and supportive social policies. In addition, over 
the past three decades, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (a committee 
which comprises 18 independent experts who monitor and report to the UN on the 
implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) has frequently issued 
comments about the nature and extent of compliance with the Articles of the 
Convention that relate to children who are raised without parental care in institutions 
(Cantwell & Holzscheiter 2008, p. 2).  
 
In addition to intergovernmental agreements, the past few decades have also seen an 
increase in public campaigning by INGOs and the UN itself about the use of children’s 
institutions, especially in the former Eastern Bloc and in the Global South. Broadly 
speaking, these entities have urged the closure of large-scale residential institutions, 
except as a last resort when all other alternatives (such as care by relatives or adoption) 
have been considered, in view of a wide range of negative impacts on childhood 
development and children’s rights (Save the Children UK 2003, pp. 1-18, Browne 2009, 
pp. 1-24, Save the Children UK 2009, pp. 1-24, Williamson & Greenberg 2010, pp. 1-
26). By way of example, the INGO EveryChild (2009, p. 8) stated: 
 
15 
Research, particularly from less developed regions, shows a substantial and 
growing number of children without parental care, with devastating impacts on 
children’s rights to survival, development, education, health, nutrition and 
freedom from abuse and exploitation.  
 
In a similar vein, the UN Secretary-General’s World report on violence against children 
(2006) called for a reduction in the use of institutions in light of evidence about wide-
ranging negative psychological, physical and other impacts on children, with the 
severity of these negative impacts being worse for children under the age of four years 
and for those who experienced long periods of institutionalisation (pp. 16-17).  
 
In relation to factors that drive institutionalisation, UNICEF (2009) stated that the 
majority of children were placed in institutions by a family member or members as a 
result of poverty rather than the loss of one or more parents. Save the Children UK 
(2009, p. 5) also asserted that at least four out of five children in institutions globally 
had at least one living parent and that ‘most children in institutions come from poor 
families and/or those that are discriminated against’. As is the case with accurately 
determining the numbers of children in institutions, such global claims need to be read 
with caution due to the absence of independently-verifiable, comprehensive and up-to-
date data.  
 
Another conspicuous aspect of INGO and UN advocacy over the past few decades—and 
a central matter for this dissertation—has been the call for national governments in the 
former Eastern Bloc and in the Global South to adopt deinstitutionalisation policies that 
aim to ensure that children are admitted to, or reside in, institutions only where this is in 
the best interest of the child and where no other alternative is available. Responding to 
what they considered to be the slowness of some countries to adopt 
deinstitutionalisation policies, Save the Children, UNICEF and the Better Care Network 
(2009, p. 2) called for ‘political will, leadership, and creative thinking from 
governments…in order to co-ordinate policies and programmes relating to the care and 
protection of children’. Save the Children UK (2009, p. 11) contended: 
 
…at the heart of the proliferation of institutional care lies a lack of political will 
to invest in the most vulnerable children. Care institutions provide a safety valve 
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for governments that are unable―or unwilling―to tackle complex social and 
economic factors driving families to place their children into care.  
 
Academic interest in children living in institutions in the former Eastern Bloc and in the 
Global South has also evolved strongly over the past three decades. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 2, academic inquiry into the effects of institutions on childhood development 
in many industrialised countries commenced in the 1930s. Goldfarb (1945) and Bowlby 
(1952, 1982) focused attention on a range of adverse effects for children who were 
deprived of maternal care, especially in the first few years of life. Building on those 
foundations, the past three decades have seen the expansion of research into the impacts 
on and consequences for children living in institutions. In the former Eastern Bloc, for 
example, numerous studies have been undertaken, such as the (still ongoing) Bucharest 
Early Intervention Project (Carlson & Earls 1997, pp. 419-24, MacLean 2003, p. 857, 
Zeanah et al. 2003, Smyke et al. 2007).  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 9, the past few decades have also seen increased 
academic research into the effects of institutionalisation on children in some countries 
of the Global South. Interestingly, when compared with the main thrust of research on 
institutions in the relatively more industrially-advanced countries of the Global North, 
some of this research points to the benefits of institutions in some settings as well as to 
their negative impacts on children. Research by Wolff et al. (1998) into Ethiopian 
orphanages, for example, found evidence that orphanages can play useful roles in 
protecting children in war-torn countries (p. 1319). Whetton et al. (2009) found 
evidence that children in institutions in India, Cambodia, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya 
were not disadvantaged in terms of cognitive functioning and emotional, behavioural 
and physical health when compared with children who were raised in family settings 
(pp. 1-10). 
 
Beyond examining the effects of institutionalisation, recent scholarly publications 
relating to children’s institutions in the former Eastern Bloc and in the Global South 
have taken several other directions. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, these directions 
include work by Bilson et al. (2003) and Bilson and Larkins (2013, pp. 1566-75) on so-
called ‘gatekeeping’ measures to help prevent, or reduce, the incidence of placement of 
children in institutions, and by Cantwell and Holzscheiter (2008), who explored legal 
concepts relating to children without parental care in institutions and other settings as 
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contained in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international and 
regional legal instruments. Mulheir et al. (2007) examined how policy makers, 
practitioners and others can change institutional care into systems based on family and 
community support.  
 
For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, a field of inquiry that is yet to develop as strongly 
relates to government policymaking on the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in the Global South. Policymaking literature has, to date, focused mainly on 
the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions and institutions for adults in the 
Global North and, to a lesser extent, in the former Eastern Bloc. Within that literature, 
opinion is divided as to the key drivers of the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in countries such as the US. Some scholars support the view that the closure 
of institutions from the 1950s was primarily a response to studies about the adverse 
effects of institutionalisation on children. Others contend, however, that rising financial 
costs for governments played a far greater role in deinstitutionalisation policy decisions 
than has previously been acknowledged.    
 
By way of contrast, and as discussed in Chapter 2, relatively little effort has been made 
to date to research policymaking on the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions 
in the Global South. Some recent scholarly publications discuss why it is important for 
governments to adopt national deinstitutionalisation policies and suggest what these 
policies should contain (Cantwell et al. 2012). Yet, they generally fail to offer insights 
into why and how countries that have adopted deinstitutionalisation policies actually did 
so. Such a shortcoming in scholarly research is especially curious given that, as noted 
above, criticisms over the pace of deinstitutionalisation policymaking in countries of the 
Global South have been so much at the heart of commentary by the UN and some 
INGOs over the past few decades.  
 
1.2 Purpose and central argument 
The dearth of research into deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Global South is 
the point of departure for this dissertation. In response, at its broadest level, the overall 
purpose of this thesis is to contribute to understandings about factors that lead 
governments in the Global South to adopt—or not adopt—policies to deinstitutionalise 
children’s institutions.  
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Specifically, by using an approach to understanding policymaking through the analysis 
of the discourses—or meanings, beliefs and values—held by actors involved with these 
activities, this study sheds light on deinstitutionalisation policymaking in a country of 
the Global South, namely, Indonesia. It asks: What factors led the Indonesian 
Government to adopt a policy during the 2000s to reduce reliance on a type of 
children’s institution known as panti asuhan? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Indonesia was selected for analysis principally because it 
recently signalled a shift in policy from that of providing financial and other support to 
institutions for orphaned, neglected or abandoned children known as panti asuhan to 
one that aims to strengthen the capacities of impoverished families to keep their 
children rather than relinquish them to institutions. Indonesia also appears to be of 
significance in global terms given estimates, discussed in further detail in Chapter 8, 
that there are between 170,000 children (using Indonesian Government figures) and 
over 500,000 children (using Save the Children figures) in thousands of panti asuhan 
(Save the Children UK et al. 2006, pp. 6-10, Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 18-
21, Government of Indonesia 2013b). If one were to draw on claims by Save the 
Children (2003) and UNICEF (2009), noted earlier in this chapter, that there may be 
between two and eight million children living in institutions worldwide, then Indonesia 
alone could possibly account for between six and eight per cent of all children in 
institutions around the world. 
 
Commencing around 2007, the Indonesian Government began to announce policy 
measures that aimed to reduce the number of children living in panti asuhan in favour 
of family or community-based care for such children. According to the Indonesian 
Government (2011, p. 5), the new policy aimed to make panti asuhan ‘the last resort in 
the continuum of alternative care methods’. Indonesia’s policy shift has been publicly 
depicted by both the Indonesian Government and Save the Children as a rare instance of 
deinstitutionalisation policy change in the Global South based on the importance of 
complying with international children’s rights standards about the best interests of 
children.  
 
This thesis argues that the prevailing explanation for Indonesia’s policy change on panti 
asuhan as aligning Indonesia with its obligations under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child represents only a partially accurate picture. In reality, political, 
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economic, cultural, and religious discourses—rather than concerns about children’s 
rights and wellbeing only—predominated in shaping government policy. The new 
policy represented a compromise under which panti asuhan would be allowed to 
continue to play a central, if somewhat changed, role while appearing to show 
internationally that Indonesia was complying with its children’s rights obligations. 
Rather than being designed only to benefit children, the final policy sought to appease 
both pro-reform and pro-panti asuhan audiences.  
 
By employing a discourse analysis approach advanced by Hajer (1995, 2005, 2006) as 
the primary research methodology and elite-interviewing techniques, I argue that 
coalitions of policy actors who held pro-reform or pro-orphanage ‘status quo’ story 
lines vied to shape the new policy on panti asuhan in a three-step sequence 
commencing in the late 1990s. First, from the late 1990s, a pro-reform group (or 
‘discourse-coalition’) of policy actors mobilised to initiate the process of policy change. 
The 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were among key 
events that focused the energies of this group. I show that lobbying efforts by Save the 
Children and UNICEF placed pressure on government to respond to children’s rights 
concerns while, at around the same time, key government decision-makers, acting from 
different motivations, increasingly regarded panti asuhan as being inconsistent with 
Indonesia’s rapidly changing social, economic and administrative policy directions and 
as too costly for government to continue subsidising. Second, around the mid-2000s, a 
‘status quo’ discourse-coalition comprising supporters of panti asuhan, especially the 
large socio-religious group Muhammadiyah, responded by voicing its opposition to 
proposed change. Finally, the Indonesian Government’s wish to realign panti asuhan 
policy with changing national economic, social and administrative policy directions, and 
reduce the cost of subsidising panti asuhan while avoiding conflict with pro-panti 
asuhan interests generated the final policy outcome that amalgamated both the 
deinstitutionalisation and status quo positions.  
 
The final policy represented a compromise under which panti asuhan would be allowed 
to continue to play a central, if somewhat changed, role while appearing to show—as 
per the dominant public version of events, noted above—that Indonesia had complied 
with its international children’s rights obligations. Rather than being designed only to 
benefit children, as publicly portrayed, the new policy represented an attempt to appease 
both pro-reform and status quo audiences. The origins of the new policy—as found in a 
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mixture of international pressure on Indonesia over children’s rights, domestic 
budgetary concerns, a growing gap between old policy that supported panti asuhan and 
new political, economic and social policies after the fall of President Suharto, and the 
countervailing influence of politically powerful pro-panti asuhan actors—explains why 
the Indonesian Government presented the new policy to the international community as 
a milestone in Indonesia’s observance of its international children’s rights obligations 
while, domestically, it adopted a more cautious, gradualist approach to 
deinstitutionalisation that helped to assuage key pro-panti asuhan concerns.   
  
These findings provide new understandings for literatures on deinstitutionalisation, 
public policy, as well as Indonesian policymaking on panti asuhan. In terms of 
implications for policy change advocates, such as INGOs and UN agencies, I suggest 
that efforts to achieve policy change regarding the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in the Global South may be more effective if pursued on the basis of more 
detailed understandings about times when policy change is more likely to occur, that is, 
at critical moments of political, economic or social change and when arguments for 
deinstitutionalisation are also viewed by governments as helping to address other 
national problems not necessarily related to children’s issues. In that regard, I contend 
that Hajer’s discourse analysis methodology provides a particularly useful mechanism 
to gain such understandings. Future empirical studies of deinstitutionalisation 
policymaking in other countries would be useful in terms of investigating and refining 
these contentions. 
 
1.3 Structure 
The argument is developed in three Parts. In Part I, after introducing the study, I review 
research literatures about deinstitutionalisation policymaking. I find a particular 
limitation in the literature relating to the Global South and only limited guidance on 
ways to analyse deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the literature about the Global 
North and the former Eastern Bloc. To help overcome these shortcomings, Chapter 3 
discusses how interpretive policy analysis can be applied to gain deeper understandings 
about deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Global South. In particular, I adopt 
Hajer’s discourse-coalition framework as the primary research methodology. I also set 
out the rationale for selecting Indonesia to understand the dynamics of 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking.  
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Part II, ‘Policy meanings: scene-setting and story lines in Indonesia’, commences the in-
depth study of the Indonesia case by presenting, in Chapter 4, scene-setting information 
about panti asuhan and the current standard panti asuhan policy-change narrative or 
story derived from public source materials. Chapter 5 outlines how field and desk 
research was conducted and introduces the various meanings attributed to the policy 
shift by players ranging from policymakers to policy change advocates, from academics 
to journalists, and from politicians to those running panti asuhan. These meanings are 
grouped into the two principal story lines about policy change. Chapters 6 to 8 present 
and analyse the first story line, the ‘pro-reform’ story line, and its three main constituent 
narratives. Chapter 9 presents and analyses the ‘status quo’ story line and its two main 
narratives.  
 
Part III, ‘Making policy, conclusions and implications’, commences (Chapter 10) with a 
discussion about how the two main story lines mobilised the activities of two distinct 
‘discourse-coalitions’ that vied to shape new panti asuhan policy in three phases 
between 1999 and 2009. Chapter 11 considers the study’s principal research question in 
light of case study findings. As well as suggesting practical lessons for policymakers 
and policy change advocates, it draws together implications for literatures on 
deinstitutionalisation, interpretive policy studies, and Indonesian social policy. The 
Epilogue briefly describes progress that has been made to date in implementing the new 
policy direction on panti asuhan. 
 
  
22 
Chapter 2:  Literature review 
 
Overview 
This chapter sets the scene for the dissertation by critically examining research 
literatures about the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions. It starts by exploring 
recent research into various aspects of deinstitutionalisation with particular reference to 
countries in the former Eastern Bloc and in the Global South. With most 
deinstitutionalisation studies deriving from the fields of social work, childhood 
development and medicine, it finds comparatively little research into the processes of 
policymaking in relation to the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in the 
Global South.  
 
Faced with these shortcomings, I look to earlier literature concerning 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking in countries such as the US and UK. That literature 
offers potentially useful insights into apparent linkages between the factors that drive 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking and the effectiveness of subsequent policy 
implementation efforts. I argue that the deinstitutionalisation literature has been limited, 
however, by the absence of appropriate analytical techniques through which deeper 
understandings can be gained about the dynamics of policymaking. A fundamental 
research task, then, is to better understand how and why policymaking about the 
deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions occurs, particularly in countries of the 
Global South. This conclusion sets the context for the use of discourse analysis as the 
principal methodology for this dissertation and the specification of the principal 
research question in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1 Definitions 
By way of preface, some key terms need to the defined. In accordance with the UN’s 
Guidelines for the alternative care of children (2010, p. 6), the term ‘children without 
parental care’ is taken to mean ‘all children not in the overnight care of at least one of 
their parents, for whatever reason and under whatever circumstances’. Also, it adopts 
UNICEF’s (2014, p. 10) definition of an orphan as a child ‘whose only parent or both 
parents are dead or missing’.  
 
Academic, UN and INGO literatures concerning children without parental care often 
use the terms ‘orphanages’, ‘children’s institutions’ and ‘residential care’ 
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interchangeably. The UN Guidelines for the alternative care of children (2010, p. 6) 
defined ‘residential care’ as: 
 
…care provided in any non-family-based group setting, such as places of safety 
for emergency care, transit centres in emergency situations, and all other short-
and long-term residential care facilities, including group homes.  
 
This dissertation avoids using the term ‘residential care’ because, as the research 
literature discussed in this chapter indicates, the sorts of ‘care’ provided to children in 
institutions is ambiguous and the provision of ‘care’ in the sense of tending the welfare 
of children cannot be assumed in all cases. Instead, the term ‘children’s institution’ is 
used in this dissertation, after Mulheir et al. (2007, p. 13), to mean: 
 
…residential care without a parent or guardian for longer than three months 
catering for large numbers of children of 25 or more, or small numbers of 
children between 11 and 24 in a building often referred to as a ‘children’s 
home’.  
 
‘Deinstitutionalisation’ is also defined in this study, after Mulheir et al. (2007, p. 36), as 
‘the process of moving away from a child care system based on large institutions 
towards a range of integrated family-based and community-based services’ by seeking 
to prevent unnecessary admissions and stays in institutions, developing alternative 
community child care, strengthening services to children and families, and arranging 
long-term placements in surrogate families for children who are unable to live with their 
parents. Finally, public policy is defined, following Lowi and Ginsburg (1996, p. 607), 
as ‘an officially expressed intention backed by a sanction, which can be a reward or a 
punishment’.  
 
2.2 Deinstitutionalisation: the former Eastern Bloc and the Global South 
At its broadest level, recent scholarly literature relating to children’s institutions in the 
former Eastern Bloc and in the Global South has tended to focus on the impacts of 
childhood institutionalisation and on what I term ‘system improvement measures’, 
including deinstitutionalisation policies and practices. This section focuses on the latter, 
drawing particular attention to the comparatively less-developed literature about 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Global South. 
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Because of its relevance to later discussion about Indonesia (see Chapters 4 and 9), I 
note in passing an extensive literature concerning the effects of institutionalisation on 
childhood health and wellbeing in the former Eastern Bloc and, to a lesser extent, the 
Global South. This literature arises mainly from the disciplines of psychology, 
psychiatry and general medicine. In relation to the former Eastern Bloc, one of the most 
high-profile studies to date has been the Bucharest Early Intervention Project, a 
randomised controlled trial of foster care for children who, around the time of birth, 
were placed in one of six Bucharest orphanages (Rutter & English and Romanian 
adoptees study team 1998, pp. 465-76, Zeanah et al. 2003, pp. 885-907, Zeanah et al. 
2005, Smyke et al. 2007, pp. 210-18, Dozier et al. 2012, pp. 1-25). The study found that 
previously-institutionalised children placed in foster care fared better particularly in 
cognitive and social-emotional development when compared with children who 
remained in orphanages and that the earlier a child was placed in foster care (ideally 
before two years of age) the better the chance of recovery from the developmental 
delays associated with institutionalisation (Nelson et al. 2007, pp. 1937-40). As 
discussed in Chapter 9, a research literature has also been developing over the past 
decade or two about the effects of institutionalisation on the health and welfare of 
children in some countries of the Global South; interestingly, some of this literature has 
suggested that there is a mixed picture in terms of the pros and cons of institutional care 
on childhood wellbeing.   
 
Of particular relevance to this dissertation, the ‘system improvement measures’ 
pertaining to children’s institutions in the former Eastern Bloc and in the Global South 
can be categorised into studies that concentrate on practices relating to children’s 
institutions, such as how institutions can be made more responsive to the needs of 
children, and studies that focus on deinstitutionalisation policies and on policymaking. 
The remainder of this section considers these literatures, with particular reference to 
policymaking studies.  
 
Children’s institutions practice literatures. One of the most significant components of 
the practice improvement literature concerns ‘gatekeeping’, or screening, referral and 
other processes that aim to reduce the number of children who are placed in institutions. 
Writing from a social work perspective, Bilson et al. (2003, p. 31) argued that the 
success of gatekeeping practices in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth 
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of Independent States depended on societal attitudes toward parenting and children, as 
well as having adequately resourced support services, thus: 
 
Gatekeeping requires major changes not only in decision-making systems and 
services, but also in the underlying attitudes and beliefs about children and the 
role of parenting. That is, reforms are unlikely to be effective without a shift 
away from the paradigms of rescue, state paternalism, ethnic discrimination, and 
the deficit model of disability. Such a change will require staff, managers and 
policymakers to reconsider the value they place on children, their rights and the 
importance of parents and families in the upbringing of children. 
 
While the authors emphasised the need for supportive attitudes on the part of 
policymakers and society at large, they stopped short of inquiring into how and why 
gatekeeping policies and practices had been introduced in the first instance. Instead, 
they appeared to assume that policymakers would recognise the importance of 
deinstitutionalisation and act accordingly. Similarly, Bilson et al. (2007) referred to the 
Sri Lankan Government’s decision to reduce the prevalence of institutional care, but did 
not examine why that government had taken such a policy decision (p. 42). More 
recently, this tendency is seen in the study concerning Bulgaria by Bilson et al. (2013) 
in which the authors noted changes to gatekeeping processes, but did not examine why 
or how these new practices were adopted as part of a broader government 
deinstitutionalisation policy (pp. 1566-75).  
 
The ‘practice improvement’ literature also contains a growing number of studies that 
suggest how deinstitutionalisation can work in practice at individual country levels. For 
example, Ansah-Koi (2006) considered ways in which foster and community-based care 
could be strengthened as an alternative to placing children in orphanages in Ghana (pp. 
555-64). Muguwe et al. (2011) examined efforts to reintegrate children from nine 
children’s homes into family-based care in Zimbabwe (pp. 142-49). They identified 
numerous barriers to the successful reintegration of children into their families, in 
particular, the lack of adequate government funding. In relation to Uganda, Walakira et 
al. (2014) suggested a model of care in family-based or community settings as an 
alternative for the care of abandoned children in orphanages (pp. 144-50). They stressed 
the importance of establishing programs aimed at tracing the child’s birth family, 
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carefully arranging for the child to be reunited with their family, and establishing 
adequate post-resettlement family support arrangements.  
 
Finally, recent practice improvement literature has addressed ways of making 
institutions more responsive to the needs of children. The St. Petersburg-USA 
Orphanage Research Team (2008), for example, pointed to how enhanced quality of 
care-giving within institutions had led to improvements in children’s physical growth 
and a range of social-emotional-relationship behaviours (pp. vii-viii). Working on the 
assumption that many countries were unlikely to have the resources to undertake 
deinstitutionalisation on any significant scale, Groark and McCall (2011) examined how 
to improve children’s developmental outcomes within institutions, including through 
improvements to caregiver-child interactions. Groark et al. (2009) studied the Ukraine 
to develop qualitative and quantitative indicators for use by policy makers and others to 
assess a country’s progress in efforts to reform children’s institutions (p. 27). McCall 
(2013) argued that, as care-giver-child interactions were a major predictor of outcomes 
for children in institutions, greater attention should be paid to improving conditions for 
children within institutions, especially in poorer countries where there was no realistic 
short-term possibility of deinstitutionalisation (p. 193).  
 
Literatures on deinstitutionalisation policymaking. Another strand of recent literature 
about children’s institutions in countries of the former Eastern Bloc and in the Global 
South relates to policymaking on deinstitutionalisation. This literature has tended to fall 
into one of two categories: works that offer guidance about the matters that ought to be 
included in deinstitutionalisation policies, and a relatively smaller set of studies about 
how and why deinstitutionalisation policymaking occurs. 
 
In relation to the former, a literature has developed over the past few decades that 
proffers advice on key elements for inclusion in national deinstitutionalisation policies. 
This material originates mainly from the disciplines of social work and psychology. 
Cantwell et al. (2012), for example, provided guidance to policymakers, service 
deliverers and others on the application of the 2009 UN Guidelines on for the 
alternative care of children. Mulheir et al. (2007) presented a ‘guide to good practice’ 
for deinstitutionalising children’s services in which they discussed the key features that 
ought to be included in national policies, such as development of a strategic plan and 
adequate staff training. Their key recommendation was that an analysis should be 
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undertaken of a country’s institutional system to determine matters such as the number 
of institutions and the state of existing family support services that could be used to 
provide greater help to families and children without recourse to institutionalisation 
(Mulheir et al. 2007, pp. 55-58).  
 
By way of contrast to the depth of literature about practice improvement and on ‘ideal’ 
elements for inclusion in deinstitutionalisation policies, however, only relatively few 
studies to date have attempted to analyse why governments in the former Eastern Bloc 
and in the Global South have adopted policies to deinstitutionalise children’s 
institutions.  
 
To start with the former Eastern Bloc, only a handful of studies have attempted to 
explain why countries have adopted policies to close children’s institutions. Tobis’ 
(2000) study for the World Bank on Albania, Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania 
found that numerous political, social, cultural and economic factors impeded policy 
change, such as pressure exerted by orphanage operators on governments to retain 
institutions, the lack of social welfare infrastructure, government financial incentives 
that encouraged the perpetuation of institutional care, and widespread public support for 
the continuation of institutions (pp. 12-16). Despite these barriers, some progress on 
deinstitutionalisation was made in these countries in the 1990s largely in response to 
changing social attitudes about the importance of family as the best place to raise 
children, growing recognition amongst officials about harms caused to children in 
institutions, and increasing financial costs to governments of supporting institutions. As 
Tobis (2000, p. 30) noted:  
 
They [policymakers] increasingly see residential care as a last resort, an 
orientation that began to develop before the end of the socialist era. The 
concerns raised by senior policymakers, however, often focus on the high cost of 
residential care. The importance of quality care, high standards, and the harm to 
clients caused by residential care are still secondary concerns.  
 
Another early attempt to analyse reasons for changing government policy towards 
children’s institutions in the former Eastern Bloc was made by Lataianu (2003) who 
contended that Romania’s decision to undertake major reforms to the child protection 
system in the late 1990s—moving from one favouring institutions to one that aimed to 
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use institutions as a last resort—was driven primarily by government concerns about the 
rising cost of supporting these institutions and the importance of demonstrating 
compliance with European Union human rights obligations as a condition for ongoing 
European Union membership (pp. 107-19). Without an explicit analytical framework, 
Lataianu stopped short of indicating whether other factors might have played a role in 
the Romanian government’s change of policy, such as lobbying by domestic children’s 
rights groups or INGOs in a changing post-Cold War domestic political setting or the 
impact of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on government thinking. 
Moreover, her claim that rising cost was a major driver of government concern over 
children’s institutions was left unsupported by evidence, such as interview or other data.     
 
A more thorough attempt to understand the dynamics of deinstitutionalisation 
policymaking in Romania in the 1990s was made by Jacoby et al. (2009) who traced the 
pressures exerted on Romania by the European Union to adopt European Union-wide 
child protection rules and standards, as well as changes to Romania’s internal political 
environment that made it more possible than in the past for Romania to adopt 
deinstitutionalisation policies (pp. 111-33). For these authors, the Romanian 
Government largely ignored its obligations to the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child until increased pressure was brought to bear by the European Union on human 
rights issues in general. They claimed that pressure from the European Union shifted the 
Romanian Government’s policy on orphanages because it coincided with the rise of 
politicians who, after the 1996 Romanian national elections, took decisions on a range 
of policy issues, including child protection, in order to ensure Romania’s speedy 
integration into the European Union. Speaking to a broader scholarly debate about how 
international ‘norms’ (such as human rights) are diffused at individual country levels, 
Jacoby et al. (2009, p. 130) concluded: 
 
…external actors need long attention spans in order to help their domestic 
partners defend policy innovations opposed by domestic or international 
foes…Domestic actors are required who can ‘pull in’ innovations from outside 
and work to adapt them to local conditions…Success here came in slow motion 
and by a process of insider-outsider linkages that are easy to miss in stylized 
inquiries about whether ‘external or internal dimensions are the real causes’. 
(italics in original).   
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While this research advanced understandings about deinstitutionalisation policymaking 
in the former Eastern Bloc, it was largely descriptive in nature and did not employ 
analytical methods that might have provided deeper understandings about the reasons 
decisions were made. Thus, Jacoby et al. (2009) offered no way of verifying their 
assertions that the Romanian government had little interest in child protection except 
when failure to deinstitutionalise possibly meant compromising Romania’s compliance 
with European Union human rights standards. As with Lataianu (2003), cited above, 
they did not, for example, question whether other factors might have been at play in 
government decision-making. 
 
Another attempt to understand the factors at play in deinstitutionalisation policymaking 
in the former Eastern Bloc was made by Lough and Panos (2003), who compared the 
factors leading to the deinstitutionalisation of orphanages in the US with the Ukraine. 
They observed how domestic political and economic, as well as international, forces 
influenced policymakers to alter policy direction during the 1990s. They pointed not 
only to the influence of US anti-orphanage thinking, but also to overcrowding in 
orphanages, improvements to social work practices and, reflecting a reversal of 
Communist collectivist ideology that had driven the growth of institutions from the 
1920s, declining government funding for orphanages (Lough & Panos 2003, pp. 53-62).  
 
As with the other studies cited above relating to former Eastern Bloc countries, 
however, this study contained deficiencies in terms of analytical rigour. For example, 
the authors asserted that the prospects for successful deinstitutionalisation policymaking 
had increased because of strengthened public attitudes against childhood 
institutionalisation, and because pressure exerted by the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child had shifted official attitudes from being strongly pro-orphanage to one that 
opposed such institutions. Neither of these general claims were, however, supported by 
evidence showing how changed public attitudes or recommendations by the UN led to 
changed government policy thinking. 
 
More recently, Ivanova and Bogdanov (2013) examined the role of the European Union 
in the development of Bulgaria’s deinstitutionalisation policies. As with others cited 
above, they claimed that government deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the 2000s 
was largely influenced by European Union policies on child protection. They also 
asserted that government policy reforms were hastened in response to public concerns 
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within Bulgaria about appalling conditions for children with disabilities living in one of 
the country’s orphanages. The authors proceeded to list the key elements of the 
Bulgarian government’s deinstitutionalisation plan (Ivanova & Bogdanov 2013, pp. 
205-10). While providing some useful descriptive materials this study failed, however, 
to shed light on how new government policy was shaped by these pressures. Thus, we 
are presented with a description of the new policy, generalised statements about the 
factors that might have led to policy reform, and conjecture, without supporting 
evidence, about the linkages between these two occurrences. A similar lack of analysis 
and detail can also be seen in Greenberg et al.’s (2014) description of 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Republic of Georgia, which cited factors such 
as the government’s heightened political will and support by international donors, but 
failed to assess how, and in what ways, these factors influenced policy design and 
implementation (pp. 185-91).          
 
If significant limitations are noted in the literature about deinstitutionalisation 
policymaking in former Eastern Bloc countries, there is even less scholarship about 
policymaking in relation to the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in the 
Global South. As noted above and in Chapter 1, there is a large body of scholarly and 
non-peer reviewed literature concerning the need for deinstitutionalisation in terms of 
children’s development, on ways to accomplish deinstitutionalisation, and on elements 
to include in national deinstitutionalisation policies. Yet, specifically in relation to the 
Global South, neither the scholarly nor non-peer reviewed literature sheds light on how 
such policies are devised, or why and how countries that adopted such policies actually 
did so.  
 
A study by Frimpong-Manso (2014) of Ghanaian deinstitutionalisation policymaking on 
children’s institutions in the 2000s is a case in point (pp. 402-09). Noting the limited 
international literature on deinstitutionalisation policymaking and policy 
implementation strategies, the author concluded that Ghana had failed to develop an 
effective deinstitutionalisation policy in terms of meeting targets for establishing family 
support services and reducing the number of children entering orphanages due mainly to 
lack of funds and human resources and unrealistic expectations about the pace of reform 
(Frimpong-Manso 2014, pp. 403-07). While acknowledging the dearth of literature that 
might assist in analysing deinstitutionalisation policymaking, Frimpong-Manso did not 
seek explanations for the alleged failure of Ghana’s deinstitutionalisation policy. By 
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asking how the policy was established, for example, the author might have shed light on 
constraints and challenges faced by policymakers that influenced how effectively the 
policy was implemented.       
 
For the sake of comprehensiveness, I also note that the limited amount of scholarly 
focus on factors at play in deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Global South is 
also reflected in recent INGO literature. Numerous INGO-funded publications 
(sometimes co-authored with academics) on deinstitutionalisation in former Eastern 
Bloc countries and in the Global South advocate deinstitutionalisation, promote 
instances of progress toward deinstitutionalisation and recommend ways that 
governments undertake deinstitutionalisation programs. It has become commonplace for 
the INGO-funded literature to claim that children suffer a range of adverse effects due 
to institutionalisation and that institutionalisation can be prevented, or at least 
ameliorated by national governments. This literature often contains recommendations 
directed at governments in the Global South to adopt deinstitutionalisation policies and 
to establish programs to better support families and thus (they claim) reduce the 
likelihood of children being relinquished to institutions (Carter 2005, Save the Children 
in Sri Lanka 2005, Save the Children UK et al. 2007, Better Care Network 2009, Better 
Care Network et al. 2009, Browne 2009, Oswald & Forbes 2009, Save the Children UK 
2009, Save the Children 2012, Rosenthal & Ahern 2013, pp. 193-200).  
 
As already noted in Chapter 1, another common feature of the INGO 
deinstitutionalisation literature has been its call for national governments to display 
‘political will’ by embracing deinstitutionalisation policies. The top priority in the five-
point deinstitutionalisation formula advanced by EveryChild (2011, p. 5), for example, 
was for governments to ‘increase political will for change, using strategies such as 
encouraging public support for deinstitutionalisation, demonstrating the effectiveness of 
alternative forms of care, and external pressures from donors’. On rare occasions when 
the INGO literature offers explanations for deinstitutionalisation policy change, it has 
tended to take highly generalised forms. Save the Children, UNICEF and the Better 
Care Network (2009) suggested, for example, that pressure by the European Union was 
a key driver of Romania’s policy change, but did not explore how and in what ways that 
pressure had influenced change and what, if any, other factors might have been at play 
in the policy change process (p. 20) . 
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In sum, therefore, the scholarly and non-peer reviewed literature regarding the former 
Eastern Bloc and the Global South has, to date, focused almost exclusively on what 
ought to be included in deinstitutionalisation policies and practices and on how to 
improve the situation for children living in institutions. With the exception of a handful 
of descriptively-oriented studies about the former Eastern Bloc, there has been a notable 
lack of detailed investigation into how and why deinstitutionalisation policies are 
adopted by governments in the Global South. This appears to be the case because the 
research literature has derived largely from the disciplines of social work, childhood 
development and medicine rather than also from the fields of political science or policy 
studies. Similarly, the recent non-peer reviewed literature on deinstitutionalising 
children’s institutions has derived predominantly from non-government organisations, 
whose broad mission is to advocate for change in the situation for children in countries 
of the former Eastern Bloc and the Global South. The gap, particularly in the research 
literature with respect to deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the former Eastern Bloc 
and in the Global South, seems particularly curious given that, as noted in Chapter 1, 
criticisms over the pace of deinstitutionalisation policymaking in countries of the Global 
South have been so much at the heart of commentary by the UN and some INGOs over 
the past couple of decades. As discussed further below, this shortcoming provides the 
starting point for this thesis.  
 
2.3 Deinstitutionalisation: the Global North 
If a challenge for research is to deepen understandings about the dynamics of 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking particularly in countries of the Global South, where 
should we turn for guidance, particularly about analytical methods? A starting point is 
the literature concerning the first attempts by governments to alter policy directions on 
the institutionalisation of adults and children, that is, in countries of the Global North 
during the mid-to-late twentieth century. Specifically, this section considers how 
scholars have sought to understand the dynamics of deinstitutionalisation policymaking 
in relation to institutions for adults and for children in countries such as the UK and US. 
 
2.3.1 The closure of institutions for adults. Over the past few decades, an extensive 
literature has developed about the factors that led governments, particularly in North 
America and Europe, to adopt policies to close large-scale institutions for adults, such 
as mental hospitals, asylums and nursing homes. At the broadest level, two main 
explanations have been advanced for deinstitutionalisation decisions. The first school of 
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thought—what I term the ‘health and welfare’ school—has argued that 
deinstitutionalisation decisions flowed primarily from scientific evidence that 
institutionalisation had a wide range of detrimental health and other effects. Weiner 
(1992, pp. 725-27), LaJeunesse (2002) and Niles (2013), for example, traced the 
influence of so-called ‘moral therapy’ theories espoused in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries by French physician Pinel and English mental health advocate 
Tuke under which inmates in institutions were offered varying forms of rehabilitation, 
such as exercise and improved living conditions, in preference to traditional methods of 
incarceration which paid little or no regard to their treatment or rehabilitation.  
 
Research into the plight of people living in institutions was boosted in the 1960s with 
the publication of Asylums, a landmark study by American sociologist Goffman (1968). 
This study drew attention to the impacts that institutions had on those placed in them, 
including the erosion of inmates’ sense of individuality and their capacities to manage 
independently in the outside world. Goffman (1968) coined the term ‘total’ institutions 
to describe places, such as orphanages, prisons and monasteries, that were largely or 
completely sequestered from the outside world, and were inherently inward-looking and 
isolating for inmates and workers alike (p. 16). Also in the 1960s, revelations about 
poor standards of care for the elderly in the UK by sociologist Townsend (1962) offered 
a parallel to Goffman’s criticisms of institutions. In an apparent response to these 
critiques, by the 1970s, the principle of normalisation advanced by thinkers such as 
Nirje gained widespread acceptance amongst governments and health care 
professionals. This principle held that, rather than being placed in institutions, it was 
more beneficial, and in keeping with human rights standards, for people with disabilities 
to be placed in everyday community and family settings, ideally with strong supporting 
services to help ease and sustain the transition process (Dear & Wolch 1987b, pp. 14-
20, Chenoweth 2000, pp. 82-84).  
 
The second major school of thought about government deinstitutionalisation decisions 
in the Global North can be described as a ‘savings, profit and productivity’ approach. 
Scholars who advance this broad approach have contended that the need for 
governments and institution-owners to save costs and to maximise profits—and not 
humanitarian concern for the welfare of patients—were the primary drivers of 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the second half of the twentieth century. Much of 
this literature derived from analyses of the deinstitutionalisation of large-scale mental 
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and aged care facilities in the US. Scull, in particular, advanced the view that financial 
factors played a more important role in driving policy decisions to close US mental 
institutions than had been admitted by other academic studies of deinstitutionalisation 
(Scull, 1977, pp. 143-153). Contending that mental patients were seen by operators of 
institutions as ‘social junk’ and as ‘transactionable commodities, a source of income’, 
he argued that mental asylums were initially established as a cost-efficient response by 
capitalist entrepreneurs during the Industrial Revolution (Scull 1981, pp. 741-51). 
According to Scull (1981), increased costs of running large-scale institutions had, by the 
mid-twentieth century, forced institution owners to rethink their business operating 
model (pp. 744-47).  
 
The result, Scull (1977) contended, was a cheaper, and even more financially profitable, 
alternative that involved reassigning the mentally ill to small-scale government-
supported, but often privately-run, ‘community’ facilities, such as nursing homes and 
welfare hotels (pp. 41-94). Scull also argued that the rise of the welfare state and 
macroeconomic problems for governments during the second half of the twentieth 
century played a critical role in facilitating the demise of large-scale mental hospitals in 
the US. Changes to the US Federal Government’s health funding programs in the 1950s 
and 1960s meant that Federal funding was directed to patients not residing in State-
financed mental hospitals. In an apparent cost-shifting exercise, these new funding 
programs encouraged many States to close down large-scale mental hospitals that had 
traditionally been funded by State budgets. Particularly in the 1970s, US State 
governments were also attempting to cope with high rates of inflation and were keen to 
make cost savings. For Scull (1981), the net effect of these forces was ‘decarceration’ or 
the mass closure of mental institutions. Scull ruefully noted, however, that these new 
profit-driven arrangements did not lead to significant improvements in the welfare of 
former inmates of large-scale institutions (pp. 741-51).  
 
Other scholars have supported a ‘savings, profit and productivity’ explanation of 
government deinstitutionalisation policy change in the 1960s and 1970s in the US and 
UK. In the field of aged care, Estes and Harrington (1981) argued that it was incorrect 
to ascribe the mass closure of large-scale aged care facilities in the US in the 1960s to 
the application of the ‘health and welfare’ ideologies of normalisation, social role 
valorisation and human rights (p. 814). While agreeing that these ideologies played 
some role in policymaking, in line with Scull’s earlier work they argued that the closure 
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of large-scale institutions for the elderly was also heavily influenced by financial 
factors. Estes and Harrington (1981) claimed that, during the 1960s and 1970s, the cost 
of running large-scale facilities rose sharply due to inflation and restructured US Federal 
Government assistance payments to the elderly drove private sector entrepreneurs to 
open an increasing number of smaller-scale nursing and residential care homes, thus 
reducing further the number of large-scale aged care institutions (p. 814). 
 
In relation to the UK, Hudson (1991) argued that the government’s drive to 
deinstitutionalise mental health and disability institutions in the 1970s and 1980s in 
order to respond to shrinking public sector financial resources, particularly under the 
Thatcher Government, severely compromised the expected benefits of 
deinstitutionalisation in terms of providing improved welfare for formerly 
institutionalised people (p. 26). Characterising deinstitutionalisation as a new form of 
social control, Warren (1981, p. 726) asserted that people who had formerly been 
labeled as deviant and needing to be institutionally-segregated from society were re-
located or ‘transinstitutionalised’ from ‘state budgets to various combined welfare-
private profit systems that cost the state less and provided numerous entrepreneurial 
opportunities’.  
 
Of particular relevance to discussion later in this dissertation, some scholars have 
suggested that there is an association between the reasons governments embarked on 
deinstitutionalisation policies and the subsequent effectiveness of deinstitutionalisation 
programs. For Dear et al. (1987, pp. 17, 59-71), Scull (1977, 1981), Simmons (1990), 
and Niles (2013, pp. 54-83), the cost-saving imperative for governments that largely 
drove the closure of institutions in the US and Canada for people with disabilities and 
people with mental illness in the twentieth century was carried through by these 
governments in terms of inadequate provision of funds for services to care for former 
inmates in the post-institutional phase. Dear and Wolch (1987) observed that, due to 
inadequate government funding, many ex-inmates were forced into dilapidated and sub-
standard accommodation (pp. 71-189). Scull (1981, p. 748) was particularly scathing 
about the maltreatment of many people with mental illness in the US after the closure of 
large-scale institutions, contending that governmental imperatives to save money by 
closing large-scale institutions continued through to governmental failure to adequately 
fund community services and small-scale facilities, such as nursing homes, that could 
cater for former inmates, or: 
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The massive numbers discharged from or refused admission to the state 
hospitals have simply exceeded the capacity of the nursing home system to 
absorb more bodies, particularly since state and federal welfare programs have 
been simultaneously expanding the supply of other clients for their services, 
notably the elderly. In consequence, discharged mental patients may also be 
found in a variety of other, perhaps still less salubrious, settings. 
 
In relation to Canadian mental institutions, Simmons (1990) argued that the cost-saving 
imperative that primarily drove deinstitutionalisation policy also meant that funding for 
after-care planning and supports in the community was often either absent or inadequate 
(p. 160). In the same vein, after examining stories about the problems faced in the 
community by former inmates of institutions, Niles (2013, p. 80) argued that a closer 
examination of the causes of deinstitutionalisation in north America was needed 
because, therein, lay the seeds of the success or failure of the on-ground implementation 
of deinstitutionalisation policies: 
 
Understanding that institutionalization was initially based on the ideals of the 
medical model of disability can assist us in working to deconstruct the 
foundation this model was built on in order to promote a more holistic approach 
to caring for ex-patients in society. 
 
Close examination of both the ‘health and welfare’ and the ‘savings, profit and 
productivity’ arguments suggests, however, that neither of these explanations for 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking were based on detailed analyses of the 
policymaking process. That is, there has been a strong tendency for both explanations to 
focus on a few key factors, such as rising costs or advances in psychopharmacology, 
that were believed to have been largely responsible for government policy change rather 
than on seeking detailed understandings of how policymakers understood and responded 
to issues of concern about institutions.  
 
Only rarely have scholars sought to delve deeply within government decision-making 
processes in regard to deinstitutionalisation, for example, by analysing Congressional, 
parliamentary or committee proceedings, or by obtaining evidence from policymakers 
about the factors that influenced their policymaking deliberations. We see this tendency 
to assert reasons for policy shifts which often have a poor evidence base, for example, 
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in Gronfein’s (1985) examination of the role played by psychotropic drugs in reducing 
rates of institutionalisation of people in mental hospitals in the US in the 1950s. Rather 
than seeking evidence about how policymakers regarded the issue through means such 
as the records of parliamentary proceedings, he asserted without any supporting 
evidence only that ‘Policy makers believed the psychotropic drugs could potentially 
launch a new era in the treatment of mental illness’ (Gronfein 1985, p. 449). 
 
Warren’s (1981) account of the deinstitutionalisation of US mental hospitals contained a 
similar gap. She asserted that deinstitutionalisation policy was driven primarily by the 
need to ‘transfer “social junk” from state budgets to various combined welfare-private 
profit systems that cost the state less and provide numerous entrepreneurial 
opportunities’ (Warren 1981, p. 726). However, she failed to explain precisely how the 
policy was formed apart from the general assertion that it reflected ‘the ideology of 
deinstitutionalization [that], since the mid-1960s, has taken root in public policy 
directives’ (Warren 1981, p. 725). Hudson’s (1991) study of the deinstitutionalisation of 
places for people with intellectual disabilities in the UK in the 1970s went some way 
toward analysing the content of UK Government policy documents, but also fell short of 
providing detailed understandings about the factors that made policy emerge in the way 
it ultimately did (pp. 21-36).    
 
This way of conducting the debate over the drivers of deinstitutionalisation perhaps 
goes some way to explaining why the two main schools of interpretation of 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking remain relatively polarised. Perhaps if we were able 
to understand more about why and under what circumstances deinstitutionalisation 
policymaking occurred in particular contexts we might be able to find greater common 
ground in understandings of these processes. This point—about the importance of 
developing more detailed and comprehensive understandings about policymaking 
processes in regard to deinstitutionalisation—was also made by Novella (2008), an 
historian of psychiatry, who analysed accounts of the deinstitutionalisation of mental 
institutions. Novella (2008) argued that Scull’s claims were inconsistent with US 
economic and public policy history in several respects: first, deinstitutionalisation 
commenced decades before the economic crisis of the 1970s which Scull claimed was a 
major factor in government deinstitutionalisation decisions; second, alternatives to 
institutions included public-funded facilities and were not restricted only to those 
provided by private sector entrepreneurs; and third, no direct causal link could be 
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established between government fiscal reform programs and reforms to institutions (pp. 
303-14).  
 
For Novella, no previous explanations for deinstitutionalisation in the Global North 
satisfactorily explained what actually occurred. He asserted that ‘although we are 
dealing with processes which started more than five decades ago, the quest for accurate 
explanatory models seems far from having been completed’ (Novella 2008, p. 312). 
Taking particular issue with what he termed the ‘conventional psychiatric account’ of 
deinstitutionalisation (akin to the ‘health and welfare’ model noted above), he argued 
that deinstitutionalisation accounts failed to give adequate attention to broader social 
attitudes and values that underpinned the shift away from institutions and toward 
‘community care’ solutions.  
 
In the light of these apparent shortcomings, Novella argued that new approaches were 
required to understand policymaking processes with regard to deinstitutionalisation. 
What was needed were ‘methodological and conceptual strategies for a renewed 
theoretical understanding of these significant transformations’ (Novella 2008, p. 303). 
To achieve this goal, Novella suggested that further empirical studies of 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking be undertaken using multi-disciplinary approaches 
that would extend beyond the few disciplines that had customarily commented on 
deinstitutionalisation, such as health care, philosophy of medical practice and social 
history, and which should include reflection on the nature of social and cultural shifts 
that underpinned deinstitutionalisation decisions (Novella 2008, pp. 311-13). Novella 
did not, however, proceed further (as this dissertation does) in terms of undertaking 
empirical studies of deinstitutionalisation using methodologies from disciplines other 
than those which have usually discussed deinstitutionalisation. 
 
2.3.2 The closure of institutions for children. There is an extensive literature 
concerning the reasons for the closure of children’s institutions in countries such as the 
US, UK, Canada, Ireland and Australia during the second half of the twentieth century. 
At its broadest level, there appears to be agreement that deinstitutionalisation decisions 
were driven by four main factors, namely, increased public and professional concern 
about the psychological and other adverse impacts of institutionalisation on children, the 
introduction of government welfare policies under which parents, especially single 
parents, gained new or additional access to social welfare support, increased use of 
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foster care as an alternative to institutionalisation, and a growing regard for the rights of 
children (Lough & Panos 2003, p. 54). Reflecting the view that changes to social 
security thinking influenced US policies toward children’s institutions, for example, 
Gula (1973, p. 14) wrote: 
 
…in the 1930s, social security legislation established financial aid to families 
with dependent children, child-welfare services, and public adoption and foster-
family care as alternatives to orphanage care for neglected and dependent 
children. The alternatives worked. Orphanages emptied half their beds in the 
next few decades.  
 
Wilson et al. and Hendrick argued that the introduction of the UK’s 1948 Children Act, 
with its emphasises on foster, rather than institutional, care for children was driven 
largely by a contemporary understanding or construction of childhood under which 
children were viewed increasingly as citizens in a welfare democracy as well as family 
members (Wilson & Petrie 1998, p. 184, Hendrick 2005, pp. 34-62). For Wilson et al. 
(1998, p. 184): 
 
Such a construction can be seen as emerging both from the experiences of 
wartime Britain, and also from developments in psychological thinking which 
had started in the interwar years and gained great impetus from the thousands of 
children, both British and from overseas, who were uprooted from their families 
during the war. The experiences of evacuated children provided ample 
confirmation of the harmful effects of separation from family and in particular 
mother or mother figure. 
 
These authors contended that policymakers were influenced by medical studies that 
claimed to have demonstrated a wide range of negative psychological and other 
consequences for a child separated from its family, in particular, a child’s mother figure. 
Such studies began to appear in the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1930s, for 
example, Skeels and Dye (1939) advanced evidence of the significant negative impact 
of institutions on child mental development (pp. 114-36). In the 1940s, American 
psychiatrist Goldfarb (1945, p. 18) claimed that ‘there is cumulative evidence that an 
extensive period of deprivation of babies in an infant institution is profoundly 
detrimental to their psychological growth’.  
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In the early 1950s, studies by British psychologist and psychoanalyst Bowlby generated 
major public attention by pointing to evidence of adverse long-term emotional and other 
effects caused by ‘maternal deprivation’ experienced by young children (Bowlby 1952, 
1982, Hodges & Tizard 1989, Wilson & Petrie 1998). Other investigations of the 
situation for children in institutions published around this time included Maas and 
Engler’s Children in need of parents (1959), which revealed similar stories about the 
adverse effects of institutionalisation on children. While not specifically addressing the 
situation of children in institutions, the publication in 1962 of work by American 
paediatrician Kempe and his colleagues on child physical abuse, or the ‘battered-child 
syndrome’, added fuel to public and political concern about the treatment of children in 
general (Kempe et al. 1962, Smith 1975).  
    
Other scholars, however, have sought even more nuanced explanations for the closure 
of children’s institutions in many countries of the Global North during the twentieth 
century. While not disagreeing that deinstitutionalisation policy decisions taken by 
governments and private operators, such as church groups, were heavily influenced by 
child welfare concerns, Jones claimed that the rising costs of orphanages in the US 
played a far greater role than had previously been acknowledged (Jones 1989, pp. 613-
29, 1993, pp. 459-80). Contrary to conventional wisdom that institutions were closed 
due to child welfare concerns and the growing acceptance of evidence about the 
detrimental effects of institutionalisation on children, he argued that the steady 
dismantling of American orphanages from the 1940s flowed mainly from the rising 
financial burden on government and orphanage operators of running these places.  
 
According to Jones (1993), the 1935 US Social Security Act reduced the capacity of 
orphanages to attract private charitable giving, thereby compromising their ability to 
fund infrastructure renewal at a time when it was most needed after having coped with 
extra demands caused by the Depression (pp.460-80). Moreover, as foster care became 
increasingly popular, due mainly to the introduction of government financial support 
programs after World War Two, the number of children entering institutions declined 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the US, the number of children in foster care rose 
from 165,000 in 1961 to 394,000 in 1977 (Jones 1993, p. 474). As foster carers were 
often reluctant to undertake the care of sick or disabled children, an increasing 
proportion of the diminishing number of children in orphanages required more costly 
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therapeutic interventions than in previous decades, adding further to the costs of running 
institutions.  
 
Jones argued that, by the late 1960s, the cost of running US orphanages was rising and 
government subsidies were failing to cover these costs. The actual cost of care was 
around US$20 per child per day in an orphanage, whereas per capita support from 
government was only half that amount (Jones 1993, p. 472). Jones (1993, p. 473) 
concluded:  
 
Whatever the ideological basis may have been for placing a child in a foster 
family rather than an institution, it was strongly seconded by considerations of 
cost. The consequence was a steady pressure toward lower censuses [that is, a 
reduction in the numbers of children] in the homes. These two realities, the high 
and rising financial burden on the homes and a falling census, mutually 
reinforced each other. 
 
Thus, the picture presented by Jones was that the closure of children’s institutions in the 
US should be viewed not just as a response to concerns about the health and welfare of 
children, but also as a consequence of the increasingly precarious financial position of 
these institutions.           
 
In a similar vein, Zmora (1994) argued that the closure of orphanages in Baltimore (US) 
during the twentieth century flowed mainly from mounting financial problems as these 
institutions tried to cope with growing numbers of children who were relinquished into 
care by impoverished parents. In a summary of the situation that parallels the 
contemporary story of Indonesia’s panti asuhan set out in Parts II and III of this study 
in terms of the attitudes of poor parents toward institutions in providing educational and 
other opportunities for their children, Zmora (1994, p. 181) argued: 
 
…the orphanages’ worst enemy was their success. Changing child labor laws in 
many states [of the US] and greater emphasis on schooling and vocational 
education made the orphanage popular for poor, single parents, many of whom 
regarded the orphanage as a boarding school that would give their children better 
opportunities. The pressure on orphanages to admit children beyond their 
capacity created serious overcrowding, staff shortage, and financial strain.   
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The role played by rising costs in the closure of children’s institutions was also 
examined in the context of the UK by Cliffe et al. (1991). They pointed to the influence 
on policymakers of research about institutions for adults and children conducted by 
researchers such as Goffman, Bowlby and Barton, as well as the impact of anti-
institution thinkers such as Foucault (Bowlby 1952, Barton 1959, Foucault 1965, 1979, 
Bowlby 1982, Cliffe & Berridge 1991, p. 12, Lakritz 2009). Cliffe et al. (1991, p. 13) 
also argued that the cost of providing residential care was a highly significant factor 
behind the closure of many institutions from around the middle of the twentieth century 
particularly as relatively lower-cost foster care became popular amongst policymakers 
for the out-of-home care of children, thus: ‘from 1948 to date residential care has 
consistently cost more than foster care and this differential has been a constant, if 
infrequently acknowledged, factor in the changing balance of provision.’    
 
As with studies relating to the deinstitutionalisation of institutions for adults in the 
Global North, however, accounts about the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in countries such as the US have tended to present factors that were 
considered to be important in the deinstitutionalisation story without seeking to analyse 
how various factors played out in government policymaking processes. This tendency is 
observable, for example, in Jones’ (1993, p. 474) claims about the reasons behind 
changed government policies the institutionalisation of children in the US in the 1960s 
and 1970s: 
 
The rediscovery of child abuse in 1962 by a group of Denver physicians, headed 
by C. Henry Kempe, lent further impetus to the flood of children who needed 
substitute care. Kempe and his colleagues did much more than present a few 
cases. They described “the battered child syndrome” as a clinical entity, 
complete with signs and symptoms (such as bone fractures, soft-tissue swelling, 
or skin bruises), incidence, psychiatric aspects, radiology, and measurement. The 
impact of this paper was enormous. By 1973, all 50 states had passed a 
mandatory reporting law. “Protective services,” the investigation of child-abuse 
complaints coupled with efforts, where needed, to protect the child, became an 
ever-larger part of child-welfare agencies throughout the country. 
 
In this passage we see, once again, the tendency to make a link between one high-
profile development—in this case, Kempe’s much publicised work on the ‘battered 
43 
child syndrome’—and deinstitutionalisation policymaking without attempting to 
analyse what weight policymakers accorded to this factor, amongst others, in finally 
deciding to close children’s institutions (Jones 1993, p. 474).  
 
A similar tendency is observed in Wilson et al.’s (1998) discussion of the development 
of the UK’s Children Act 1948. They asserted that particular ways of viewing children 
and childhood after World War Two were reflected in the Children Act but without 
clearly establishing how these constructions were understood by policymakers, as 
revealed, for example, in testimony to UK Parliamentary committees or in the memoirs 
of politicians and senior officials. Instead, we are provided only with the broad claim 
that ‘recognition of the importance of the attachment relationship in establishing a 
child’s secure sense of identity and well-being is a lesson clearly set out in the 
legislation’ (Wilson & Petrie 1998, pp. 183-88). Similar to literature concerning the 
deinstitutionalisation of adult institutions, noted above, this tendency to reach 
conclusions about factors that shaped policy with little or no analysis of the inner 
dynamics of the policymaking process does little to help produce clear pictures of how 
policy decisions were formed. Without this deeper level of analysis it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand clearly why deinstitutionalisation policies took the formed 
they did, or why this was the chosen policy option.     
 
2.4 Implications for research, policy and practice 
Three main conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing review of literatures. First, as 
noted in Section 2.2, above, there are gaps in our knowledge about why and how 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking occurs in relation to the Global South. While some 
recent studies have shed some light in relation to the former Eastern Bloc, these have 
largely been descriptive in nature and have largely failed to probe the dynamics of 
policymaking. Such limitations in scholarship appear to have heightened importance 
when seen against the background of increased international attention over the past few 
decades on issues relating to children who are being raised without parental care and, 
specifically, the situation for children being raised in institutions in the Global South.  
 
Second, the deinstitutionalisation literatures relating to institutions for adults and for 
children point to the importance of identifying and applying an analytical method that 
enables the widest possible range of factors to be taken into account when seeking to 
understand why and how deinstitutionalisation policymaking occurs, as well as to assist 
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in evaluating the effects of such policies. One might suggest that such a deficit has 
arisen largely from the disciplinary origins of research into institutions and 
deinstitutionalisation, that is, from the fields of medicine, psychology, social work and 
history. As will be suggested in the next chapter, interpretive policy studies have the 
potential to strengthen these understandings.  
 
Third, while the literature on deinstitutionalisation of institutions for adults in countries 
such as the US and UK has limitations, it draws attention to a possible association 
between the on-ground outcomes of deinstitutionalisation policies for former patients 
and their families and the factors that drive deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the 
first instance. It will be recalled that Scull and others argued that the cost-saving ethos 
that appeared to play such an important role in deinstitutionalisation policymaking also 
influenced how deinstitutionalisation policies were rolled-out, that is, with inadequate 
funds being allocated for family or community-based care for those who had formerly 
been in institutions. If, as Scull and others argued, there was an association between the 
factors that drove deinstitutionalisation policymaking and the success of later policy 
implementation (at least in the cases studied to date), those interested in assessing the 
effectiveness of deinstitutionalisation policies might benefit by understanding more 
about the factors that drive policymaking processes.   
 
Overall then, our understanding of deinstitutionalisation is likely to be advanced by 
studies into the factors that drive policymaking about the deinstitutionalisation of 
children’s institutions in countries of the Global South which also provide a framework 
for the analysis of factors that underpin policymaking activity that is applicable in a 
wide range of country contexts.  
 
In addition to contributing to research, examination of deinstitutionalisation 
policymaking in the Global South is of practical relevance for policymakers and policy 
change advocates alike. First, with tools that enable more precise analysis of the 
deinstitutionalisation policy making process, policymakers and proponents of policy 
change may be able to identify with greater precision the best moments to move forward 
on deinstitutionalisation policymaking, and the times when resources are best 
conserved. For policymakers and advocates, structured analysis of the range of issues 
surrounding the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions might alert them to 
potential roadblocks and enable them to put in place alternative strategies. Armed with 
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more nuanced understandings about political, social, economic, cultural and other 
factors that may impact upon deinstitutionalisation decisions, they might, for example, 
be better able to time their campaigns and activities to increase the probability that 
countries will adopt policies to deinstitutionalise children’s institutions. 
 
Second, more in-depth understanding of the factors at play in deinstitutionalisation 
policymaking should interest those tasked with evaluating deinstitutionalisation 
policies. If policy implementation appears to be proceeding slowly, it would seem 
logical to examine the underlying causes. As noted in some of the US 
deinstitutionalisation literature, the relationship between the success or failure of 
deinstitutionalisation and the initial drivers of the policy should not be overlooked. It 
may be that, while some government policy actors favour deinstitutionalisation on cost-
saving grounds, the final policy outcome might be slowed, for example, due to pressures 
exerted by political forces that favour the continuation of institutions. On the other 
hand, relatively greater progress with deinstitutionalisation may be the result of the 
influence of powerful pro-reform individuals within government.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has identified limitations in recent literature in terms of being able to offer 
explanations for policymaking directed at deinstitutionalisation in the Global South 
based on the analysis of the widest possible range of political, social, economic, cultural 
and other factors. I argued that, despite its many advances, the deinstitutionalisation 
literature concerning countries such as the US and UK has not effectively explored 
policymaking processes, so cannot serve as a guide to investigating policymaking in 
settings in the Global South.  
 
At its most general level, then, an important task for research is to better understand 
why, and under what conditions, policymaking about the deinstitutionalisation of 
children’s institutions in countries of the Global South occurs. The next chapter argues 
that discourse analysis methodology has the potential to illuminate such 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking processes in a way that has not been previously 
attempted. Finally, it introduces the study’s principal research question, that is, to 
examine why Indonesia adopted a policy during the 2000s to reduce reliance on a type 
of children’s institution known as panti asuhan. 
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Chapter 3:  Aims and methodology 
 
Overview 
Based on the review of deinstitutionalisation literatures in Chapter 2, this chapter 
introduces discourse analysis as the principal methodology used in this dissertation to 
study policymaking on the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in the Global 
South, defines the study’s specific research question concerning a recent case of policy 
change in Indonesia, and discusses the rationale for selecting Indonesia for analysis. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that, to date, the deinstitutionalisation research literature 
has paid relatively little attention to why and how governments in the Global South 
make policy aimed at reducing reliance on various forms of children’s institutions. This 
appears to flow from the disciplinary origins of most academic research into institutions 
and deinstitutionalisation to date—that is, from fields such as social work and medicine 
rather than policy studies—as well as from the advocacy mandates of international 
organisations that have issued publications over the past couple of decades. This gap is 
significant when seen against the background of efforts over recent decades by 
international players, such as the UN, to encourage governments in the Global South to 
establish policies aimed at deinstitutionalising children’s institutions.  
 
At the most general level, then, fundamental questions that remain to be explored are 
why, and under what conditions, policy decisions towards the deinstitutionalisation of 
children’s institutions occurs, particularly in countries of the Global South. This 
dissertation seeks to make a contribution to this quest by identifying and applying a 
particular discourse analysis methodology to produce insights about policymaking on 
the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in a country of the Global South, 
namely, Indonesia.  
 
3.2 Social constructionism and discourse analysis 
To illuminate the inner dynamics of deinstitutionalisation policymaking processes in the 
Global South, we need to start with fundamental questions concerning policymaking: 
Why does public policy change occur? How can policy change processes be understood 
or examined? This section offers responses to these questions from a social 
constructionist standpoint. I commence by providing an overview of social 
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constructionist thought, followed by a discussion of interpretive policy analytic 
approaches that are based on a social constructionist orientation. Within the broader 
frame of interpretive policy analysis, I discuss the features and key benefits and 
limitations of an approach to discourse analysis that was initially advanced by Maarten 
Hajer in the 1990s, and which is used in the remainder of this study to examine the case 
of deinstitutionalisation policy change in Indonesia in the 2000s (Hajer 1995, 2005, 
Hajer & Versteeg 2005, Hajer 2006).  
 
3.2.1 Philosophical foundations. The historical origins of social constructionist thought 
can be traced to a wide variety of intellectual influences, such as work by Mannheim on 
the sociology of knowledge, Hegel and Marx on ideology, Wittgenstein and Austin on 
the language of philosophy, Mead on sociology, and even Aristotle with respect to 
rhetoric (Burr 1995, pp. 9-14, Hajer 1995, pp. 43-44, Fischer 2003, p. 53). From these 
forebears, modern social constructionist thought can be viewed, following Burr (1995, 
pp. 2-5), as resting on four basic philosophical premises. First, social constructionists 
contend that understandings about ‘reality’ and the nature of ‘truth’ can only ever be 
subjective and never absolute because these understandings are based on perceptions 
about, and interpretations of, phenomena, such as the environment, politics and society. 
For Fischer (2003, pp. 12-13), this orientation seeks 
 
…to overcome the objective-subjective dualism imposed by ‘positivist’ or 
‘neopositivist’ epistemological doctrines, principles that spelled out the 
traditional scientific principles long serving to rule out or downplay the 
subjective foundations of social understanding….Adamantly rejected is the idea 
that a unified understanding of science methodology can be applicable to all 
research questions. Underlying this commitment is a rejection of the possibility 
of a neutral observational vocabulary that can be used to test and conclusively 
prove or falsify explanatory hypotheses. ‘Facts’ are always ‘theory-laden’ and 
thus rest on interpretations.  
 
Second, social constructionists take the view that knowledge is in a continual state of 
flux and is contingent, or reliant upon, the existence of specific historical, social, 
cultural and other conditions. Thus, they challenge essentialist claims about the fixed, 
and yet-to-be-discovered-by-science, nature of the physical and social world. Using an 
example of relevance to this dissertation, Burr (1995, pp. 3-4) stated that: 
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Whether one understands the world in terms of men or women, pop music and 
classical music, urban life and rural life, past and future, etc., depends upon 
where and when in the world one lives. For example, the notion of childhood has 
undergone tremendous change over the centuries. What it has been thought 
‘natural’ for children to do has changed, as well as what parents were expected 
to do for their children...It is only in relatively recent historical times that 
children have ceased to be simply small adults (in all but their legal rights). 
 
Third, according to Burr, social constructionists contend that human beings manufacture 
knowledge about the world through social interaction and competition. That is, the 
subjects that comprise knowledge and the content of that knowledge are not pre-existing 
in some type of permanent, objective and yet-to-be-discovered dimension but are 
produced, elaborated and even discarded through social discourse and interaction. For 
Burr (1995, p. 4), what is regarded as ‘truth’ is a ‘product not of objective observation 
of the world, but of the social processes and interactions in which people are constantly 
engaged with each other’.  
 
Finally, once knowledge is constructed through social processes, it is translated into 
various forms of social action, such as in the form of laws and government policies. 
Various types of socially-constructed knowledge become viewed as either socially 
acceptable or unacceptable. In this regard, for example, we might think of the way in 
which the idea of children’s institutions was widely supported by many governments of 
the Global North up to the mid-twentieth century based on a particular, widely-shared 
‘knowledge’ or belief held by decision makers, religious organisations, and society at 
large that these places represented an appropriate way to care for children who were 
orphaned, or deemed by authorities to be neglected or in need of care outside the family 
home.        
 
While there are numerous influential modern social constructionist thinkers, Burr’s four 
fundamental premises of social constructionism are perhaps best illustrated in the works 
of French post-structuralist philosopher Michel Foucault. Of central importance to 
Foucault was the notion of discourse, which emerged in his earlier ‘archaeological’ 
phase of work, from the 1970s. In this phase of work, he sought to understand how 
discourses, which he defined as socially-produced statements about reality rooted in, or 
contingent upon, particular historical conditions, become dominant in terms of setting 
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social rules and governing what society deemed to be acceptable or unacceptable 
(Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 12). For Foucault (1972, p. 117) discourses were 
 
…made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of 
existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless 
form…it is, from the beginning to end, historical – a fragment of 
history…posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific 
modes of its temporality. 
 
In this phase of his work, Foucault sought to draw attention to how change in 
phenomena, such as politics, resulted from the interplay of small, often unobserved, 
elements within discourse, which he sometimes termed ‘micro-powers’ or ‘micro-
physics’ (Foucault 1982). Foucault (1982, p. 26) argued that a vitally important task of 
analysis was to trace how such practices interacted and interconnected to produce 
effects in the world and influence larger systems and institutions, such as legal codes, 
thus: 
 
…the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on a 
body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of 
domination are attributed not to ‘appropriation’, but to dispositions, manoeuvres, 
tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of 
relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might 
possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract 
regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory. 
 
In seeking to identify the complex, interdependent nature of discourses, Foucault 
diverged from the line espoused by positivists, who sought to understand causality by 
seeking to identify an underlying factor or factors that made change occur and which 
could form the basis for predicting future events (Hajer 1995, pp. 47-48). Foucault 
sought to avoid the criticism that ‘everything matters’ in explaining change; instead, he 
contended that, not only could the drivers of change be distinguished through analysis, 
but that a ‘discursive order’ could be arrived at which showed how change occurred 
through contestation or struggle amongst discourses and their constituent ‘micro-
powers’. Noting the fluidity of language as a vehicle for the expression of socially 
generated meanings, Foucault advanced the notion of discursive struggle to signify 
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competition between different discourses to achieve dominance as the standard way of 
understanding and expressing the nature of reality. As we will see below, the notion of 
competition between discourses for hegemony over meanings attributed to aspects of 
the world, such as public policies, laws and other forms of social conduct, occupies an 
important place in Hajer’s work on discourse ‘saturation’ and ‘institutionalisation’.    
 
Another key aspect of Foucault’s early work was his interest in understanding the role 
of the individual and the nature of power in producing a particular discursive order. 
Rather than seeing the individual as lacking agency, or as powerless in the face of large 
institutions such as the State, he argued that there was a constant interplay and 
interdependency between the individual (as the subject) and the larger world inhabited 
by the individual. For Foucault (1980, pp. 73-74): 
 
...the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of 
power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a 
relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, 
forces.  
 
Expressed another way, Foucault (1980, pp. 187-88) stated: 
 
Between every point of a social body, between a man and a woman, between the 
members of a family, between a master and a pupil, between everyone who 
knows and every one who does not, there exist relations of power which are not 
purely and simply a projection of the sovereign’s great power over the 
individual; they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the sovereign’s 
power is grounded, the conditions which make it possible for it to 
function…power is not built up out of ‘wills’ (individual or collective), nor is it 
derivable from interests. Power is constructed and functions on the basis of 
particular powers, myriad issues, myriad effects of power. It is this complex 
domain that must be studied.  
  
Foucault’s focus on the nature of power and its interconnectivity with the generation of 
knowledge in his later ‘genealogical’ phase of work provided yet another important 
conceptual tool for social constructionist theorists (Burr 1995, pp. 62-78). Foucault 
(1980, p. 119) considered power to permeate all human activity and to create the 
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conditions under which discourses were generated, produced change, and dissolved, 
thus:  
 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. 
 
For Foucault, the positivist quest for singular, universalised ‘truth’ was irrelevant. 
Because ‘truth’ was generated through social discourse conditioned by certain types of 
historically-contingent knowledge and power, the best the researcher could do was to 
seek understandings about how the effect of truth was brought into existence at a 
particular moment in time by analysing how discourses were created, disseminated, 
sustained, transformed and ultimately disappeared (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p. 14). 
 
Influenced by the works of Foucault and other major constructionist theorists such as 
Habermas (1971), Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987), over the past few decades scholars 
from disciplines such as psychology, history, linguistics, politics, and—of particular 
relevance to this dissertation—policy studies, have paid increased attention to theories 
and methods of discourse analysis (Dryzek 1997, Fairclough & Wodak 1997, Bevir & 
Rhodes 2005, Finlayson 2007, Glynos et al. 2009, pp. 5-41). There are many points of 
variation and inflection amongst discourse analysts on theory and method, much of 
which derives from differing disciplinary emphases. Yet, discourse analysts would 
generally take as their starting point the view that a ‘discourse’ is more than just the 
things people talk about. Rather, it represents the ways that people give meaning to their 
experiences and perceive and construct the world in which they live. Dryzek (1997, p. 
8), for example, understood discourses as ‘a shared way of apprehending the world 
[which] enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them 
together into coherent stories or accounts’. For Boonstra (2006, p. 147), discourse was 
‘a rhetorical manifestation of a specific perception, belief or worldview, which gives 
meaning to the world in which people live’.  
 
Suggesting that discourses should be seen as being any form of social practice and not 
just linguistic utterances, Glynos et al. (2009, p. 5) regarded discourses as spanning 
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‘natural language, speech, and writing, to almost anything that acts as a carrier of 
signification, including social and political practices, to discourse as an ontological 
horizon’. Yanow (2000) argued that a variety of social artefacts, such as language and 
acts can be included in discourse analysis (p. 22). For Hajer (1995, p. 44), discourse was 
 
…an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, 
reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities.  
 
In whatever ways discourse is expressed, a key task for discourse analysis is to 
understand how, through social practices particularly language, people subjectively 
construct, perceive and give meaning to the world with which they engage. That is not 
to say that physical phenomena do not exist in their own right, but only that they are 
given meaning through the social practice of discourse. Through language as well as 
other social practices, discourse analysts contend that we construct particular versions of 
reality about a situation, either perhaps as a way of summarising complex issues and/or 
to simplify issues for rhetorical purposes, such as to clearly communicate the case for a 
particular type of change in response to a perceived problem. For Hajer (2006, p. 68), 
for example, a key challenge for the discourse analyst is to illuminate the varying 
meanings that are embedded within the language that is used to talk about the physical 
and social world they inhabit and with which they interact, thus: 
 
…discourse should be distinguished analytically from discussion so as to allow 
for the differentiation of plural discourses. Discourses consist of structures 
embedded in language. Discourses are therefore ‘found’ or traced by the analyst. 
Discourses might not be immediately obvious to the people that utter them, 
although respondents should recognise a discourse when pointed out to them by 
the analyst. 
 
While discourses are important to examine in their own right to understand how realities 
are socially-derived, many constructionist-oriented scholars go further. Following the 
lead of Foucault and others, they are also interested in how changes in widely-accepted 
discourses lead to changes in phenomena such as laws and public policy. Jorgensen et 
al. (2002, p. 9) expressed this point about the effect of changes to discourses thus: 
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…different discourses each point to different courses of action as possible and 
appropriate…language is a ‘machine’ that generates, and as a result constitutes, 
the social world. This also extends to the constitution of social identities and 
social relations. It means that changes in discourse are a means by which the 
social world is changed. Struggles at the discursive level take part in changing, 
as well as in reproducing, the social reality. (italics in original).     
 
To illustrate, we might again take the case of orphanages and other types of institutions 
for children. In terms of understanding social attitudes and public policies in the Global 
North during the twentieth century toward children’s institutions, hypothetically, 
discourse analysts would commence by examining discourses around, say, child welfare 
or the cost of running children’s institutions. They would then examine how these 
discourses challenged previously accepted discourses about the appropriateness of 
institutions for the care of children who were unable to live with their parents. They 
would then consider how holders of existing and newer discourses (for example, 
orphanage owners versus children’s rights advocates) competed for dominance and 
how, ultimately, this struggle was resolved in terms of the arrival of a new and widely-
accepted social attitude about the questionable nature of children’s institutions.  
 
3.2.2 Discourse analysis and policymaking. Moving to the specific field of policy 
studies, ‘interpretive policy analysis’ has become a widely used term to signify a 
collection of discourse analysis approaches that seek to shed light on policymaking 
processes through the analysis of the meanings, ideas, beliefs and values held by actors 
who are involved with these activities (Dryzek 1982, pp. 309-29, Yanow 1995, 2000, 
Wagenaar 2007, Yanow 2014). As with other social constructionist approaches, 
interpretive policy analysts contend that positivist theories of policymaking fail to 
adequately explain why and how policy change occurs. For Fischer (2003, p. 15), the 
task of understanding policymaking requires the analyst to ‘understand and accept the 
need to explicate the multitude of dimensions inherent to deliberation and debate 
relevant to most policy issues’. Similarly, for Nevile (2002, p. 7), interpretive policy 
analysis is premised on understandings that ‘multi-causality is the norm…[and that] 
being able to explain policy change with reference to a single explanatory variable is the 
exception rather than the rule’. Put another way, Hendricks (2007, p. 279) stated:  
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…interpretive researchers reject the idea that the goal of policy analysis is to 
settle debates by conducting a value free, objective assessment of the policy 
situation. In contrast, they seek to appreciate and improve policy practice by 
studying its paradoxes and ambiguities, and exploring various meanings 
embedded in language, action and artefacts.  
 
The task of the interpretive policy analyst, in short, is to comprehend how discourses as 
ways of summarising, organising or cataloguing the world, arise and shape the 
policymaking process. For Fischer (2003, p. 60): 
 
The task of the analyst is to examine the multiple understandings of what 
otherwise appears to be a single concept, in particular how these understandings 
are created and how they are manipulated as part of political strategy. 
Uncovering the hidden arguments embedded in each policy concept…explains, 
can illuminate and even at times resolve the political conflicts that would 
otherwise only appear to be on the surface of the issue. 
 
3.2.3 Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis: methods and challenges. 
Disenchanted with what they consider to be the reductionist limitations of positivist 
policy change theory, interpretivist scholars have developed a wide range of approaches 
and techniques to produce understandings about policy change based in analysis of the 
widest possible range of factors that may affect policy decisions, in particular, the 
meanings attributed to policies by decision-makers and others (Glynos et al. 2009, p. 
21). Yanow (2000, p. 22) suggested, for example, that policy analysis should proceed in 
four steps: locating artefacts, such as language, that convey meaning about a policy 
matter in all its inherent complexity; identifying ‘the communities of 
meaning/interpretation/speech practice that are relevant to the policy issue under 
analysis’; pinpointing the key discourses as expressed through artefacts; and, identifying 
areas of conflict between communities holding differing interpretations. Fischer (2003, 
p. 147) sought to extend the first step of Yanow’s methodology by suggesting that the 
analyst seeks to identify ‘the relevant ‘interpretive communities’ in a particular policy 
space, that is, those people who share understandings of the policy ideas and language 
different from those of other groups, such as policymakers, academics, journalists, and 
officials.     
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This thesis takes as its central methodology an approach to policy discourse analysis 
that was initially advanced by Dutch political scientist and urban and regional planner, 
Maarten Hajer, in the 1990s. It is the first time that Hajer’s methodology has been 
applied to the study of policymaking in regard to the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in general and, in particular, a country in the Global South. Hajer’s 
contribution to interpretive policy analysis is of particular significance to this study 
because he elaborated concepts and steps for the conduct of research and emphasised 
the importance of identifying how policy formation occurs through competition between 
coalitions of policy actors with shared understandings about policy issues and solutions, 
or what Hajer termed ‘story lines’. Hajer (in conjunction with Versteeg) (2005, p. 175-
176) began from the premises that discourses were expressed mainly in linguistic form, 
as assemblages of ‘ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to 
social and physical phenomena’ and that ‘language profoundly shapes one’s view of the 
world and reality, instead of being only a neutral medium mirroring it’. The discursive 
meaning people give to phenomena such as policy problems could, he contended, best 
be understood through an analysis of linguistic regularities (Hajer 1995, p. 44, Feindt & 
Oels 2005, p. 166, Hajer 2005, p. 300).  
 
To understand such linguistic regularities, or to study ‘language-in-use’, Hajer 
suggested that the researcher focus on three discursive elements—metaphor, story lines 
and discourse-coalitions (Hajer & Versteeg 2005, p. 176, Hajer 2006). For Hajer (2006, 
p. 69), a metaphor was a representation or symbol of a thing or phenomenon, whilst a 
story line was 
 
…a condensed statement summarising complex narratives, used by people as 
‘short hand’ in discussions. Identifying story lines brings out that people not 
merely refer to a problem with a fixed identity, but are continually changing the 
problem definition. (italics in original).  
 
Story lines are, in other words, ways of thinking about and expressing complex issues in 
a condensed form so that a range of people can find common ground about an issue 
even though at times there may be wide variations, and even conflicts, in terms of what 
people actually understand by the same basic story line (Hajer 2005, p. 302).  
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Hajer’s third discursive element, ‘discourse-coalition’, refers to a ‘group of actors that, 
in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of 
story lines over a particular period of time.’ (Hajer 2006, p. 70) (italics in original). In 
emphasising the word ‘practices’, Hajer (2006) argued that discourse should be 
understood in the interrelationship between perceptions and concepts and the ways that 
these were manifested in external world phenomenon, such as political activity and 
policymaking (p. 70). In that sense, he stated that a discourse-coalition ‘is related to 
practices in the context of which actors employ story lines, and (re)produce and 
transform particular discourses’. Thus, Hajer’s interest was in how and why policy 
actors placed themselves within a particular discourse and, in doing so, seek to 
influence those discourses, thereby shaping policy decisions (Feindt & Oels 2005, p. 
166). 
 
For Hajer, the next task in discourse analysis was to draw a link between various 
discourses and their influence on policymaking. The identification of story lines and 
how they constituted discourse-coalitions was, for Hajer, only part of the story. An 
essential step was to identify how discourse-coalitions arranged themselves around 
particular story lines and vied for dominance over policy. For Hajer (1995, p. 59), 
gaining an understanding of the nature of competition within and across discourse-
coalitions was critically important in making sense of policymaking and underpinned 
his whole approach, or: ‘The argumentative approach conceives of politics as a struggle 
for discursive hegemony in which the actors try to secure support for their definition of 
reality’.  
 
Hajer employed two terms to study this ‘argumentative’ aspect of policymaking. First, 
he used the term ‘discourse structuration’ to describe the situation when a particular 
discourse comes to dominate the views of a ‘social unit’, such as a policy area, a 
company or a government. Second, ‘discourse institutionalisation’ occurs when a 
particular discourse becomes enshrined in institutional arrangements such as laws, 
policies and regulations (Hajer 2006, p. 70). Hajer suggested that a discourse-coalition 
dominates a policy debate when both discourse structuration and discourse 
institutionalisation occur. He also noted that, while one discourse might be seen as 
dominating policy outcomes, it was rare that policy decisions reflected only one 
discourse. It was more usual for elements of several discourses, even those that 
appeared to be at odds, to find their way into final policy because they had ‘discursive 
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affinity’ or shared ways of viewing the world (Hajer 2006, pp. 70-71). Thus, instead of 
simply noting the static existence of varying interests in driving policy change, by 
delving into the interactions between varying interests, discourse-coalition analysis has 
the potential to uncover how policy change acts as metaphor for wider socio-historical 
factors.        
       
To skip ahead momentarily, in Parts II and III of this dissertation I argue that the views 
held by policy actors condensed around two basic ‘story lines’ concerning the 
deinstitutionalisation of a particular type of children’s institution in Indonesia—that is, a 
story line that favoured policy change based largely on concerns about children’s rights 
and government financial and other policy concerns, and another that favoured the 
policy status quo under which children’s institutions should continue to be supported by 
the Indonesian Government. I show how these story lines generated specific discourse-
coalitions that vied for policy dominance or, in Hajer’s terms, ‘discourse 
institutionalisation’. I argue that, arising from this contest, the resulting new policy 
represented an amalgam of both pro-reform and status quo story lines. Finally, I argue 
that utilising discourse analysis approaches can thus offer unusually detailed insights 
into how and why policy evolves in particular ways and that such knowledge is likely to 
be important when judgements are made about the significance of a policy change 
and/or when later appraisals are made about policy implementation and impact.            
 
Going to specific research processes, Hajer proposed ten steps for policy discourse 
analysis, which are summarised in Table 3.1, below. They are: desk research of the 
main documents; ‘helicopter’ interviews with a few key people to gain an overview of 
the issue; document analysis for structuring concepts, story lines and metaphors; 
interviews with key players to understand the sequencing of events and interpretations 
about what happened and why; using data and materials, such as parliamentary 
proceedings, to try to account for the ‘argumentative exchange’ that led to policy 
change; analysing how some actors changed the positioning and role of other players; 
identifying key incidents essential to understanding the policy change; assessing 
whether and how the meanings of particular actors are reflected in changed practices, 
such as policies; identifying a ‘discursive order’ that prevailed in relation to the policy 
change process, that is, an account of discursive structuration and resulting changed 
practices; and, finally, a second visit to key players to verify that the analyst’s 
inferences resonated with their understandings (Hajer 2006, pp. 73-74).  
58 
Table 3.1 Hajer’s ten steps for policy discourse analysis 
 
Step Main tasks 
1 Desk research 
2 Helicopter interviews 
3 Document analysis 
4 Interviews with key players 
5 Sites of argumentation 
6 Analysis of positioning effects 
7 Identification of key incidents 
8 Analysis of practices in particular cases of argumentation 
9 Interpretation 
10 Second visit to actors 
 
Source: Hajer (2006, pp. 73-4). 
 
At the core of these steps is what Hajer termed ‘argumentative discourse analysis’ in 
which the analyst seeks to identify how meanings held by policy actors about an issue 
are produced or shifted as a result of interactions between and across differing 
discourses or exchanges between participants. Hajer (2006) noted that this type of 
analysis was most likely to produce useful results in situations where exchanges were 
recorded and transcribed, for example, in parliamentary records (pp. 72-73).  
 
Using this discourse analysis approach, Hajer (1995) was able to illuminate the 
dynamics within environmental debates in the UK and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Hajer showed that the wide variations of values and beliefs within coalitions had a 
significant effect on the final shape of policy. His analysis indicated that, while 
coalitions seeking policy change to combat air pollution appeared united in terms of 
their values, in reality they were comprised of people who held widely diverse views 
and beliefs and who attached different meanings to the term ‘acid rain’, such as those 
for whom air pollution was emblematic of deeper ills of capitalist society, through to 
those who regarded air pollution as a technical/scientific problem (Hajer 1995, 2005, 
2006).  
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According to Hajer, the term ‘acid rain’ acted as a metaphor, or as an ‘ordering 
concept’, for broader debates about the larger issue of environmental degradation. By 
noting the diversity of perspectives within the environment advocacy groups, he drew 
attention to the way that positivist interpretations of different countries’ policy 
responses had condensed and over-simplified a complex set of perspectives when 
viewed just as an ‘acid rain’ problem (Hajer 2006, p. 66). Hajer contended that two 
different discourse-coalitions formed around people who held either a ‘traditionalist-
pragmatist’ or an ‘eco-modernist’ story line about acid rain. According to Hajer (1995, 
pp. 105-06): 
 
These two story-lines mobilized two different discourse-coalitions that stretched 
from politics to science, from regulators to NGOs, and from journalists to 
academics. The reconstruction of the dynamics of these discourse-coalitions 
explains how ecological modernization was taken up in Great Britain and how 
the problem of acid rain was regulated. (emphasis added).       
 
Beyond simply noting the existence of these discourse-coalitions, Hajer (1995, pp. 111-
12) went further to observe how these groupings provided the means by which these 
coalitions vied for policy dominance thus: 
 
The British acid rain controversy involved many different actors, each with their 
own preoccupations and interests, and each with their own particular 
contributions and insights. Yet basically the argument can be represented as a 
competition between two distinct discourse-coalitions that were organized 
around two different story-lines: one drawing on the categories of traditional 
pragmatism [that is, beliefs that environmental action should be cost-effective 
and based on detailed scientific understanding about air pollution and its 
effects], and the other using the concepts of ecological modernization [that is, 
beliefs that instead of devoting time to amass even more comprehensive 
scientific evidence, enough was already known about the magnitude of the 
problem of acid rain to warrant taking urgent action to avert catastrophe]. 
 
Thus, one of Hajer’s important contributions to interpretive policy analysis has been to 
advance concepts by which analysts could tease out the inner dynamics, the ‘pushes and 
pulls’, compromises and conflicts, between policy players that occurs in the making of 
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policy. Understanding these intricacies is important because it helps to explain why 
policy takes the shape it does. Hajer made the important point that this knowledge helps 
to explain what then happened as policy became enacted. In the case of the UK, he 
noted that how the problem of acid rain was dealt with could only be fully understood 
by an in-depth appreciation of factors at play in the policymaking process. Identifying 
these nuances was important because they helped to explain the nature of strategies that 
were devised by coalitions, as well as how coalitions ultimately engaged in negotiation 
and other activities as part of the policy development process (Fischer 2003, p. 101).   
 
It should also be noted that Hajer’s methodology has enjoyed growing academic 
popularity over the past couple of decades. Perhaps because of Hajer’s initial focus on 
environmental policymaking, numerous studies have appeared that utilise, either in part 
or in full, Hajer’s ideas in relation to matters such as the environment, climate change, 
energy, greenhouse gas emissions technology transfer, urban planning, and forestry 
(Paul 2012, pp. 549-66, Spath 2012, pp. 1256-73, Christoff 2013, pp. 349-67, Leipold 
2014, pp. 12-20, McGee & Wenta 2014, pp. 367-81, Munoz et al. 2014, pp. 179-90). 
While the initial focus of many of these studies was on countries of the Global North, an 
increasing range of studies have appeared using Hajer’s methods in relation to non-
environmental issues as well as a relatively smaller, but nonetheless growing, number of 
studies that focus on countries of the Global South (Gillespie 2011, pp. 1-37, Clement et 
al. 2012, pp. 112-20, van Dyk et al. 2013, pp. 1-19, Zeitoun et al. 2013, pp. 293-322, 
Kakonen et al. 2014, Snijders 2014, pp. 173-89).  
 
In relation to the Global South, for example, we not only see studies on environmental 
and resource management issues, but an increasing research interest in using Hajer’s 
approach, either in part or in conjunction with other discourse analysis approaches, to 
examine issues as diverse as anti-corruption efforts in Paraguay to nature conservation 
in Benin, and hydro-electric planning in Brazil (Bingham 2010, pp. 1-10, Gephart 2014, 
Pochet 2014, pp. 1-19). Hajer’s methodology has also been drawn upon by some 
researchers to understand discourses about children, such as in relation to early 
childhood education policy in Ontario, Canada, and in relation to the drafting of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Holzscheiter 2011, pp. 1-28, Turgeon 2014, pp. 
224-49). To date, however, Hajer’s form of discourse analysis has yet to be deployed in 
any published academic study of policymaking about institutionalisation or 
deinstitutionalisation in regard to children in either the Global North or Global South.          
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Hajer’s discourse analysis approach: benefits. Hajer’s methodology is particularly 
relevant in addressing this dissertation’s overarching quest, that is, to contribute to 
understandings about why, and under what conditions, policymaking about the 
deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions occurs particularly in countries of the 
Global South. First, as scholarly literature has had only limited success in delving 
deeply into the dynamics of deinstitutionalisation policymaking in the Global North, the 
former Eastern Bloc and the Global South, this approach enables the widest possible 
range of factors to be considered in understanding policymaking dynamics. As such, it 
has the potential to address Novella’s concern (see Chapter 2) about the failure of 
deinstitutionalisation literature to adequately take into account the wider social, political 
and economic context in which deinstitutionalisation policymaking occurs (Novella 
2008, pp. 303-14). Hajer’s methodology has the potential to do this because it insists 
that the researcher delves beneath the things that people say about a particular instance 
of policy change and examine data and other secondary materials to try to understand 
the broader context in which policymaking happens. Hajer (2005, p. 300) stressed that 
the analysis of the language used by policy players needed to be examined with 
reference to, and not isolated from, the broader socio-historical context:  
 
…analysis of discursive constructions such as narratives, story lines or 
metaphors is especially powerful when done in the context of the study of the 
socio-historical conditions in which the statements were produced and received.  
 
Thus, while Hajer’s approach was firmly anchored in the exploration of discourse, he 
also encouraged the inclusion of background data, such as quantitative and secondary 
materials, to augment understandings about factors that lead to policy change. Such 
openness to other sources seems likely to build more deeply contextualised and hence 
more plausible stories about policy change processes.  
 
Moreover, Hajer’s entreaty that the analysis of policymaking be undertaken on the basis 
of a series of steps helps to overcome allegations that some interpretive policy 
approaches lack clear methodology. In this regard, Hajer has effectively drawn on the 
work of Foucault and many others writing in a social constructionist mode to develop a 
method or approach to policy analysis using specific language analysis concepts, for 
example, concerning the use of metaphor, story lines and discourse-coalitions. In setting 
out the steps for analysis and by focussing squarely on how linguistic exchanges 
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between policy protagonists shaped policy outcomes, Hajer sought to overcome what he 
perceived to be a limitation in Foucault’s approach. For Hajer (1995, pp. 51-52), much 
of Foucault’s work was too abstract and did not clearly specify how the analysis of 
discourses should be conducted: 
 
Foucault’s theoretical concepts are a valuable source of inspiration for the study 
of discourse formation in politics. Yet there is a need to devise middle-range 
concepts through which this interaction between discourses can be related to the 
role of individual strategic action in a non-reductionist way. Likewise, there is 
still a conceptual gap between Foucault’s abstract work and the study of 
concrete political events. 
 
As well as specifying specific steps for analysing the policymaking process, Hajer 
offered tools to help bridge the gap between abstract concepts and clear method by 
deploying ideas from social psychology. Rather than just focusing on linguistic content 
(that is, the things that policy players say), Hajer stressed the importance of 
understanding the argumentative context in which policy was formed—that is, the 
competition amongst discourses over a particular issue—to know what was really going 
on within the usually opaque policymaking ‘black box’ (Hajer 1995, pp. 52-54). Thus, 
Hajer gets us closer than many other discourse analysis approaches to the ‘thick 
descriptions’ proposed by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) in reference to 
explanations of behaviours or phenomenon within wider historical, social and political 
contexts (pp. 3-30). By producing contextually-grounded understandings, and insisting 
on the identification of a hierarchy showing which discourses were more influential than 
others and why, Hajer provided a compelling response to the criticism that is commonly 
leveled against interpretive approaches about their failure to identify what particular 
factor or factors predominated in terms of driving policy change (van den Brink & 
Metze 2006, p. 13).         
 
Hajer’s discourse analysis approach: challenges. While offering a more explicitly-stated 
method than other major discourse analysis approaches to date, and appearing to offer 
other benefits, Hajer’s approach is not without apparent limitations. As noted above, 
Hajer contended that his argumentative discourse analysis was most likely to produce 
useful results in situations where exchanges between policy actors were recorded and 
transcribed, for example, in the form of parliamentary records. This suggestion about 
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sources touches on a broader issue regarding the nature of discourse. Earlier in this 
chapter, I noted that while language was usually regarded by discourse analysts as the 
principal means through which meaning was ascribed, others seek to identify discourses 
from other forms of social practices, such as via objects or acts.  
 
Writing from a background in political science and planning studies, Hajer appears to 
take a more limited approach, emphasising the collection of language-based discourse 
information derived from written texts and interviews. It is open to question whether, 
then, Hajer tends to overlook other forms of social practice, unnecessarily privilege 
written and oral language, and risks producing incomplete understandings of discourses 
around a particular issue or question. Moreover, as well as emphasising written and oral 
records as primary discourse signifiers, Hajer does not offer guidance about the 
collection of discourse information in situations where there is either no or scant written 
records, such as parliamentary hansard or committee minutes. On the surface at least, 
this may appear to present greater challenges in some countries of the Global South 
compared with Europe where Hajer’s research was undertaken. Later in this 
dissertation, I discuss such perceived limitations, as well as the benefits, of Hajer’s 
methodology in the light of the case study.  
 
3.3 Principal research question and techniques  
Using Hajer’s discourse analysis methodology, this dissertation aims at its broadest 
level to shed light on factors that lead governments in the Global South to adopt policies 
to deinstitutionalise children’s institutions. Specifically, it does this through an in-depth 
examination of deinstitutionalisation policymaking in a country of the Global South, 
namely, Indonesia.  
 
3.3.1 Case study selection. Indonesia is selected for study for three reasons. First, it 
appears to be one of only a relatively small number of countries of the Global South to 
have adopted a national policy to reduce reliance on children’s institutions as ways of 
dealing with orphaned, neglected or abandoned children in the past decade or two. It is 
unclear how many countries in the Global South have taken this step as there is 
incomplete information published on this topic. Basic descriptive information on 
children’s institutions and related policies is either absent or patchy on scores of 
countries of the Global South. Information that is provided, such as by the Child Rights 
International Network (2015) (an internet-based repository of information about 
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children in alternative care) and in reports of the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (2015), seldom provide detail about national deinstitutionalisation policies.   
 
Within the apparently small number of countries to have adopted national policies to 
deinstitutionalise children’s institutions over recent decades, Indonesia’s change of 
policy on a particular type of institution for orphaned, neglected or abandoned children 
known as panti asuhan has been publicly portrayed by some INGOs, the UN and even 
the Indonesian Government as a leading example of how one country of the Global 
South undertook policy reform on children’s institutions. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
Indonesia’s policy change on panti asuhan has been depicted by these players as a 
milestone in international efforts led by the UN and INGOs to reduce reliance on 
children’s institutions in the Global South and as a recognition by the Indonesian 
Government of its international children’s rights obligations. The level of public 
attention that has been given to Indonesia’s policy reform thus suggests that the 
Indonesia case is worthy of more detailed analysis.  
 
Second, Indonesia is of particular interest in global terms given estimates that between 
170,000 and over 500,000 children live in thousands of Indonesian panti asuhan when 
compared with estimates that, globally, there may be between two and eight million 
children living in institutions (see Chapter 1). This thesis does not recommend that 
lessons from the Indonesia case be applied in other countries with different political, 
social, cultural and other circumstances. However, in view of the large numbers of 
children involved, it does suggest that the case of Indonesian policymaking on panti 
asuhan is likely to be of interest to policymakers, researchers and policy change 
advocates in other countries of the Global South, especially in terms of a methodology 
aimed at assembling a broadly-based understanding about the environment in which 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking occurs.  
 
Third, from a practical research standpoint, Indonesia was selected because it has been 
possible to gain relatively unfettered access to a wide range of senior officials, INGO 
and NGO representatives, researchers and others who were either directly involved with 
the policy reform process or who closely observed it. As discussed in Chapter 5, most of 
the key policy players could be accessed by the author for interview.   
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3.3.2 Research question and techniques. Bearing in mind limitations in the research 
literature noted above and the anticipated advantages of policy discourse analysis, this 
dissertation asks: What factors led the Indonesian Government to adopt a policy during 
the 2000s to reduce reliance on a type of children’s institution known as panti asuhan? 
 
In line with Hajer’s discourse approach, face-to-face interview was the principal 
qualitative method used to identify the views of key informants about the main drivers 
of Indonesian policy change on panti asuhan. Interviews were a critically important 
means to gather information that was unavailable from other sources, such as 
publications and official inquiries, and to help interpret other primary and secondary 
evidence. Given that my aim was to obtain the perspectives of key decision-makers and 
others closely associated with the policy change, I drew on elite-interviewing techniques 
(Aberbach & Rockman 2002, pp. 673-76, Goldstein 2002, pp. 669-72, Dexter 2012, pp. 
31-72). Richards (1996, p. 199) defined an ‘elite’ as ‘a group of individuals who hold, 
or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientist is 
concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general 
members of the public’. In the context of policy studies, the aim of elite-interviewing is 
to provide the researcher with the subjective perceptions of players who had either 
direct or close involvement with the policy process.  
 
While the material acquired through interviewing elites may be important in addressing 
research questions, it may also present particular challenges for the researcher. First, 
gaining access to high-status individuals for interview purposes can be difficult and lack 
of access to a sufficiently wide range of people associated with the subject of the 
research can diminish the reliability of findings (Nader 1972, pp. 301-08). Even when 
adequate access is gained, interview duration is likely to be limited. This requires the 
researcher to recognise the power differential between themselves and the interviewee, 
to be highly targeted and flexible in their approach to questioning, and to recognise that 
not all questions may be answered. Interviews with elite actors are therefore more likely 
to take the form of semi-structured conversations that use open-ended, rather than 
closed, questions (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, p. 674). As with other qualitative work, 
the interviewer also needs to bear in mind the reliability of accounts provided by 
interviewees; for example, memory lapses on the part of the interviewee may affect the 
reliability of findings if the interview and the event being discussed are far apart in time 
(Richards 1996, pp. 200-01, Silverman 2000, pp. 148-60).  
66 
Chapter 5 contains further information about interview selection, protocols and conduct 
that are specific to the case study. I conducted interviews as open-ended discussion. In 
order to facilitate access to elite interviewees, I provided information about the purposes 
and methods of the research project to all prospective interviewees when seeking 
interviews. At the outset of every face-to-face or telephone interview, I asked 
interviewees for oral consent to: conduct the interview; make either hand-written notes 
or an audio recording of their responses to questions; and, use their responses without 
attributing comments to them by personal name in the final report. All interviewees 
indicated their agreement to these requests.  
 
Typed transcripts of all interviews were prepared on the basis of either hand-written 
notes or audio recordings. Human research ethics approval to conduct interviews for 
this study was granted by the Australian National University in February 2012, in 
accordance with the University’s ethics policies and the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research (2007) issued by the Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council.  
 
3.4 Boundaries 
While this dissertation aims to shed light on recent Indonesian policymaking on panti 
asuhan and to relate this to broader deinstitutionalisation and public policy literatures, 
there are things that it does not and cannot do. First, being situated within an 
interpretive epistemology, it does not purport to ‘test’ or assess the validity of any 
particular theory or theories nor reach conclusions that can be generalised and applied in 
other country contexts. Instead, it presents an interpretation of what happened in the 
particular case of Indonesia. As will be discussed in the concluding chapter, to the 
extent that the study is applicable to other country contexts, it is in the way that the 
analysis of policy change was undertaken, that is, through a discourse analysis lens. 
Second, the prime focus of this study is on the deinstitutionalisation policy change 
process itself, rather than on how policy implementation has progressed. While the 
factors that drive policymaking may influence the character of policy implementation, 
my focus was on the former aspect. Finally, while many senior government, non-
government and academic sector representatives were interviewed, it was not possible 
to meet all key government personnel, such as the former Indonesian Minister for Social 
Affairs who oversaw the policy change. Nonetheless, as will be discussed later, the 
interviews covered a broadly representative sample of people directly associated with 
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the policy change process. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, there were also limitations 
around language and the availability of written information.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that, in the absence of highly-nuanced understandings of 
policymaking from existing deinstitutionalisation studies, Hajer’s method of discourse 
analysis of policymaking, set within social constructionist thinking, appears to offer a 
helpful way forward in terms of illuminating the full range of factors that influence 
policymaking about the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in the Global 
South. The specific research question was also outlined, that is, to examine 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking through an in-depth case study of recent Indonesian 
policymaking on panti asuhan using elite-interviewing techniques.  
 
Part II turns to the case of Indonesia. It begins by providing background about panti 
asuhan, including the dominant public narrative about policy change as advanced by the 
Indonesian Government and some international players. Yet, interviews and other 
analysis reveals a range of different perspectives held by policymakers and policy 
advocates about the need for policy reform. These crystallised into pro-reform and pro-
panti asuhan ‘status quo’ story lines. Part III suggests how these story lines, in turn, 
mobilised the actions of two discourse-coalitions that vied to shape Indonesia’s final 
policy based on the competing beliefs and attitudes of numerous actors about the place 
of panti asuhan in modern Indonesia. 
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Chapter 4: The panti asuhan policy change story 
 
‘Indonesia has been implementing what we call a paradigm shift, moving from a 
child welfare system that was based primarily on residential care towards a 
system that is centred on family-based care.’ 
 
Makmur Sunusi, Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister of Social 
Welfare and former Director-General for Social Services and 
Rehabilitation in the Ministry of Social Affairs, speech at UNICEF 
headquarters in New York, in Sunusi 2013, p. 1 (italics in original). 
 
‘The role of Child Welfare Institutions is to support the care of children within 
their families and to provide services for children in need of alternative care.’ 
 
Decree of the Minister of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. 
National standards of care in Child Welfare Institutions (Government of 
Indonesia 2011, p. 29). 
 
Overview 
To set the scene for the detailed analysis of Indonesian policymaking on panti asuhan, 
this chapter provides a brief introduction to recent developments in Indonesia, discusses 
the general nature and characteristics of panti asuhan and outlines how the new panti 
asuhan policy has been explained by the Indonesian Government and international 
players. In particular, it describes the standard, public narrative about panti asuhan 
policy change as presented by the Indonesian Government and some international 
players, namely, that the new policy was designed primarily to comply with Indonesia’s 
international children’s rights obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Within Indonesia, however, the new policy put panti asuhan at the centre of 
policy implementation activities. The apparent discrepancy between international 
statements and domestic policy realities suggests that the making of new panti asuhan 
policy was a more complex undertaking than portrayed in the standard account, and 
provides the impetus for a more detailed examination of Indonesian policymaking on 
panti asuhan than has been undertaken to date.    
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4.1 Indonesia: an overview of recent developments  
After about 350 years of colonial rule, predominantly under the Dutch, Indonesia gained 
political independence in 1945. Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno, held office from 
1945 until 1967 (Ricklefs 2001, p. 262). Suharto became President in 1967. Lasting 
until 1998, Suharto’s regime, which became widely known as the ‘New Order’, 
promoted economic growth based on stable, authoritarian and highly centralised rule 
(Elson 2001, pp. 167-308, Ricklefs 2001, pp. 342-407). Amongst other major changes 
during the New Order, Suharto expanded the role of the military in civilian affairs, 
including through the appointment of senior military personnel as ministers and in other 
key civilian roles, and opposed territorial fragmentation, most notably in East Timor, 
Aceh and Irian Jaya (present-day Papua) (Hill & Shiraishi 2007, pp. 124-25).  
 
Despite corrupt financial practices that were encouraged by Suharto, his family and 
business associates (discussed further in Chapter 9 as they relate to the growth of panti 
asuhan), the Indonesian economy grew strongly during the New Order, with average 
annual growth rates of 6.5 per cent being recorded between 1967 and 1997 (Brown 
2006, p. 956). Between 1976 and 1996, the number of Indonesians living at or below 
the poverty line (a measurement of food adequacy and non-food expenditure on needs 
such as housing, clothing, health and education) fell from 40.1 per cent of the 
population (or 54.2 million persons) to 11.3 per cent (or 22.4 million persons) 
(Government of Indonesia 2003, p. 7). Between the 1970s and late 1990s, across-the-
board improvements were also made in education and health (Sumarto 2006, p. 2). 
Amongst other indicators, life expectancy at birth increased to 65 years in 1997 
compared with 55 years in 1980, near universal entry into primary education was 
achieved by the early 1980s, and there was near universal completion of primary 
education by the end of the Suharto era (Daly & Fane 2002, p. 317).  
 
Indonesia was severely impacted by the financial crisis that swept through many Asian 
economies in 1997-98. Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell from a growth 
rate of 4.95 per cent in 1997 to negative 13.7 per cent in the following year 
(International Monetary Fund 1999, p. 3). The Asian financial crisis was a significant 
factor in precipitating Suharto’s fall from power in May 1998. Suharto’s political 
demise ushered in a period which became widely known as the Reformasi (or reform) 
era under Presidents Habibie (May 1998 to October 1999), Wahid (October 1999 to July 
2001), Megawati (July 2001 to October 2004) and Yudhoyono (October 2004 to 
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October 2014) (though outside the scope of this study, Joko Widodo became President 
in October 2014).  
 
The Reformasi era has seen far-reaching changes to Indonesia’s national political, social 
and economic policy directions, as well as efforts to improve the country’s international 
image. The swing toward democratic reform was signalled when, in 1999, Indonesia 
held its first free elections since 1955 (Barton 2001, pp. 273-81, Hill & Shiraishi 2007, 
pp. 123-41). Amongst other major developments in the first few years of Reformasi 
were improvements in freedom of speech and freedom of the press, a referendum on the 
future of East Timor, and the passage of laws to decentralise much administrative and 
decision-making power from Jakarta to sub-national levels of government (Aspinall & 
Fealy 2003). According to Hill and Shiraishi (2007), by around 2004, Indonesia’s 
macroeconomic position had largely stabilised after the catastrophic Asian financial 
crisis, with poverty incidence rates and per capita income levels returning to the levels 
of the mid-1990s (p. 123). Post-Suharto governments have also sought to improve 
Indonesia’s international standing, including by seeking to strengthen relationships with 
other Asian countries (He 2008, pp. 47-72). As discussed further in Chapter 6, the early 
Reformasi era saw Indonesia adopt UN instruments relating to matters such as human 
rights and the rights of children, such as the International Labour Organisation 
Convention concerning the elimination of the worst forms of child labour.    
 
4.2 Panti asuhan: key characteristics and research  
4.2.1 Definitions and history. Most Indonesian children are raised within their family 
home, either by parents or other family members, or in the homes of extended family 
members. Children who live away from their immediate and extended families do so in 
a range of differing residential circumstances. There are three main types of institutions 
in Indonesia that provide care and education to children on a residential basis outside 
the family home which are collectively known as panti sosial anak: first, boarding 
schools or pesantren or pondok pesantren (pondok means dormitory) that provide full-
time care and education based on Islamic principles at no or minimal direct financial 
cost (these may be called different names in different places, for example, dayah in 
Aceh); second, panti sosial penyandang cacat, or institutions that care for children with 
disabilities; and, finally, panti asuhan, or institutions for orphaned, neglected or 
abandoned children (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, p. 15).  
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With historical roots dating back at least to the sixteenth century as places of learning 
for followers of Islam (santri), Islamic boarding schools or pesantren are Indonesia’s 
oldest form of formal education for children and young people (Vickers 2005, p. 55, 
Endang 2006, Federspiel 2015). Parents send their children to pesantren for a variety of 
reasons. For some families, pesantren provide access to education for their children at a 
lower cost than is otherwise available through the State education system, while other 
families who have no financial hardships may choose pesantren for religious or 
ideological reasons (Lukens-Bull 2005, p. 18). Typically, the pesantren curriculum 
includes traditional religious education, elements of the government approved 
educational curriculum, and vocational training. Pesantren teaching focuses on Islam’s 
principal holy book (the Qur’an), Arabic language and Islamic traditions and law 
(Lukens-Bull 2005, pp. 18-19).  
 
It is common for boys and girls to enter pesantren at the age of six years and live there 
until around the age of 18 years. While many pesantren provide full-time residential 
facilities, there is often ongoing contact between children and their families, in 
particular, during the holy fasting month of Ramadan, when many children return to 
their family homes. Children’s institutions of all types in Indonesia often receive 
charitable gifts from the Islamic faithful during Ramadan in accordance with religious 
practices such as sadaqah or voluntary charity (Lukens-Bull 2005, pp. 62-65, Frederick 
& Worden 2011, pp. 153-54). While some pesantren teach elements of the Indonesian 
Government’s secular curriculum, they have a primarily religious aim, that is, to 
inculcate Islamic values, often through the methods of rote learning and memorisation 
of the Qur’an (Rabasa 2005, p. 101). Pesantren are led by religious teachers called kyai. 
Most, but not all, pesantren and kyai are affiliated with the Islamic social welfare 
organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (Lukens-Bull 2005, p. 17). Pesantren differ from another 
major form of Islamic educational institution for children and young people, the 
madrasa (school), which combines religious subjects taught at pesantren with secular 
subjects from the government education system (Kuipers 2011, p. 154). Unlike most  
pesantren, madrasa do not normally provide residential (pondok) accommodation, but 
many do so, especially in remote regions.There are over 40,000 madrasa in Indonesia 
with around six million primary and secondary pupils (Hafidz 2012). 
 
Besides pesantren, the other major form of residential child care is panti asuhan. Panti 
asuhan is an Indonesian language term that denotes a place for the rearing of orphans 
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and children who live away from their family. The word panti is commonly translated 
as a ‘home’, ‘residence’ or ‘institution’. The word asuhan means ‘rearing’, ‘education’ 
or ‘upbringing’. The root term from which the word asuhan derives is asuh, meaning ‘to 
nurse’ or ‘to bring up’). The term ‘panti asuhan’ is often coined as the shortened form 
of panti sosial asuhan anak, which is translated as ‘institutions for the upbringing of 
children’ (anak or child) or ‘social institutions for the care of children’. Both panti 
sosial asuhan anak and panti asuhan are often shortened to panti or its Anglicised 
plural form, pantis. Panti asuhan is the term used in this study to denote these various 
forms in both plural and singular senses.  
 
Chapter 9 discusses the factors behind the growth of panti asuhan, especially during and 
after Suharto’s New Order. At this point we might note that orphanages were unknown 
in Indonesian society as places for the care of orphaned, neglected or abandoned 
children prior to the arrival of Dutch colonists in the early sixteenth century; such 
children were generally raised by relatives and others within local communities. 
Orphanages were introduced by the Dutch colonial government. In the early twentieth 
century, the Dutch orphanage model was appropriated by local Islamic socio-religious 
welfare organisations who expanded the number of panti asuhan throughout Indonesia. 
President Sukarno supported the growth of panti asuhan to help care for children who 
had been abandoned or orphaned during and after World War Two. Under Suharto, the 
number of panti asuhan grew rapidly due to strong State financial and other forms of 
support, a trend that continued over much of the first decade of the Reformasi era.   
 
Returning to the present day, there is considerable fluidity, and hence room for 
confusion, in relation to how different forms of Indonesian children’s institutions are 
defined and categorised. One of the most significant definitional problems arises 
because children may be placed in pesantren by their families not only to access Islamic 
education but, as with panti asuhan, also to help cope with family financial hardship 
(Hicks 2011, pp. 57-59). While panti asuhan are generally regarded as places for 
children whose families cannot afford school fees and of lower social status than 
pesantren, the distinction between them is often blurred. All panti asuhan provide free 
education, food and lodging to children, although children in them are frequently 
required to perform tasks such as cleaning and meal preparation (Save the Children UK 
et al. 2007, p. 189).  
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Some pesantren provide free education to children depending on their family’s financial 
circumstances and may describe themselves as panti asuhan. Save the Children UK et 
al. (2006) noted, for example, that some children’s institutions in Aceh described 
themselves as either or both a dayah (pesantren) and a panti asuhan in order to access 
different sources of government funding (pp. 13-16). In other places, a panti asuhan 
may be run within a pesantren or other educational facilities such as kindergartens and 
elementary schools.  
 
4.2.2 Numbers, ownership and funding. In the absence of a comprehensive national 
child protection and care information system, no accurate and up-to-date information is 
available about the number of children’s institutions, or the number of children in these 
institutions, in Indonesia (this problem of counting is also seen in many other areas 
relating to child protection and care in Indonesia to the present day, such as in the fields 
of early marriage and children subjected to sexual violence (Boothby & Stark 2011, pp. 
993-95)). With respect to pesantren, the latest available estimate, provided by the 
Indonesian Directorate General of Islamic Organisations (cited in Save the Children UK 
et al. 2007, p.31), was that in 2003-4 there were 3,364,180 children receiving Islamic 
education through 14,655 pesantren.  
 
The precise number of panti asuhan is unknown, a matter that is discussed further in 
Chapter 8. A range of estimates has been provided by the Indonesian Government and 
INGO sources. Save the Children UK et al. (2007, p. 19) estimated that there were 
between 5,250 and over 8,610 institutions, in which between 370,230 and 516,000 
children lived. Using data about the number of panti asuhan that were provided with 
government fuel subsidy reduction compensation (Chapter 8 contains further discussion 
of the Indonesian Government’s Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan 
Bakar Minyak, or fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme, which offered financial 
assistance to panti asuhan and other institutions to help offset increases in the cost of 
fuel resulting from reductions in government fuel subsidisation), the Indonesian 
Government (2013) stated that, in 2009, 167,000 children lived in 5,712 panti asuhan.  
 
Yet, other Indonesian Government figures differ. In 2013, Senior Advisor to the 
Indonesian Minister of Social Welfare and former Director-General for Social Services 
and Rehabilitation in the Ministry of Social Affairs (widely known in Indonesia as 
Kemensos, the acronym for Kementerian Sosial), Makmur Sunusi (2013), stated that 
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institutional care in Indonesia had been ‘very much on the rise’ during the early 2000s, 
with 8,000 panti asuhan caring for up to half a million children. He added that 90 per 
cent of children in panti asuhan were not orphans, but had been placed in institutions 
due to parental poverty. He did not, however, provide any information in support of 
these claims. 
 
As is the case with the numbers of panti asuhan and children in panti asuhan, the full 
picture of who owns and operates Indonesia’s panti asuhan is far from clear. 
Comprehensive and up-to-date information about panti asuhan ownership is not 
available, although estimates can be made from a range of sources. The three largest 
operators of panti asuhan are the mass Indonesian socio-religious organisations, 
Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and, to a lesser extent, Hidayatullah. With a strong 
rural base especially in central and eastern Java, Nahdlatul Ulama is the largest Islamic 
organisation in Indonesia with an estimated 50 million members. Muhammadiyah is the 
second largest Islamic organisation with an estimated 35 million members drawn 
predominantly from educated urban backgrounds (Mujani & Liddle 2004, p. 111). Most 
pesantren are affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama. Many Nahdlatul Ulama-affiliated 
pesantren share the same main characteristics as panti asuhan run by other 
organisations, that is, they mostly provide food, shelter and basic education for children 
who are either orphaned or, more frequently, sent by poor families so that their children 
can access educational opportunities. Nahdlatul Ulama loosely coordinates its pesantren 
through a foundation called Yayasan Al Maarif although individual pesantren usually 
operate with a high degree of autonomy under the control of a kyai. By contrast, 
Muhammadiyah exercises greater centralised control over its panti asuhan as well as its 
other education and health care institutions (Sirry 2010, pp. 60-74, Hicks 2011, p. 58).  
 
There are a variety of estimates of the number of Muhammadiyah-operated panti 
asuhan. Lubis (2004) put the number at 240 (p. 106) . Fauzia (2008) claimed that 
Muhammadiyah operated 330 orphanages, with a key role in panti asuhan management 
being played by women from Muhammadiyah’s adult-women’s branch, ‘Aisyiyah (p. 
180). Muhammadiyah’s own documents state that it operated 421 panti asuhan in 2010 
(Central Board of Muhammadiyah 2010). Yet another figure, provided to the author by 
a member of Muhammadiyah’s social welfare staff, was that, in 2013, Muhammadiyah 
operated between 750 and 1,000 panti asuhan (2013, pers. comm., 2 August).  
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The number of panti asuhan operated by Nahdlatul Ulama is even less precisely known, 
reflecting the fact that, at the national level, Nahdlatul Ulama exercises little 
administrative control over its local panti asuhan. Save the Children UK et al. (2007) 
estimated that Nahdlatul Ulama operated 103 panti asuhan, while another Islamic 
organisation, Hidayatullah, had 246 branches, most of which ran panti asuhan (as a 
form of pesantren, which it described as centres for the education of pious children or 
Pusat Pendidikan Anak Shaleh) (p. 22).   
 
Numerous other Islamic organisations operate panti asuhan. These organisations 
include Al Amin, Nur Ilahi and Ibnu Taimiyah in West Kalimantan, Al Ummah in 
Aceh, Al Hidayah, Nurul Ikhlas in Maluku, and Nahdlatul Wathon in Nusa Tenggara 
Barat and other provinces (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 65). In 2000, the 
minority Islamic group, Ahmadiyah, opened a panti asuhan in Tasikmalaya, West Java 
(Rayda 2010). In addition, overseas Islamic organisations fund panti asuhan in 
Indonesia. In the 1990s, Al-Birr—the Charitable Foundation of Royal Family of 
Dubai—opened an office within Muhammadiyah’s premises in Jakarta. Later renamed 
the Asian Muslim Ceretif Foretion (Asian Muslim Charity Foundation), this 
organisation has since funded 89 orphanages, most of which are operated by 
Muhammadiyah and some by Persatuan Islam (Persis), an organisation which, since 
being founded in 1923, has been active in establishing pesantren, particularly in West 
Java (Latief 2012, pp. 237-38).  
 
Panti asuhan are also operated by non-Islamic religious and secular organisations and 
individuals. There are, for example, several Christian-run panti asuhan in West 
Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, and Maluku (Siahaan 2009, Buwalda 2011, Jaringan Kerja 
Lembaga-Lembaga Pelayanan Kristen di Indonesia (JKLPK) 2013). Secular 
international organisations that run panti asuhan include SOS Children’s Villages 
International, which operates in several provinces, including West Java, Jakarta, Bali 
and Aceh (see also discussion about SOS Kinderdorf, the earlier name for SOS 
Children’s Villages, in Chapter 9) (SOS children's villages Indonesia 2013).  
 
Individuals and groups from other countries also contribute financially to, and even 
operate, panti asuhan. Overseas-sourced donations to panti asuhan include those from 
Muslims in countries such as Australia who contribute to orphanages, especially at the 
end of the holy month of Ramadan, through collection and remittance agencies 
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(discussed further in Chapter 9) (Marcoes 2015). The Indonesian Government itself 
operates panti asuhan, although in very small numbers compared with private religious 
and other providers. In 2007, of between 4,305 and 8,610 panti asuhan, the Indonesian 
Government operated only 35 panti asuhan, whilst an unknown number were run 
directly by province and district governments (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 1, 
18).  
 
Panti asuhan receive financial support from a variety of sources in addition to, or 
separate from, the national government. In the absence of comprehensive, publicly-
available reporting on panti asuhan internal financial matters, glimpses were provided 
by the 2007 Save the Children-led study and from the author’s examination of panti 
asuhan websites. Save the Children UK et al. (2007) found at least eight revenue 
sources in the panti asuhan sample group (pp. 72-73). While important income sources 
for many panti asuhan were the national government’s fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation scheme (discussed in Chapter 8) and grants provided by sub-national 
levels of government in the context of administrative decentralisation from Jakarta, 
other sources included donations from individuals and the community, private 
companies, international supporters and the panti asuhan’s parent organisation (Chapter 
9 further discusses how Islamic charitable giving practices support panti asuhan).   
 
4.2.3 Previous studies. From an academic standpoint there has been only relatively 
limited examination of how panti asuhan operate and their short and long-term effects 
on children. Only five academic studies concerning panti asuhan have been issued over 
the past decade (with none appearing prior to that). These derive from the fields of 
social anthropology, paediatrics, psychiatry, and social work.  
 
First, in an unpublished graduate dissertation through the University of Oslo, social 
anthropologist Skavelden (2007) examined three panti asuhan in the central Java city of 
Yogyakarta in which she lived for six months in 2006 and 2007. As discussed further in 
Chapter 9, she found evidence that panti asuhan played generally well-understood and 
accepted roles in Yogyakarta society as places that helped to promote a sense of 
selfhood amongst Javanese children (Skavelden 2007, p. 11). She found that panti 
asuhan provided opportunities for children from poor rural backgrounds to learn refined 
behaviours, disciplines and social skills. At least with respect to the three children’s 
homes studied, it appeared that the panti asuhan were seen by families of children and 
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the broader community as helping children to achieve a better life, as well as providing 
opportunities for local women to develop and express personal standing and prestige in 
the wider local community. In contrast to popular representations of life in children’s 
homes in the Global North where child-parent links were often completely severed, 
Skavelden (2007) found many similarities between life in panti asuhan and life in 
Javanese households (pp. 64-86).  
 
Paediatricians Mulyardi and Soedjatmiko (2009) studied 40 children aged between 12 
and 24 months in ten orphanages in Jakarta, Bogor and Tangerang. Compared with a 
sample group of 40 children of similar age who were raised in family home settings, 
they found significantly higher rates of delayed language development amongst children 
living in panti asuhan (52.5 per cent of children in panti asuhan compared with 27.5 per 
cent of children in family home environments). They attributed this gap to a lower 
quality of ‘home stimulation’ in panti asuhan, that is, in areas such as care-giver 
emotional responsiveness to the child and the availability of appropriate play materials 
(Mulyadi et al. 2009, pp. 25-32).  
 
Wanat et al. (2010), psychiatrists from Stanford and Emory Universities (US), used a 
qualitative approach to examine the challenges and coping strategies adopted by a 
sample of 14 young people aged 10-14 years in one Jakarta pesantren, some of whom 
had been transported to these institutions from Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. They found that the positive aspects most frequently mentioned by 
interviewees included access to education and friendship, while the most challenging 
aspects were sub-optimal educational opportunities and a lack of engagement with the 
adult staff (Wanat et al. 2010, pp. 45-50). The study by Wanat et al. focused on a 
pesantren but is mentioned because, as noted earlier, it can sometimes be difficult to 
distinguish between pesantren and panti asuhan. While children living in panti asuhan 
would usually originate from poorer families than those accessing pesantren who do so 
in order to provide an Islamic education for their children, the distinction is not always 
clear-cut. Many of the children in Wanat et al.’s sample group were children who had 
been displaced as a result of the 2004 tsunami and who had subsequently been 
transported from Aceh to Jakarta. These children appeared, therefore, to have many of 
the same characteristics as those who would usually be seen in panti asuhan, that is, of 
being abandoned or orphaned. 
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From a social work perspective, an unpublished graduate dissertation by Mughni (2011) 
through Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, examined conditions in two panti 
asuhan in Yogyakarta’s Bantul District. The study found that the panti asuhan provided 
‘comprehensive services’, such as physical safety, support for religious expression, 
employment-related education, and support groups and the ‘orphanages acting as family 
for the children’. Mughni recommended that a range of improvements be made to these 
panti asuhan, in particular, improving training for adult workers, employing 
professional social workers, offering greater opportunities for children to express their 
views, and enhancing vocational training for the children and young people.  
 
More recently, Sandika et al. (2014) examined the perceptions of five boys aged 
between 14 and 18 years who lived in Taman Harapan orphanage in central Java. From 
interviews with this small group, the authors pointed to a range of circumstances that 
led to the boys being sent to the panti asuhan. These included a desire to meet parental 
expectations about attaining an education and problems faced by some families that 
could not afford to keep their children at home due to parental illness (Sandika & 
Yuwono 2014, pp. 69-70).     
 
It will be noted that the sample sizes in this handful of studies were small, ranging from 
five to 40 children and young people and between one to 10 panti asuhan. These factors 
naturally limit the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about matters such as the 
conditions and effects of panti asuhan for larger cohorts of Indonesia children living in 
these places. It is noteworthy, too, that there has been no peer-reviewed research into 
the social, health, economic and other outcomes for Indonesian adults who lived in 
panti asuhan as children, or the effects on parents and other family members arising 
from the institutionalisation of their children. Moreover, while there are comparatively 
rich veins of academic research into the role of pesantren in inculcating Islamic values 
and identity (see, for example, Lukens-Bull 2005, van Doorn-Harder 2006, and 
Srimulyani 2012), no similar inquiries have been conducted in relation to panti asuhan 
(Lukens-Bull 2005, van Doorn-Harder 2006, Srimulyani 2012).  
 
Four non-peer reviewed reports have also been issued during the past decade that focus 
either wholly or partially on panti asuhan. In 2006, Save the Children in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNICEF issued a report entitled A rapid 
assessment of children’s homes in post-tsunami Aceh, which examined the situation for 
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children in Aceh who had been displaced by the 2004 tsunami (Save the Children UK et 
al. 2006). In 2007, Save the Children, again working in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and UNICEF, issued a report entitled ‘Someone that matters’. The quality 
of care in childcare institutions in Indonesia (Save the Children UK et al. 2007). The 
latter report examined the circumstances for children living in 37 panti asuhan in six 
Indonesian provinces, including Aceh. In 2013, Save the Children issued a report 
entitled Changing the paradigm. Save the Children’s work to strengthen the child 
protection system in Indonesia 2005-2012 which provided an overview of Save the 
Children’s work in Indonesia since 2005 aimed at improving child protection and family 
support, with a particular focus on childcare institutions (Save the Children Indonesia 
2013). These three Save the Children reports are discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
Finally, in 2012, UNICEF’s Indonesia office, in conjunction with the SMERU Research 
Institute (an independent research and public policy studies institute based in Jakarta) 
and the Indonesian Government’s Ministry of National Development Planning (Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional or Bappenas) issued a report entitled Child poverty 
and disparities in Indonesia: challenges for inclusive growth (UNICEF Indonesia et al. 
2012). This report contained a brief qualitative assessment of a panti asuhan in north 
Jakarta. Of note, UNICEF Indonesia et al. (2012, p. 170) found that most of the children 
inside the panti asuhan had at least one living parent, and that 
 
…some children were taken to the panti by their parents, while others were 
invited by a friend or sibling who had been living there. Some of the residents 
had both parents living in slums near the panti. These children were entrusted to 
live at the panti so that they would be enrolled in school and have a better place 
to live.  
 
The study also indicated that placement in a panti asuhan had led to improvements in 
the quality of life for some children as they were not required to perform domestic 
labour and were provided with some access to education whereas these children had 
previously been required to undertake domestic labour and were not provided with 
access to schooling whilst living with their biological families, relatives or guardians 
(UNICEF Indonesia et al. 2012, p. 171).  
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4.3 The new panti asuhan policy and its depiction 
Having noted various features of panti asuhan, I turn to a discussion of the 
characteristics of Indonesia’s new policy on panti asuhan and how the Indonesian 
Government and some international players have depicted it to date.  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the new policy on panti asuhan was hailed by 
UNICEF and Save the Children as an exemplar of deinstitutionalisation policymaking 
in the Global South. For the Indonesian Government, the policy was also portrayed as a 
momentous development. At a gathering at UNICEF’s headquarters in New York in 
April 2013, Makmur Sunusi, Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister of Social 
Welfare and former Director-General for Social Services and Rehabilitation in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, stated that ‘Indonesia has been implementing what we call a 
paradigm shift, moving from a child welfare system that was based primarily on 
residential care towards a system that is centred on family-based care.’ (Sunusi 2013, 
p. 1) (italics in original). Sunusi was referring to decisions taken by the Indonesian 
Government, commencing in 2007, to revise its former policy of providing significant 
financial and other support to panti asuhan in favour of a new policy under which 
government would reduce the number of children entering panti asuhan.  
 
The Indonesian Government did not express its new policy in a single announcement 
but through several initiatives that began to appear from around 2007 (Sudrajat 2010). 
The new policy had four major components. First, in 2007, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, assisted by Save the Children, announced that it would establish a national 
database for children in alternative care. The aim of the database was to ensure that no 
panti asuhan would receive a government subsidy unless it was registered on this 
official database. The Ministry of Social Affairs requested all provinces to register 
children’s institutions, including panti asuhan, in their jurisdictions on a central 
Ministry of Social Affairs database (Save the Children Indonesia 2013, p. ix). Panti 
asuhan were supplied with a registration number as they were entered onto the database. 
According to the Ministry of Social Affairs (cited in Save the Children Indonesia 2011, 
p. 2), between 2008 and 2011, information on 3,898 panti asuhan and 123,669 children 
from all provinces had been recorded on the database. According to Save the Children 
Indonesia (2013), under the new policy, panti asuhan that were registered on the new 
database and were thus entitled to receive government financial assistance would be 
required to expend at least 40 per cent on children living with their families, with that 
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amount rising to at least 60 per cent (neither the available Save the Children nor 
Ministry of Social Affairs documents indicated, however, when such targets were to be 
met) (p. ix). 
 
Second, work commenced in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2007 to develop a 
government regulation on alternative care. The draft regulation would aim to establish 
the requirements and processes for a range of family support and alternative care 
matters, such as how foster care and institutional care would operate. At the time of 
writing this dissertation, discussions were continuing within the Indonesian Government 
about this initiative (Sunusi 2013, p. 2).  
 
Third, between 2008 and 2011, new national standards of care for children in 
institutions were developed. The standards were based on the understanding that the 
‘best interests’ of the child, as per the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, would 
be promoted by social welfare interventions that would work to strengthen the 
capacities of families and communities in which children lived. They emphasised the 
importance of protecting children’s rights, promoting the strengths of the child, family 
and community, and assessing children’s physical, psychological, social and spiritual 
needs in making decisions about the type of care that should be provided (Government 
of Indonesia 2011, pp. 29-119). Key principles on which the standards rested included a 
child’s right to a family, the responsibility of parents for the care and protection of 
children, the prevention of family separation, the need to provide a continuum of care 
from family-based care to care provided by others in the community outside the family, 
and support for families to care for their own children (Government of Indonesia 2011, 
pp. 19-23). According to the Indonesian Government (2011, p. 7), the national standards 
were aimed at  
 
…fulfilling children’s rights to receive care in their families; providing guidance 
to the Child Welfare Institutions [the Indonesian Government’s new name for 
panti asuhan, see below] in carrying out their role as the last alternative in the 
care of children; developing direct services to support families that face 
challenges in the care of their children; supporting family-based alternative care 
for children through foster care, guardianship, and adoption; and facilitating the 
competent authorities in developing management systems for Child Welfare 
Institutions that meet the needs of children and their families.  
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Matters covered by other standards included care planning and assessment of the needs 
of children by Child Welfare Institutions, respect for the child’s dignity as a human 
being, protection from violence, ensuring that the child has a clear legal identity, 
supporting the relationship between the child and his/her family or relatives, the 
provision of adequate food and clothing, access to health and education services, 
prohibition of child labour, and the involvement of parents and families in important 
decisions about their children. Finally, a range of organisational standards were 
promulgated. These included provisions concerning the legal establishment and 
registration of a Child Welfare Institution, their accreditation by an Accreditation Board 
for Social Welfare organisations, and the provision of adequate facilities and reporting 
to the Ministry of Social Affairs (Government of Indonesia 2011). 
 
Of particular note, the new national standards placed panti asuhan (which were to be 
renamed Lembaga Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak, or Child Welfare Institutions) at the 
centre of new service delivery arrangements. According to the Indonesian Government 
(2011, pp. 29-33), the new roles of panti asuhan were 
 
…to support the care of children within their families and to provide services for 
children in need of alternative care…[to] carry out preventive measures so that 
the child is not separated from his or her family or needs to be placed in 
residential care…[and to] facilitate financial or psychosocial support for the 
child in the family or to develop access and make referrals to other organisations 
that provide services to vulnerable families. 
 
Finally, in 2009, the national government established the Program Kesejahteraan Sosial 
Anak, or the Social Welfare Program for Children, to fund panti asuhan as well as 
support children under the age of five years, children with disabilities, children in 
contact with the law, and children in need of special protection (Government of 
Indonesia et al. 2011, p. 10). The principal aims of the Program Kesejahteraan Sosial 
Anak were to help enhance family and community responsibility for the care of 
children, and to help transform panti asuhan into centres that would, over time, offer 
increasing amounts of financial and other forms of support to vulnerable families and 
children in the community with the aim that fewer children would be relinquished to 
institutions. The new Program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak incorporated the Indonesian 
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Government’s previous system of financial support to panti asuhan through the fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation scheme (Government of Indonesia et al. 2011, p. 30).  
 
As part of this transformation process, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the local 
government of West Java supported Save the Children to establish a pilot child and 
family support project in Bandung under which the Bandung Child and Family Support 
Centre (Pusat Dukungan Anak dan Keluarga) would assess the needs of vulnerable 
families and children with a view to providing additional support so that children were 
not placed in institutions except as a last resort (Government of Indonesia 2010a, 2010b, 
pp. 6-7, UNICEF Indonesia et al. 2012, pp. 166-67, Sunusi 2013, p. 3).  
 
Significantly, the new policy has been publicly depicted by the Indonesian Government 
and Save the Children as a major ‘paradigm shift’ for Indonesia in terms of moving 
away from reliance on panti asuhan which, these parties claimed, cared for over 
500,000 children (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 19, Cantwell et al. 2012, p. 70, 
Sunusi 2013, p. 1). As noted above, the statement in 2013 by Makmur Sunusi, former 
Director-General for Social Services and Rehabilitation in the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, characterised the new policy as ‘a paradigm shift, moving from a child welfare 
system that was based primarily on residential care towards a system that is centred on 
family-based care.’ (Sunusi 2013, p. 1) (italics in original).  
 
Save the Children claimed a major role in motivating the Indonesian Government to 
adopt the new policy. They stated that the new policy represented a ‘major shift in 
government thinking’, reflective of the principles of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (Save the Children UK 2009, p. 19). Holding up Indonesia as a case study 
in deinstitutionalisation policy change, Save the Children Indonesia (2014) stated that 
its 2007 survey of panti asuhan conducted in conjunction with UNICEF and the 
Ministry of Social Affairs  
 
…revealed that almost 90% of the children living in institutions had one parent 
alive, and that 56% had both. Most children had been placed in residential care 
so that they could get an education, and stayed until they had completed 
secondary school. This revelation led to a major shift in government thinking. 
(emphasis added).  
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Save the Children Indonesia (2010) stated that Indonesia’s change of policy was 
especially noteworthy as Indonesia had one of the highest per capita rates of placement 
of children in institutions in the world. Save the Children Indonesia (2013, pp. viii-ix) 
claimed that its 
 
…research findings formed the basis for a wide range of recommendations and 
advocacy work, which led in 2008 to revised [Indonesian] government policies 
to support family based care. This, in conjunction with other work and research, 
culminated in child protection being included as a mainstream policy in the 
government’s National Strategic Plan 2010-2014.   
 
Aside from international players, statements by the Indonesian Government pointed to 
its compliance with international children’s rights standards as the main driver behind 
policy change. Indonesia presented a picture to the international community via the UN 
that it had, within only a few years, undertaken a significant policy shift from one of 
support for panti asuhan to a policy that embraced deinstitutionalisation in line with 
Indonesia’s international children’s rights obligations under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. In 2011, when introducing one of the major elements of the new 
policy, the Indonesian Government (2011) stated that its new national standards of care 
in Child Welfare Institutions responded directly to four recommendations issued by the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2004 (p. 3) . The Indonesian Government 
(2011, p. 3) also announced that the national standards were ‘based on the findings of 
two important studies conducted by Save the Children’. In 2013, Dr Makmur Sunusi, 
Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister of Social Welfare, further supported the view 
that Indonesia’s wish to conform to international children’s rights standards lay squarely 
behind the policy shift:  
 
Following the tsunami [of December 2004 which caused major damage and loss 
of life in the Indonesia province of Aceh as well as many other countries around 
the Indian Ocean littoral], and as a follow up to the recommendations of the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2004, the Indonesian Government 
started a review of the situation of children in alternative care with support from 
Save the Children and UNICEF. (Sunusi 2013, p. 1).   
 
86 
The new policy also enabled Indonesia to report to the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child in 2010 that it had made significant progress in meeting its international 
obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Indonesia’s combined 
third and fourth periodic reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2012, p. 5) noted that ratification of the 
Convention had inspired the amendment of Article 28B paragraph (2) of the Indonesian 
Constitution in 2000’ by the addition of the words that ‘Every child shall have the rights 
to survival, growth, and development and shall have the rights to protection from 
violence and discrimination’. Despite unpublished Indonesian Government figures 
(discussed in Chapter 8) revealing that the number of children in panti asuhan 
continued to rise steadily during the second half of the 2000s, the Indonesian 
Government (cited in UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 2012, p. 22) even 
claimed that it  
 
…ensures that every child has the right to be raised by their own parents, except 
when there are reasons and/or valid legal provisions indicating that separation 
may be in the best interest of the child and constituted the last resort.   
 
The report by the Indonesian Government (cited in UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child 2012, pp. 22-23) also commented on the treatment of children in panti asuhan, 
which it now referred to as ‘social foster homes’, and emphasised that the Indonesian 
Government had reviewed its practices concerning children living without parental care 
in direct response to previous recommendations by the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, as follows:  
 
97. The government ensures that every child has the right to be raised by their 
own parents, except when there are reasons and/or valid legal provisions 
indicating that separation may be in the best interest of the child and 
constituted the last resort.  
 
98. Responding to the Committee’s recommendations, the government 
conducted a comprehensive review of policies, standards and practices 
regarding children outside of family care. A study in 2007 assessed the 
situation in [social] foster homes in six provinces, Aceh, Central Java, West 
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Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara and Maluku….(emphasis 
added). 
 
100. The government has developed a database system of Children outside 
Family Care to facilitate their monitoring and oversight… 
 
102. To further improve services for children who have lost their family 
environments, the government will be undertaking the following measures:  
(a) Disseminating foster care standards in social foster homes;  
(b) Setting up systems for permits issuance, registration, and monitoring 
of social foster homes for children;  
(c) Developing and implementing [a] data collection system for children 
in alternative care, including children in social foster homes; and 
(d) Establishing policies and prioritizing family-like and community-
based care as the first alternative [to the placement of children in 
social foster homes].  
 
In passing, it should be noted that the Indonesian Government did not elaborate what it 
meant by ‘family-like and community-based care’ for children, referred to above. It 
seems likely, however, that this was taken to mean care not provided within a social 
foster home or panti asuhan but by persons living in a typical community setting who 
were either not biologically-related to the child (foster or adoptive parents) or who were 
relatives but not the child’s parents (kinship or relative carers). 
 
Thus, the dominant public narrative that has been advanced by international players and 
even the Indonesian Government to date is that Indonesia’s deinstitutionalisation policy 
was designed largely to enact the country’s international children’s rights obligations.  
 
The second noteworthy aspect of the new policy was that, far from providing detail 
about how and when the reduction or dismantling of panti asuhan would occur, as 
might be expected of a deinstitutionalisation policy, it actually placed these institutions 
at the centre of policy implementation. As noted above, panti asuhan were not only to 
continue to provide alternative care to children, but they were to be used as the 
mechanism—though renamed as Lembaga Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak—through which 
support to families would be delivered with the aim of reducing rates of child 
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relinquishment to institutions over an unspecified period of time. The new policy did 
not set timeframes for phasing out, or reducing the numbers of, panti asuhan and it 
envisaged that the new standards would be adopted by panti asuhan in order to gain 
ongoing access to government financial subsidisation. This meant, however, that the 
large number of panti asuhan that did not receive subsidies were under no compulsion 
to comply or be part of the new policy arrangements (as discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, 
not all panti asuhan receive government subsidies, and many operate with funding from 
their parent organisation or other sources such as donations).  
 
Moreover, the national government’s decisions to continue to use panti asuhan as the 
focal point for implementation of the new policy diverged from views expressed by 
Save the Children. Save the Children UK et al. (2007, p. 300) had recommended that: 
 
Direct services to support families who are facing challenges in the care of their 
children should be developed and piloted…and should be provided by the 
Government in partnership with community and faith based organisations that 
are crucial to social welfare service delivery in Indonesia.  
 
While leaving the door open as to how this could be achieved, Save the Children did not 
explicitly recommend the delivery of family support efforts through the existing 
network of panti asuhan. That decision was made by the national government for 
reasons that are explored later in this study.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
As well as providing background about panti asuhan, this chapter has highlighted two 
particular features of Indonesia’s new panti asuhan policy. It showed that the standard, 
public explanation offered by the Indonesian Government and some international 
players for the policy change was that it represented adherence to international 
children’s rights norms as contained in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and in recommendations issued by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.  
 
By way of contrast, however, in its domestic setting, Indonesian policy on panti asuhan 
adopted a gradualist approach to deinstitutionalisation that kept panti asuhan at the 
centre of policy implementation arrangements. The discrepancy between statements 
made in international arenas by the Indonesian Government and other players and the 
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realities of the new policy within Indonesia suggests that the making of new panti 
asuhan policy was a more complex undertaking than has been depicted to date. The 
following chapters employ Hajer’s discourse analysis methodology to reveal a far more 
nuanced picture of how the Indonesian Government’s policy shift on panti asuhan 
resulted from the complex interplay of domestic political, social, economic and other 
factors, as well as international dimensions, with origins that dated back at least to the 
1990s.   
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Chapter 5: Field research and main story lines 
 
Overview 
This chapter explains how the standard portrayal of policy change presented in the last 
chapter was investigated through field and desk research. Compared with the standard 
account of policy change, it previews the perspectives of policy actors about panti 
asuhan in the form of two main story lines. These perspectives reveal a complex 
policymaking story that goes well beyond the dominant public version of events. 
 
5.1 The case study: a preview  
As will be recalled from Chapter 3, Hajer advanced ten steps for policy analysis. These 
ten steps might be further divided into two parts: first, gathering data through field 
interviews and desk research to identify key story lines, inner narratives and metaphors 
as expressed by policy actors; and, second, identifying and analysing how differing 
story lines mobilised discourse-coalitions that interacted to shape new policy. In other 
words, the essential tasks are, first, to identify and analyse the story lines and, second, to 
identify how, and to what extent, these story lines mobilised discourse-coalitions that 
interacted to form new, or change existing, policy. 
 
The following five chapters examine Indonesia’s panti asuhan policy change story 
around these two parts. First, on the basis of interviews and other materials, Chapters 6-
10 outline and analyse two principal story lines and their inner narratives about panti 
asuhan. Second, Chapter 11 discusses how two discourse-coalitions were mobilised 
around these story lines, each vying for policy dominance. The latter chapter suggests 
that policy developed through a sequence (or what Hajer would term ‘discursive order’) 
in which a pro-reform discourse-coalition initially dominated the policy agenda 
(displaying ‘discourse structuration’), which was opposed by a pro-panti asuhan 
discourse-coalition. Concerns within government about a back-lash from pro-panti 
asuhan interests, and a degree of community acceptance about panti asuhan, meant that 
the final policy outcome (or ‘discourse institutionalisation’) represented an amalgam of 
deinstitutionalisation and status quo positions, rather than a simple victory for 
international children’s rights forces as portrayed in the standard version of events. 
Thus, despite the standard depiction by the Indonesian Government and international 
players, evidence in these chapters suggests that panti asuhan policy was, in fact, a 
compromise struck by the national government between two opposing sets of interests 
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about this form of child care. This chapter sets the scene for these chapters by 
explaining how field and other research was conducted and previewing the two main 
story lines that emerged from interviews. 
 
5.2 Interview selection  
Field-level data were collected during three visits to Indonesia between 2011 and 2013. 
An initial seven-day orientation and fact-finding visit was undertaken to the provinces 
of Jawa Barat (West Java), Nusa Tenggara Barat (or West Nusa Tenggara), and Nusa 
Tenggara Timur (or East Nusa Tenggara, including west Timor) in August 2011, 
facilitated by the Jakarta office of an INGO, Plan International. Following that visit, I 
conducted initial desk research about panti asuhan by examining documents about 
Indonesia, Indonesia’s social welfare programs, and panti asuhan as published by the 
Indonesian Government, the UN, UNICEF, the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and INGOs, such as Save the Children, World Vision and Plan International. 
Most of these documents were written in the English language. As a non-Indonesian 
language speaker, this step necessarily limited examination of documents not written in 
English, such as materials published on the Ministry of Social Affairs’ website about 
social welfare programs. To help overcome this limitation, I was assisted by staff from 
the Save the Children and Plan International offices in Jakarta, who helped to identify 
relevant Indonesian language publications and, where these appeared to relate to the 
study topic, to translate them either in summary form or in detail where appropriate.  
 
A second visit to Indonesia was conducted between 15 and 24 February 2012, which 
involved 12 ‘helicopter’ or high-level interviews in Jakarta with senior Indonesian 
national government officials, senior UN, local Indonesian NGO and INGO officials, 
and university researchers. These interviews enabled me to gain a general appreciation 
of the role of panti asuhan and the factors that may have been at play in the policy 
change process. These interviews were arranged jointly through the Jakarta offices of 
Save the Children and Plan International on the basis of discussions between myself and 
senior representatives of these organisations about people in government and non-
government circles who had either been directly involved with the policy change 
process or who had closely observed it in a professional capacity. Save the Children and 
Plan International officers arranged all interviews and assisted with translation from 
Indonesian language to English when required. I also visited a national government-
operated panti asuhan in Bandung (West Java), accompanied by Ministry of Social 
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Affairs and local Save the Children employees. Between the second and third field 
visits, I undertook further analysis of documents that were obtained during and after the 
February 2012 field visit.  
 
A third round of in-country interviews was conducted between 7 and 25 January 2013. 
As well as basic training in Indonesian language, this visit involved 29 interviews with 
22 people (seven were interviewed twice), including with a member of the national 
Parliament, senior Indonesian Government officials, senior local provincial or district 
government officials in Bandung, and senior UN, INGO and national NGO staff, as well 
as academics and a journalist with a national newspaper. Once again, all interviews 
were arranged through the Jakarta offices of Save the Children and Plan International. 
During that visit, a telephone interview was also conducted with a former employee of 
an INGO (then residing outside Indonesia) who had been closely associated with the 
Indonesian Government’s change of policy on panti asuhan. In August 2014, a further 
interview was conducted in Canberra with an employee of an Indonesia national NGO 
who had closely observed the panti asuhan policy development process.  
 
In all, 43 interviews with 35 people were conducted for this study (see Appendix A for a 
full listing of organisations consulted). Apart from telephone and in-Australia 
interviews, all interviews were held at interviewees’ offices, either in Jakarta or in 
Bandung. Table 5.1, below, provides a summary of interviews (see Appendix B for 
more detail on the interviews).  
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Table 5.1 Interviewee summary, 2012-14 
 
Category Code Number of interviews held Number of interviewees 
National politicians NP 1 1 
National government officials G 14 12 
Local provincial or district officials LG 2 2 
INGO representatives (current or former) IN 10 8 
National NGO representatives N 8 5 
Academics   A 4 3 
Journalists J 1 1 
UN officials UN 3 3 
Total  43 35 
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To ensure that the widest possible range of perspectives was obtained about the policy 
change process, interviewees were selected from the following eight fields: national 
politics; national government; provincial or district government; INGOs; national 
NGOs; academia; the UN; and, the media. Interviewees were selected because they (or 
their organisation) had either been directly associated with the panti asuhan decision-
making process as a government decision-maker, as an advocate for policy change, or 
had observed the process closely in a professional capacity.  
 
Being able to interview senior government representatives, especially in the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, who had been directly involved with developing, recommending and 
implementing the policy change on panti asuhan meant that first-hand access was 
obtained to those most directly involved with the policy change process (apart from the 
Minister for Social Affairs at the time of the policy change, Bachtiar Chamsyah, who 
was later gaoled for corruption). 
 
The identification of interviewees for the first and second round of field visits was made 
in consultation with staff at the Jakarta offices of Save the Children and Plan 
International. My growing familiarity with key players enabled me to independently 
identify interviewees for the third field visit.  
 
Appendices D and E respectively provide further information on the organisations 
consulted and on interview dates, types and locations.  
 
I interviewed senior INGO representatives who had conducted research on panti asuhan 
as part of an advocacy campaign to have the Indonesian Government change its policy 
on children’s institutions. I also interviewed senior representatives of Indonesian 
research, media and local non-government organisations who had closely observed the 
panti asuhan policy change process and were able to relate this to other aspects of 
Indonesian politics and society. In addition to interviews with middle-ranking 
representatives and officials, interviews were obtained at the level of Chairperson of a 
Komisi or Commission at the national political level (11 Komisi have been established 
as standing bodies of the House of Representatives, comprising members of the House 
of Representatives who undertake tasks such discussion and reporting on draft 
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legislation, the State draft budget and the implementation of laws and policies), at 
Director-General and Deputy Director-General level within national Government, at 
head of Provincial office level within local Provincial or district Government, at Chief 
Executive Officer level within INGOs and NGOs, at head of school/professor level 
within academia, at senior national social affairs editor level within a national English 
language daily newspaper, and at head of department level within a local UN office. 
Access to such well-placed elite individuals meant that the data collected were more 
likely to contain high-level strategic insights than, say, with more junior or middle-
ranking officials, or by relying only on published government documentation.  
 
Enlisting the assistance of local INGO staff to arrange interviews and to assist with 
translations raised questions about potential bias. I was cognisant that these employees 
and their organisations might have had real or perceived conflicts of interest in the way 
that the research was conducted by me and its final outcome. For example, their advice 
to me about the selection of interviewees could have been influenced by a wish for me 
to speak only to those who were well-known to the INGO concerned so that the INGO’s 
ongoing country operations would not be compromised. Moreover, I was aware of the 
possibility that interviews with critics of the deinstitutionalisation policy initiative might 
be side-stepped, and that translations from Indonesian to English might, either 
deliberately or inadvertently, lead to important nuances being missed. 
 
I sought to minimise potential bias in several ways. First, by undertaking a document 
review and conducting three field visits over the span of 18 months I was able to 
develop a detailed understanding of the main issues, personalities and organisations 
connected with the policy change process. As noted above, by the third field visit I was 
able to identify by myself the people I wanted to interview by name or organisation. 
With this knowledge, I was able to precisely advise my local INGO contacts about the 
people I wished to interview.  
 
Second, over the course of three visits to Indonesia, I paid particular attention to 
informing my local INGO contacts about the progress of the study. I discussed with 
them the gaps in interviews that needed to be filled and obtained their suggestions about 
who to interview. Through this process of discussion, I felt I was given a range of 
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potential interviewees from which select, rather than being presented with a list of 
interviewees entirely determined by my local contacts. Third, I always asked 
interviewees for their thoughts about other possible interviewees. Thus, I was able to 
widen the circle of advice beyond local INGO staff. In some cases, this technique led to 
additional interviews (occasionally, in the course of the initial interview or immediately 
after it).  
 
Finally, I sought to reduce bias in translations from Indonesian to English language by 
thoroughly briefing my translators on the purpose, background and key terms and 
concepts being used in the study. Again, conducting the study over three field visits 
proved invaluable as my translators gained in-depth knowledge of my study and 
recognised that my level of understanding about key concepts and matters such as 
government programs required less and less explanation. Moreover, by the third field 
visit, my growing familiarity with key Indonesian terms allowed me to follow parts of 
conversations, thus helping to verify to some extent that translations covered the matters 
being discussed by the interviewee. Translation bias was also reduced because at least 
half of all interviewees conducted interviews in English. At times, my local translator 
would assist in explaining complex terms, but generally this type of assistance was not 
required.   
 
All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured, conversational manner around two 
basic questions. First, in order to understand whether, and to what extent, interviewees 
either directly or indirectly influenced the decision-making process, all interviewees 
were asked: What was your role in the policy formulation process? Second, they were 
asked: Why did policy change occur? Supplementary questions included: Why did the 
change occur at the time it did? What made the policy change occur successfully? What 
problems were encountered? What had to be modified during the policymaking 
process? Handwritten notes or audio recordings (or both) were made during each 
interview with the interviewee’s prior informed consent. I later transcribed these notes 
and recordings into a typed format.  
 
To protect the identity of interviewees, each interviewee was assigned a code according 
to their respective professional field (see Table 5.1, above), the number of the interview 
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within a particular category, and the year of interview. For example, the first national 
government official interviewed during the January 2013 field visit was coded as 
interviewee GA-13, that is, ‘G’ for government official, ‘A’ to represent the first such 
official to be interviewed in that interview round, and ‘13’ to denote the year, that is, 
2013.  
 
Data obtained through interviews were coded and analysed to help make interpretations 
about why policy change occurred. Bozoki’s (2011) five steps for coding and analysis 
were followed, namely: first, being aware of barriers to the reliability of interview data, 
such as interviewer bias; second, identifying how key words and phrases reflect the 
interviewee’s subjective perceptions in contrast to ways that others construct the topic 
of research, such as a policy change; third, coding interviews in terms of the frequency 
with which key words and phrases appear; fourth, using other data sources, such as 
publications, to corroborate interviewee perceptions; and, finally, drawing inferences 
from the interview about policymaking.  
 
Interview transcripts were analysed as follows. I identified key words and phrases 
contained in each transcript. Key words and phrases were coded in terms of the 
frequency with which they appeared. Transcripts that used similar words or phrases 
were grouped together to reflect affinities in perspective amongst interviewees. These 
groupings ultimately formed the basis for the categorisation of interviews into one of 
two basic story lines. Also, coding of transcripts helped to discern narratives within 
particular story lines, that is, nuanced perspectives and attitudes in support of a basic 
story line but that were different from perspectives of others who also supported the 
same basic story line. Finally, in keeping with Hajer’s encouragement to take into 
account broader contextual factors, unpublished Indonesian Government documents and 
secondary published materials were consulted to help analyse and reflect upon the 
various policy discourses and reconstruct and draw inferences about the dynamics of 
policymaking.  
 
It should also be noted that extracts from interview transcripts are presented in Chapters 
6-10 of this dissertation in order to highlight key themes. In these chapters, interviewee 
comments that do not directly relate to interviewer questions were omitted and are 
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marked with dots (…). Also, for the sake of concision, interviewer questions (see 
above) were omitted from the transcripts contained in these chapters.      
 
5.3 Main story lines: a synopsis 
My interviews with a range of people from politics to journalism, from academia to 
international children’s rights advocacy, and from national bureaucracy to social 
welfare and religious groups, revealed two basic story lines about the reasons the 
Indonesian Government adopted a new policy on panti asuhan during the mid-to-late 
2000s. Each main story line, in turn, comprised differing narratives or ways of seeing 
and expressing the reasons for policy change.  
 
What I term the ‘pro-reform’ perspective held that policy on panti asuhan needed 
fundamental change. Interviewees expressed this story line using one or more of three 
principal narratives, that is, panti asuhan were either incompatible with international 
children’s rights standards, inconsistent with new social and economic policy directions, 
or too costly for government to continue to support.  
 
On the other hand, what I term the ‘status quo’ approach regarded panti asuhan as 
useful, and policy change as largely unnecessary. Interviewees holding this view tended 
to discuss panti asuhan as being helpful to poor families and/or as important in 
facilitating the performance of religious duty and other forms of community 
involvement. At the outset, it should be noted that interviewee reflections sometimes 
drifted across the two differing narratives to explain their adherence to either a reformist 
or status quo position. 
 
Table 5.2, below, summarises the two main story lines, narratives and players associated 
with them. 
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Table 5.2 Key findings: a typology of panti asuhan story lines 
  
Key story lines about panti asuhan  Key narratives (and sections in this study to which they 
relate) 
Main actors by profession 
or sector 
‘Pro-reform’ story line  
 
Panti asuhan were: 
 Incompatible with international children’s rights standards 
(Sections 6.1-6.2).  
 Inconsistent with new Indonesian Government social and 
economic policy directions (Sections 7.1-7.2). 
 Too costly for government to continue to support (Sections 
8.1-8.2). 
 National government 
officials 
 Child welfare/rights INGO  
 Child welfare/rights NGO 
 UN  
 National media 
 Academia/research 
‘Status quo’ story line Panti asuhan were: 
 Supported by Islamic teachings as a vehicle for charitable 
giving (Section 9.1-9.2). 
 Widely respected as a time-honoured practice in Indonesia 
for the care of children broadly defined as either neglected 
or orphaned (Section 9.1-9.2). 
 Socio-religious groups that 
operate panti asuhan 
 National parliament 
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5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined how field and desk research for this study was undertaken. On 
the basis of interviews with key policymakers, advocates and others, it previewed the 
finding that two basic story lines were held by policymakers, policy advocates and 
others about panti asuhan.  
 
The next five chapters present and analyse these two story lines and their inner 
narratives. As will be argued in Chapter 10, these story lines, in turn, mobilised the 
actions of two discourse-coalitions that vied for particular policy outcomes, that is, 
either policy reform to reduce the number of children in panti asuhan or preservation of 
the policy status quo. 
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Chapter 6: The ‘pro-reform’ story line (i): international factors 
 
‘Deinstitutionalisation policy was driven by Indonesia’s response to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child that children should not be placed in 
institutions.’  
 
A senior Ministry of Social Affairs official (GK-13). 
 
Overview 
This and the next two chapters identify three narratives expressed by policymakers and 
advocates of policy change that, taken together, form what may be termed a ‘pro-
reform’ story line about panti asuhan. The basic message of that story line was that 
government policy toward panti asuhan needed to be reformed because these children’s 
institutions had either become incompatible with international children’s rights 
standards, inconsistent with new Indonesian Government social and economic policy 
directions, and/or too costly for government to continue to support.  
 
This chapter examines the first of these narratives, namely, that panti asuhan were at 
odds with international children’s rights standards for the care of children outside their 
family environment. As in the remaining chapters of Part II, it is set out in two parts: 
first, an outline of the main aspects of the narrative as it emerged from interviews; and, 
second, using secondary data, an analysis of the claims made by those who held that 
narrative. The purpose of the second part is to produce what Hajer (2005, p. 307) 
defined as ‘data, not simply to reconstruct the arguments used, but to account for the 
argumentative exchange’ that leads to policy change, that is, to help corroborate 
explanations about why and how policy change occurred.   
 
6.1 Findings from the field 
Consistent with the standard portrayal of the panti asuhan policy change outlined in 
Chapter 4, senior national government officials, academics and INGO representatives 
expressed the view that, by the early-to-mid 2000s, Indonesian policy on panti asuhan 
had become seriously out-of-step with, if not in violation of, international children’s 
rights standards relating to children in alternative care. Two perspectives were 
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distinguishable amongst interviewees who held this overall view: first, amongst national 
government officials, that panti asuhan were increasingly seen to be inconsistent with 
the general policy directions adopted by Indonesian governments after the fall of 
Suharto in 1998 under which human rights issues were given greater emphasis in 
national laws and policies as well as in Indonesia’s international policy agenda; and, 
second, particularly amongst international players such as Save the Children, that the 
overuse of panti asuhan represented a contravention of UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child provisions relating to the care of children in alternative care. The remainder of 
this section outlines these two perspectives.    
 
6.1.1 Views from national government. The growing importance to Indonesian 
governments of adhering to international children’s rights standards in the decade after 
the fall Suharto was expressed by several senior Ministry of Social Affairs officials. A 
Ministry of Social Affairs official with responsibility for child welfare policy (GK-13) 
stated flatly that ‘deinstitutionalisation policy was driven by Indonesia’s response to the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that children should not be placed in 
institutions’. Another senior Ministry of Social Affairs official (GA-13) pointed to how 
recommendations by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child about Indonesia’s 
panti asuhan in the early 2000s, as well as to Save the Children’s research on panti 
asuhan after the 2004 tsunami, played important roles in shifting Indonesian 
Government attitudes on panti asuhan, as follows: 
 
In 2001 or 2002, the UN Committee of the Rights of the Child said that 
Indonesia had violated children’s rights by putting children into homes. But we 
did this so that children could get access to health, education and welfare. That 
[finding by the UN Committee] was the entry point for us to find alternative 
ways to help children. Then Save the Children came in after the tsunami. We 
needed research and Save the Children came up with the conclusion that 
children needed help.  
 
(Interviewee GA-13) 
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A leading social worker and senior official in the Ministry of Social Affairs (GE-13) 
drew attention to how national government officials came to see panti asuhan as a 
problem in light of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child:  
 
In 1990, Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and we 
also more recently mainstreamed children’s rights in other policies in other 
Ministries, such as the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment...Changes in 
government policy were also seen by changes in the delivery of programs in line 
with the 2002 Law on Child Protection which said that most important were 
family-based approaches for children. This was an important step. 
 
(Interviewee GE-13) 
 
A senior member of the national government’s child protection authority (GD-13) also 
reflected on how the first few years after the fall of Suharto had seen Indonesian 
governments accord greater recognition to human rights, including children’s rights, in 
the country’s Constitution, laws and policies: 
 
There were two big changes in the environment on children’s policy. First, 
between 1999 and 2004, during the period of Reformasi after the New Order, we 
changed the national Constitution four times. The most important Constitutional 
changes related to human rights. The second step was the 2002 Child Protection 
Law, which mostly referred to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Three of the four main principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child were put into the Constitution, except the one about children’s 
participation…  
 
(Interviewee GD-13) 
 
6.1.2 Academics and INGOs. Consistent with these reflections from national 
government officials, interviews with academics and the INGO community highlighted 
international pressures on Indonesia to improve its performance in relation to children’s 
institutions. Unlike national government officials who (as noted above) expressed a 
growing concern about panti asuhan in the context of the national government’s 
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increased emphasis on human rights after the fall of Suharto, a leading Indonesian 
academic (RA-13) pointed to faint but appreciable Indonesian Government interest in 
international children’s rights norms as far back as the early 1990s: 
 
Children’s rights ideas behind [the new] deinstitutionalisation policy was a case 
of the right place and the right time. But, there was a slow development of 
thinking about children’s rights over a longer period leading up to it…  
 
After Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, 
we were able to include only one paragraph on the special needs of children in 
the 1993 national development plan and in 1997, there was one small chapter on 
children with special circumstances. There were setbacks. A study of child 
labour prepared in 1993 was embargoed for two years.  
 
But, in 1996, we were more able to talk about child labour with the government. 
Today, children’s rights are in policies, but the problem is implementation. 
There are still some members of the People’s Assembly who think children’s 
rights is ‘Western talk’ and even some academics are against the concept…  
 
Children’s rights are getting into the mainstream, but it’s not a freeway and there 
are lots of junctions and obstacles. There is not enough political pressure to get 
much change and districts are not moving to the new [children’s rights] 
paradigm.  
 
(Interviewee RA-13) 
 
INGO interviewees expressed more strongly than national government and academic 
interviewees that INGO activities in Indonesia from the mid-2000s had been critically 
important in raising awareness about panti asuhan within national government. For one 
expatriate INGO employee (INB-13), the research into panti asuhan that was initiated 
by Save the Children with support from UNICEF after the 2004 tsunami was critical in 
bringing to light the gap between the treatment of children in panti asuhan and 
international children’s rights standards: 
 
105 
After the tsunami, Save the Children and UNICEF saw the opportunity to look 
at the broader situation on child protection in Indonesia…Work in Aceh clarified 
things. Save the Children and UNICEF didn’t start by looking at alternative care 
for children [to institutions], but it soon became pretty clear that unless 
alternative care was addressed you couldn’t address child protection issues…  
 
[Evidence produced by Save the Children about children’s institutions after the 
2004 tsunami hit] Aceh showed that institutions were a very clear-cut problem 
and this was at the root of everything. Alternative care was the response from 
the local authorities, even international agencies, and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and social workers. To them, children’s institutions were clearly 
understood as like ‘this [children’s institutions] is the solution to all our 
problems and there aren’t alternatives’. They [children’s institutions] were at the 
core of every social intervention and when you asked about any other alternative 
care in terms of family support or whatever, it [family support rather than 
institutionalisation] was few and far between and piecemeal… 
 
Save the Children’s mandate was to look at the child protection system, and 
institutional care was the child protection system. The panti system was entirely 
de-regulated and it was entirely residential-based and even the models that were 
being promoted by the Ministry of Social Affairs were residential-based…  
 
There was absolutely no doubt in their [the Ministry of Social Affairs’] mind 
that the only solution was to remove children and put them in 
institutions…There was real clarity for Save the Children that unless you started 
to address institutional care problems…you wouldn’t make any progress at any 
level because you just couldn’t have a discourse about alternatives. They 
[government officials] literally went blank…       
 
It [Save the Children’s work in Aceh after the tsunami] had to be a 
transformative process….The assumption amongst many officials was: what was 
the issue [with alternative care]? But at the end of the day these guys [who ran 
panti asuhan] were doing a job that the government was not doing and we 
[government] need to be grateful and support them, which is partly true but there 
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was no sense [amongst government officials] of how institutional childcare 
could be wrong and why would we be considering another thing?  
 
So, getting them [government] to do the research [into the situation for children 
in panti asuhan] was absolutely key to opening them to reality and enabling 
them to start challenging that reality. That was the key element…but it was 
against their practice. That was very much Save the Children’s doing…There 
was no discourse about alternative care even after the UN Committee’s report, 
which was relevant to alternative care, had been out for 18 months. The 
Committee’s conclusions and recommendations gave a very clear guideline...and 
kind of gave authority. 
 
(Interviewee INB-13) 
 
6.2 Analysis and discussion 
Why would these beliefs and perceptions have been held by policymakers and policy-
change advocates? This section draws upon secondary materials to examine the bases of 
these perspectives.  
 
6.2.1 Children’s rights and Indonesian policies, 1990-mid-2000s. There is evidence 
that, by the early 2000s, the Indonesian Government was attempting to apply, and be 
seen to apply, international children’s rights standards to a range of domestic policies. 
To understand this trend, we need to review the period between 1990, when Indonesia 
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the mid-to-late 2000s when 
panti asuhan policy shifted direction.  
 
When signing the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, Indonesia 
formally expressed reservations about seven Articles of the Convention relating to: the 
definition of the child; national legislation; religious freedoms; the role of the media; 
adoption; refugees; and, that understandings of the concept of human rights should take 
into account social and cultural diversity and political realities in different countries. 
The Indonesian Government (cited in UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 1994, 
p. 2) advised the UN that the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child would only ‘be adapted in conformity with the national law and the existing 
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conditions within the country’. In 2005, the Indonesian Government (cited in UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2012) informed the UN that it had withdrawn its 
seven reservations to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In doing so, 
however, the Indonesian Government did not revoke its earlier umbrella statement that 
its observance of the entirety of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child was 
dependent on, and overridden by, the provisions of the Indonesian Constitution 
(National NGO Coalition for Children Rights Monitoring & Save the Children 2010, p. 
8). 
 
Little or no perceptible progress was made in translating international children’s rights 
standards, particularly in relation to alternative childcare, into domestic policy during 
Suharto’s New Order (1967-98). Under the terms of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, each signatory country is required to report to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child on their compliance with the Convention every five years. Each 
signatory’s report is then the subject of consideration and a report by the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child (as noted earlier, the Committee comprises 18 independent 
experts who monitor and report to the UN on the implementation of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child). At the time of writing, the Indonesian Government had 
issued four reports to the Committee (Appendix C provides detail about these reports 
and Committee responses).  
 
Indonesia’s first report, in 1992, on the country’s compliance with the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child showed that, despite the Convention’s opposition to 
excessive reliance on children’s institutions, Indonesia supported the orphanage model 
for the care of children. The Indonesian Government (cited in UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child 1993, p. 13) reported that it had ‘established a special foundation 
named Dharmais Foundation to provide attention to children deprived of a family 
environment [in residential institutions]...Another foundation, named Yayasan Sayap 
Ibu, has special interest to foster the orphaned’ (sic), that is, to care for children in day 
care settings and in residential institutions. The linkages between panti asuhan and the 
upper echelons of the Suharto Government are discussed in detail in Chapter 9. Suffice 
at this point to note that Yayasan Sayap Ibu was founded in 1955 by the wife of the then 
Minister for Social Affairs, Sutomo, to provide day care, as well as longer term 
residential care, for children. By the late 1960s, the latter organisation had opened 
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branches in Jogyakarta and Jakarta. Yayasan Sayap Ibu continues to operate panti 
asuhan and other children’s services to the present day (Yayasan Sayap Ibu 2013).  
 
Despite the Indonesian Government’s admission to the UN that it supported children’s 
institutions through charitable foundations, it is noteworthy that the UN Committee 
failed to comment on the institutionalisation of children in Indonesia in the 1990s 
despite provisions in the Convention concerning such practices (United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 1993a, pp. 2-3). The closest the UN Committee 
came to expressing formally its concern about Indonesia’s children’s institutions in the 
1990s was a general encouragement that Indonesia should review its child-related laws 
to ensure conformity with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 1994a, p. 4).   
 
By way of contrast, during the first decade of Reformasi, a number of new laws and 
changes to the Constitution were passed that reflected, at least on paper, many of 
Indonesia’s obligations to children under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
as well as a range of other international human rights principles. Amongst a wide range 
of initiatives, such as the decentralisation of much administrative power from Jakarta to 
sub-national levels commencing in 1999 (discussed further in Chapter 7), the Habibie, 
Wahid and Megawati governments sought to give greater expression to human rights in 
law and government policy. Human rights-related laws adopted in the first three years 
of Reformasi included those relating to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Law 5/1998), International Labour 
Organisation Convention Number 138 concerning the minimum age for admission to 
employment (Law 20/1999), Human Rights (Law 39/1999), and the International 
Labour Organisation Convention Number 182 concerning the prohibition and 
immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (Law 1/2000). 
With respect to the separation of children from their families, Law Number 39 of 1999 
(39/1999) stated that ‘Every child has the right not to be separated from his parents 
against his wishes, except for valid legal reasons and procedures indicating that this 
separation is in the best interests of the child.’ (Article 59) (Government of Indonesia 
1999) (see Appendix C for a list of key Indonesian laws and Presidential and Ministerial 
Decrees and Regulations relevant to children’s welfare and rights).  
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Under President Wahid (October 1999 to July 2001), the Indonesian Constitution was 
amended to include several new human rights provisions, such as the right to life, the 
right to form a family, and equal treatment before the law. A new Constitutional 
provision was introduced in 2000 concerning the rights of children. Article 28B(2) 
stated: ‘Each child has the right to survive, grow, and develop as well as the right to 
protection from violence and discrimination’ (cited in UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child 2012, p. 5). In 2001, Indonesia signed the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography. In 2002, Indonesia’s Minister for Health told the UN General 
Assembly Special Session on Children that ‘in the midst of our economic turmoil, 
Indonesia remains fully committed to the goals of the 1990 World Summit on Children 
and the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.’ (Sujudi 2002). 
 
In 2002, the national government adopted Law 23/2002 on Child Protection, the 
country’s first-ever child protection law. Developed following deliberations within a 
Special Committee of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly and with 
involvement by the Ministry for Women’s Empowerment, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and NGOs, the new law took the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as its 
primary point of reference and contained many terms drawn directly from the 
Convention (Government of Indonesia 2002). The law defined the protection of children 
to mean ‘all activities designed to guarantee and protect children and their rights so that 
they may live, grow, develop and participate optimally in society.’ (Government of 
Indonesia 2002, p. 12). Article 2 stated that the Law was based on the national ideology 
of Pancasila (or five principles, which are belief in God, humanity, the unity of 
Indonesia, representative government, and social justice), the 1945 Indonesian 
Constitution, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and that it contained 
four main principles: non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right to life; 
and, respect for the opinions of children (Government of Indonesia 2002).  
 
Law 23/2002 contained provisions for the protection of children’s rights to practice his 
or her religion (Article 6), to access health care and social security (Article 8), to have 
his or her opinions listened to (Article 10), and to be free from exploitation, violence 
and involvement in armed conflict (Articles 13 and 15). It set out the following 
responsibilities of the State, community, the family and parents for the protection of 
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children: the State and Government would establish infrastructure and facilities to 
protect children (Article 22); the community would provide protection for children 
(Article 25); and, families and parents would be ‘responsible and accountable for caring 
for, maintaining, education and protecting children’ (Article 26). The new law also 
authorised the establishment of an independent Commission on the Protection of 
Indonesian Children (Komisi Perindungan Anak Indonesia). 
 
Of particular importance to the story of panti asuhan policymaking, Law 23/2002 
contained provisions relating to the care of neglected or abandoned children 
(Government of Indonesia 2002). Echoing the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child’s call for States to observe children’s ‘best interests’ and to encourage children to 
be raised primarily in a family environment except when no other alternative was 
possible, Article 14 stated:  
 
Every child shall be entitled to be brought up by his/her own parents save where 
there is a valid reason and/or legal provision that requires the separation of the 
child from his/her parents in the interests of the child. Such separation shall only 
be used as a last resort. (Government of Indonesia 2002).  
 
Article 26 (2) stated that the primary mode for the care of children who cannot live with 
their natural parent/s was to be kinship care, that is, care by other family members. 
Article 33 provided that, in cases where the child’s parents were either legally 
incompetent or their whereabouts unknown, ‘an individual or institution…may be 
appointed to serve as the guardian of the child.’ (Government of Indonesia 2002).  
 
In 2002, Indonesia submitted its second periodic report to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003). The 
report stressed that Indonesia had embarked on a process of political democratisation 
and economic reform after the fall of Suharto. It noted, for example, that human rights 
had finally been recognised under Indonesian law, in the form of Law 39/1999 (United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003). This report has particular 
significance in relation to Indonesia’s panti asuhan story as it was the first time that 
Indonesia had reported to the UN on the situation of children in panti asuhan. Indonesia 
characterised increases in the numbers of children placed in orphanages and the number 
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of orphanages in the 1990s as having represented ‘fairly rapid growth’. It also 
acknowledged its obligations under the Convention by noting that, as the ‘capacity and 
quality of orphanages and other forms of alternative care largely still do not conform 
with the minimum standards set by the Government’, a system would be devised to 
monitor the alternative placement of children during the following five years (United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, p. 43).   
 
In stark contrast to the first report issued by the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child concerning Indonesia’s compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in 1994, the Committee’s 2004 report took a dim view of Indonesia’s record on 
panti asuhan. The Committee expressed ‘concern at the high number of children who 
are placed in institutions and at the living conditions in these institutions, and at the 
increasing number of children who are abandoned by their parents.’ (United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2004a, p. 9). The Committee recommended that 
Indonesia take four actions: first, undertake a comprehensive study of the situation for 
children in institutions; second, put in place family strengthening and awareness-raising 
measures to prevent the placement of children in institutions; third, take steps to reunify 
children in institutions with their family wherever possible; and, finally, instigate clear 
standards for the operation of institutions and provisions for periodic review of 
placements of children in institutions (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child 2004a, p. 9).  
 
The UN Committee’s criticisms of Indonesia’s continued reliance on panti asuhan 
highlighted the gap between the Indonesian Government’s rhetoric on panti asuhan and 
the on-ground practice which continued to support this form of care. This gap can be 
seen, for example, in Law 23/2002. While enshrining many aspects of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child in its provisions, Law 23/2002 also provided for 
the continuation of panti asuhan and for government and the non-government sector to 
continue to operate them. Part 4, entitled ‘Social Development’, outlined how children’s 
institutions run by NGOs under the overall supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs 
would continue. Article 55 stated: 
 
The government shall be required to ensure the maintenance and upkeep of 
neglected and/or abandoned children, whether in the context of an institution or 
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outside an institution. The provision of maintenance and upkeep…may be 
undertaken by community institutions. (Government of Indonesia 2002). 
 
Article 58 stated: ‘The government or authorized institutions shall be required to 
provide places/institutions’ (Government of Indonesia 2002).  
 
Moreover, in spite of the partial emphasis in Law 23/2002 on children’s rights to grow 
up in their family of origin, the national government’s operating policies continued to 
support panti asuhan as an important vehicle for the care of children. The Ministry of 
Social Affairs’ 2002 guidelines (cited in Save the Children UK and Indonesian Ministry 
of Social Affairs 2006) listed the main functions of panti asuhan as: providing welfare 
services to children; being a source for information, data and consultation on children’s 
welfare; providing referrals for families, the community, the state and other parties; and, 
acting as agencies through which the public can become involved in providing welfare 
services to children (pp. 7-8). 
 
In 2004, the Ministry of Social Affairs reissued its guidelines on panti asuhan and these 
provide evidence of the Indonesian Government’s continued reliance on panti asuhan 
despite the call in Article 18 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child for 
children to be raised by their parents wherever possible (see discussion in Chapter 1, 
above). This also seemed to contradict at least some of the rhetoric of Law 23/2002. The 
guidelines noted Indonesia’s ongoing reliance on institutions to care for particular types 
of children. Stating that there were three million neglected or abandoned children, and 
an additional ten million who risked these conditions, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
Directorate General of Social and Rehabilitation Services’ 2004 General guidelines for 
the provision of social services to children in childcare institutions (cited in Save the 
Children UK et al. 2007, p. 26) stated:  
 
…it is no longer feasible to rely on families to deal with the problems of 
neglected/abandoned children. Instead, institutions are required that are capable 
of substituting for children’s parents. This is why childcare institutions have 
been developed as institutions that are capable of providing professional services 
to children. (emphasis added).  
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Later chapters will argue that, upon close analysis, the Indonesian Government’s much-
vaunted ‘paradigm shift’ on panti asuhan policy in the mid-to-late 2000s repeated this 
pattern whereby Indonesian Government rhetoric at the international level exaggerated 
the extent to which new policy directions on panti asuhan represented a significant 
break with past practice under which panti asuhan played a central role in the 
alternative care of children. It will be argued that, despite the Indonesian Government’s 
presentation of its new policy directions on panti asuhan as a major break with the past, 
in reality, a complex blend of political, economic, social and other forces shaped new 
policy so that panti asuhan would continue to play a pivotal role in the alternative care 
of children.    
 
In sum, there appears to be compelling secondary evidence to support interviewee 
perspectives that the early Reformasi era between 1998 and the mid-2000s saw the 
Indonesian Government increasingly translate international standards about children’s 
institutions into domestic legislation. Yet, the picture was far from clear-cut. The 
Indonesian Government’s commitments in law and policy to children’s rights relating to 
alternative care were conflicted, as demonstrated by aspects of Law 23/2002 and in the 
2004 Ministry of Social Affairs’ General guidelines that signalled the national 
government’s wish to provide ongoing support to panti asuhan for the care for 
neglected, abandoned or orphaned children into the foreseeable future.  
 
Thus, it might be concluded that, while broader international children’s rights concerns 
appeared to have influenced panti asuhan policy reform, the national government had 
not unreservedly embraced these standards by the mid-2000s. I contend that the main 
reasons for this two-track policy are to be found largely in community attitudes toward 
panti asuhan, as well as the power of organisations that operated panti asuhan, as will 
be discussed in later chapters.       
 
6.2.2 Panti asuhan as contravening the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
There is also evidence to support the perception held by interviewees from within the 
national government, academia and non-government organisations, as set out earlier in 
this chapter, that panti asuhan represented a contravention of provisions in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child relating to children in alternative care. This view 
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arose primarily from the work undertaken by Save the Children in Indonesia after the 
2004 tsunami. 
 
To appreciate the role played by this INGO, we need, first, to understand Save the 
Children’s general stance on the issue of children living without parental care. Save the 
Children was established in England in 1919. Since the late 1990s, it has campaigned 
for governments in the Global South to reduce significantly, if not end altogether, the 
placement of children in institutions except when all other options, such as kinship care 
or adoption, have been exhausted. Save the Children UK’s publication (2003), A last 
resort, declared residential care to be a violation of children’s rights and urged that a 
significant global reduction in this form of care occur as a matter of urgency (pp. 1, 3). 
In 2005, Save the Children UK issued its first publication on standards of care for 
children living without parental care entitled Raising the standards. Quality childcare 
provision in east and central Africa (2005). The US arm of Save the Children 
International commenced operations in Indonesia in the 1970s with a particular focus on 
the provision of health and education services. Save the Children UK commenced work 
in Indonesia in the late 1990s, concentrating on supporting children who were affected 
by conflict in areas such as West Kalimantan and Maluku (Save the Children Indonesia 
2013, p. 1).  
 
On 26 December 2004, an earthquake whose epicentre was west of the large Indonesia 
island of Sumatera triggered a tsunami that caused the deaths of an estimated 228,000 
people, and the displacement of another 1.8 million, in Indonesia and 13 other countries 
(Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010, p. 3). Sumatera bore the brunt of the tsunami. Within an 
hour of the initial earthquake, tidal waves killed an estimated 167,000 adults and 
children in Banda Aceh, the large provincial town on the northernmost tip of Sumatera, 
and its surrounding areas (Jayasuriya & McCawley 2010, p. 2). An estimated 35,000 
Indonesian children who survived the tsunami were displaced, that is, either separated 
from their parents, made homeless, or orphaned as a result of the death of one or both 
parents (New York Times 2005, Tan 2007, p. 44).  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the plight of children became a matter of 
significant international concern, especially with the publication of media stories about 
the illegal trafficking of children from tsunami-affected areas, including Aceh, to other 
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countries (Keys et al. 2006, p. 201). Numerous INGOs, such as Save the Children, 
World Vision and Plan International, and UN agencies, including UNICEF, responded 
to the crisis by providing direct relief assistance. Seeing the opportunity to examine 
child protection in Aceh, Save the Children’s UK arm approached the Ministry of Social 
Affairs to assist with responses to children who were unaccompanied as a result of the 
tsunami (Save the Children Indonesia 2013, p. 2).  
 
In early 2005, as part of family tracing and reunification efforts in Aceh, Save the 
Children, with support from the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNICEF, began to 
examine the situation of children in panti asuhan as well as in homes for children with 
disabilities. The subsequent publication, in 2006, by Save the Children and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs with support from UNICEF, A rapid assessment of children’s homes in 
post-tsunami Aceh, claimed that, of all 16,234 children in Acehnese institutions, only 
around ten per cent were true orphans, that is, had no living parent, around 85 per cent 
of children had at least one living parent, and almost 98 per cent of the 2,362 children 
who entered Acehnese institutions after the tsunami had been placed by their parents or 
other family members (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, p. xi). 
 
On the basis of responses to a questionnaire collected from 206 children’s institutions in 
in Aceh in late 2005 and early 2006, the Save the Children-led research team concluded 
that the children with living family members had been placed in institutions because 
families living in poverty could not afford to maintain and educate them whilst living at 
home, and that there seemed little likelihood that these children would ever be reunited 
with their families (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, pp. 12, 61-62). They suggested 
that there was an expectation, at least on the part of children’s institutions, that children 
would stay in these facilities until they completed their secondary education (Save the 
Children UK et al. 2006, pp. xi-xiv). The study also claimed that the number of 
institutions in Aceh grew substantially since the 1990s in comparison with the 
preceding six decades. Only 15 panti asuhan were established in Aceh during more than 
four decades after 1936. Commencing in the 1980s, the rate of growth in the number of 
panti asuhan in Aceh began to accelerate, with the fastest growth (an average of 10 per 
cent per annum) occurring during the 1990s (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, p. 23) 
(Chapter 9 discusses the reasons for particularly rapid growth in Indonesia’s panti 
asuhan during the 1990s as part of Suharto’s corrupt financial practices).  
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Of significance, forty-four per cent of all Acehnese children’s homes had been 
established in just six years between 2000 and 2006, an effect that the Save the 
Children-led research team attributed principally to the provision by the national 
government of fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan (Save the Children 
UK et al. 2006, pp. xiii, 24). As discussed further in Chapter 8, the Indonesian 
Government’s fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme offered financial assistance 
to panti asuhan and other institutions to help offset the costs of fuel and other 
commodities. Save the Children UK et al. (2006) contended that the availability of this 
funding encouraged panti asuhan operators to actively encourage families to relinquish 
their children to institutions on a permanent basis (p. 66). Chapter 9 discusses other 
factors that also appear to have driven strong growth in the number of panti asuhan in 
Aceh in the early 2000s, in particular, the civil unrest arising from conflict between 
Indonesian Government and pro-independence Acehnese forces. 
 
Finally, the Save the Children-led study claimed that ninety-five per cent of the 207 
children’s homes in Aceh in 2005 were run by private operators, including NGOs and 
religious bodies, with the remaining five per cent of institutions being managed by the 
national government. Because there was no system of official registration or 
accreditation of individual children’s homes, the national government did not know with 
certainty the number or location of children’s homes in Aceh, or indeed, in any other 
part of Indonesia (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, pp. 8-9). These findings led the 
Save the Children-led team to conclude that the situation for children in Acehnese 
institutions was contrary to the principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. They recommended that the Indonesian Government provide more assistance to 
families in order to reduce the rate at which children were relinquished to institutions 
and review government financial subsidies to panti asuhan (Save the Children UK et al. 
2006, p. 6).  
 
Building on the study of children’s institutions in Aceh, in 2006 and 2007, Save the 
Children, with UNICEF, jointly funded a qualitative study to identify and assess the 
quality of care offered to children in 36 panti asuhan in six of Indonesia’s then 33 
provinces (Aceh, Nusa Tenggara Barat, North Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, North 
Maluku, and Central Java Provinces), and one Ministry of Social Affairs-run panti 
asuhan that operated as a national model in Central Java. Decisions about which panti 
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asuhan were to be studied was based on factors such as whether the panti asuhan was in 
an area that was ‘predominantly under one religion or an area known for its pluralistic 
make up, whether it has been affected by insecurity including as a result of conflict or 
disaster, as well as other [unspecified] social, cultural and economic factors.’ (Save the 
Children UK et al. 2007, p. 6). 
 
Having selected the panti asuhan to be studied, the assessors used a Save the Children 
UK methodology to consider standards of care for children across a range of domains, 
such as health, education, nutrition, play and social relations. The research was 
conducted by teams of assessors who undertook field visits to panti asuhan overseen by 
two research leaders employed by Save the Children UK who were seconded to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. At each panti asuhan selected for study, interviews were 
conducted with key personnel, including the manager, carers, teachers and other support 
staff, as well as with children and some parents (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 
6-9).   
 
The resulting 2007 Save the Children-authored report, ‘Someone that matters’. The 
quality of care in childcare institutions in Indonesia, raised several concerns about panti 
asuhan and proposed a major overhaul of national government policy. First, it noted the 
dearth of quantitative and qualitative data about children in the institutions, irrespective 
of whether or not these were run by government or private bodies. Data were limited to 
listings of the names and numbers of children in a given institution that was prepared in 
order to obtain government fuel subsidy reduction compensation. No data were 
collected by any panti asuhan on qualitative matters, such as the wellbeing of children 
(Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 8). Save the Children et al. (2007) contended that 
the paucity of data was due largely to the lack of a comprehensive official panti asuhan 
registration and monitoring system (pp. 63-78). An unspecified number of panti asuhan 
operated without legal authorisation. Counting the actual number of panti asuhan with 
authorisation was complicated because the government’s letter of authorisation for an 
organisation to run panti asuhan (Surat Izin Kegiatan) was not necessarily related to 
individual institutions but could also refer to a number of institutions under the control 
of the organisation holding a letter of authorisation (Save the Children Indonesia 2013, 
pp. 69-70). The report also claimed that none of the provincial or district governments 
in which the sample group of privately-operated panti asuhan operated had any form of 
118 
registration system that would enable these authorities to know the location and scale of 
panti asuhan operations (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 69-70).  
      
Second, consistent with findings from the earlier study of Aceh (2005), Save the 
Children et al. (2007) contended that the numbers of panti asuhan had grown 
particularly after the late 1980s (p. 70). Table 6.1, below, which reproduces data 
collected by the Save the Children-led research team concerning the year of 
establishment of the 36 privately-run and one government operated panti asuhan in the 
sample group, suggested that most panti asuhan were relatively new, as two-thirds were 
established during the three decades between 1970 and 1999. 
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Table 6.1 Children’s homes in six provinces by year of establishment, 1930-2006 
 
Decade of 
establishment 
Number of new children’s 
homes established 
Cumulative total of children’s 
homes 
Average annual percentage rate of growth 
in number of panti asuhan 
1930-39 1 1 - 
1940-49 1 2 10.0 
1950-59 2 4 10.0 
1960-69 3 7 13.3 
1970-79 6 13 11.6 
1980-89 8 21 16.3 
1990-99 10 31 21.0 
2000-06 5 36 26.0 
 
Source: Adapted by author from Save the Children et al. (2007, p. 70). 
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Third, echoing one of the major findings of Save the Children et al. (2006), Save the 
Children et al. (2007) stated that most of the children in the sample group of panti 
asuhan were not technically orphans but had been relinquished by their families due to 
poverty and to enable their children to access free education (p. 83). Table 6.2, below, 
sets out the claims made in the report that only 5.6 per cent of the 2,248 children 
surveyed were ‘total’ orphans (had neither parent living), while 56.4 per cent had both 
parents living, and 33.2 per cent were ‘partial’ orphans, or had one living parent. The 
Save the Children-led team contended that, contrary to the widely-held belief within 
Indonesian society that panti asuhan were places for the care of orphans, in fact, 89.6 
per cent of children in the panti asuhan sample group had at least one living parent who 
could, if provided with adequate support, care for the child instead of having to 
relinquish the child to a panti asuhan (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 83).  
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Table 6.2 Parental status of children in 36 panti asuhan in six provinces, 2006 
 
 Total number of children  
(n = 2,248) 
Percentage of total number of children  
Both parents alive 1,267 56.4 
Neither parent alive (orphan) 126 5.6 
Father deceased 646 28.7 
Mother deceased 101 4.5 
Both parents whereabouts unknown 78 3.5 
Father’s whereabouts unknown 26 1.2 
Mother’s whereabouts unknown 4 0.1 
 
Source: Adapted by author from Save the Children UK et al. (2007, p. 83). 
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In support of their contention that the majority of children were placed in panti asuhan 
by their families to access free education, the Save the Children-led research team found 
that 93 per cent of children were of school age, that is, between ages five and 17, and 45 
per cent were between 10 and 14 years of age (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 82). 
In line with the apparent principal role of panti asuhan as places for children and young 
people from poor families to access education, the report claimed that most young 
people exited institutions upon completion of high school studies, or at around age 17 or 
18 years. The report suggested that parental attitudes favouring access to education for 
boys were reflected in the fact that there were more boys than girls in panti asuhan (by 
a ratio of 55 to 45) (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 79).  
 
Finally, the report made several observations about apparent discrepancies between the 
care provided to children in panti asuhan and international standards for the care of 
children in institutions as well as Indonesia’s Law 23/2002 on child protection drafted 
in light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It noted, for example, that the 
‘number of care staff was generally very low in relation to the number of children being 
cared for and few had received any specialized training in child care or child 
development’, and recommended that the Indonesian Government’s 2004 guidelines on 
the provision of child care in institutions should be more widely disseminated and 
applied at provincial and district levels (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, pp. 6-8, 40, 
77).  
 
Also, a range of child care and protection issues were identified that the researchers 
believed required urgent remedial action, such as the general lack of regulation of, and 
basic data about, the institutions, the large number of children placed in care despite the 
existence of family, a lack of focus on the emotional and developmental needs of 
children in institutions, and the wide variation in the skills and qualifications of workers 
in the institutions (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 271-90). The report stated that, 
while the primary intention of panti asuhan was to provide access to educational 
opportunities and did meet children’s basic needs in terms of shelter and food, little or 
no attention was given to meeting their developmental, emotional and psycho-social 
needs (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 271).  
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The report, ‘Someone that matters’, also suggested that there were wide variations in the 
size and governance arrangements of panti asuhan. Seventeen of the 36 panti asuhan 
surveyed had annual incomes of less than US$10,000, while a few (all government-run) 
had annual incomes of between US$100,000 and US$170,000 (Save the Children UK et 
al. 2007, p. 77). Of the 36 panti asuhan surveyed, 28 were privately-owned with the 
remainder being run by local district or provincial governments. Of the privately-owned 
panti asuhan, 25 were owned by, or affiliated with, faith-based organisations. Of the 
latter 25, 16 were run by Islamic organisations (Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, 
Nahdlatul Wathon and Hidayatullah), seven by Christian organisations, and two by 
other religious groups (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 64-65).  
 
In view of the alleged gaps between on-ground practice and Indonesia’s obligations 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the report called on the Indonesian 
Government to 
 
…oversee an important paradigm shift which was initiated by the ratification of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the adoption of Law 23/2002 
on Child Protection but has yet to be translated into policies, practice and 
resource allocation. (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 286).  
 
The study made 14 recommendations, the main ones being that Indonesia should: 
establish a ‘policy framework that strengthens family based care for vulnerable children 
and prioritises alternative care in the extended family or in an alternative family for 
children in need of care and protection’; review why many children from poor families 
were unable to access education; pilot and develop services to support families who 
experience problems raising their children; establish a system of alternative care that 
emphasised care for children without parents through mechanisms such as kinship care 
and fostering; establish a regulatory framework for childcare institutions that provided 
clear standards of care; devise a system to collect data about children in alternative care; 
and, establish an independent inspectorate to oversee the application of standards of 
care in panti asuhan  (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, pp. 299-306).  
 
According to Save the Children et al. (2007), a new policy was required to move the 
Indonesian Government from a position of supporting panti asuhan to one that ended 
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the placement of children in panti asuhan except as a last resort (pp. 299-306). The 
report recommended that a new regulatory system should cover all children’s 
institutions, not only those in receipt of government subsidies, as these subsidies were 
estimated to have been paid to only between 50 and 70 per cent of panti asuhan, with 
the remaining institutions being funded entirely through private donations and other 
non-government funding (Save the Children UK et al. 2007, p. 56). 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, in 2013, Save the Children Indonesia issued its third report 
relating to children’s institutions in Indonesia, entitled Changing the paradigm. Save the 
Children’s work to strengthen the child protection system in Indonesia 2005-2012 (Save 
the Children Indonesia 2013). The report synthesised the two earlier Save the Children-
led studies (2006, 2007) and provided an update on developments in working towards 
deinstitutionalisation in Indonesia since the decision to change policy occurred around 
2007-08. It claimed that the findings of the Save the Children-led studies (2006 and 
2007) ‘culminated in child protection being included as a mainstream policy in the 
government’s National Strategic Plan for 2010-2014’ (Save the Children Indonesia 
2013, p. ix). The report also stated that the Indonesian Government’s policy shift arose 
from a realisation within the Ministry of Social Affairs, on the basis of the Save the 
Children-led field research, that the overwhelming majority of children in panti asuhan 
were not orphaned—a fact that, once brought to light, stood in stark contrast to 
Indonesia’s undertakings about the unnecessary use of institutions for children as 
expressed in Law 23/2002 and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, thus 
precipitating policy change (Save the Children Indonesia 2013, p. ix). 
 
In sum, there is also secondary evidence to support perspectives offered by some 
interviewees that panti asuhan were out-of-step with international children’s rights 
standards for the care of children outside their family. The 2004 tsunami provided an 
opportunity for Save the Children and UNICEF to examine conditions within a number 
of panti asuhan, leading to the production of two major reports which compared on-
ground conditions with the standards for children living without parental care as 
contained in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Perhaps the most significant 
finding of research undertaken by these organisations, in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Social Affairs, was that very few of the children in panti asuhan were actually 
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orphans, that is, did not have either a living mother or father, but had been placed in 
panti asuhan due to family poverty in order to gain access to free education.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined and analysed the main narrative that has been advanced in the 
public arena by international players and even the Indonesian Government to date, 
namely, that by the early-to-mid 2000s panti asuhan were viewed by some national 
government officials and international players (especially Save the Children, as 
evidenced in its 2006 and 2007 reports concerning panti asuhan) as being at odds with 
Indonesia’s international children’s rights obligations for the alternative care of children 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
 
Despite the prevalence of this ‘international children’s rights’ narrative about panti 
asuhan, the next two chapters reveal two additional narratives that have, to date, been 
overlooked in accounts of policy change, that is, that panti asuhan were increasingly 
misaligned with changed Indonesian Government domestic social, economic and 
administrative policies, and were becoming too financially costly for government to 
continue to support.  
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Chapter 7: The ‘pro-reform’ story line (ii): new policy directions 
 
‘After decentralisation, we needed a national system [on children’s institutions] 
because we feared that the provinces wouldn’t care about child protection.’ 
 
An Indonesian social work academic (RD-12). 
 
‘After Suharto, there was a feeling of inferiority in Indonesia as a country, a very 
low feeling, we felt a bit embarrassed. This reaction happened in all sectors.’ 
 
An Indonesian academic (RB-13). 
 
Overview 
This chapter presents a different narrative within the basic ‘pro-reform’ story line. 
Rather than viewing panti asuhan in relation to international children’s rights norms, 
some interviewees saw panti asuhan as being increasingly out-of-step with changed 
Indonesian Government social, economic and administrative policies dating back to the 
1997-98 Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto. These new policies were not 
directly related to the care and protection of children in panti asuhan but set the broader 
policy environment in which government policymakers operated. As in the preceding 
chapter, this chapter is set out in two parts: first, an outline of the main aspects of the 
narrative as it emerged from interviews; and, second, using secondary data, an analysis 
of the claims made by those who held that narrative. 
 
7.1 Findings from the field  
7.1.1 Views from national government. A theme that emerged from interviews with 
senior Indonesian Government officials was that panti asuhan were increasingly viewed 
as inconsistent with post-Asian financial crisis Indonesian social, economic and 
administrative policy directions. As will be discussed in Section 7.2 below, the Asian 
financial crisis caused a rapid increase in rates of poverty and other forms of social 
dislocation, such as child abandonment and neglect, leading the national government to 
institute a suite of remedial measures, including social safety net and fuel price 
subsidisation programs. One senior official of the Ministry of Social Affairs (GB-13) 
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reflected that panti asuhan policy reform was influenced by changes to the 
government’s overall strategy of improving social protection, especially for the poorest 
families and households, thus: 
 
[The panti asuhan policy] was really part of a broader context of trying to take 
affirmative action to get a social protection plan, including health and education, 
for poor people across the country, and to move from residential programs…  
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs wanted a new paradigm under which there would 
be universal access to health, education and welfare services to all people…  
 
Beginning in 2002, after the financial crisis, with the support of the Minister for 
Finance, we created a model of conditional cash transfer to poor families, and 
budget was allocated for this. 
 
(Interviewee GB-13) 
 
A senior official in the Ministry of National Development Planning (GI-13) also spoke 
about a growing recognition within national government circles from the early 2000s 
that raising children in panti asuhan was not only expensive in terms of the financial 
cost to government but inconsistent with the government’s desire to maximise 
workforce participation for economic growth:   
 
In the last ten years, we became more aware of the need for more prevention 
rather than late responses to social problems and we are trying to create a 
referral system that is more sustainable and which involves NGOs and local 
governments…  
 
We also learned about the neuroscience that it’s not as good for a child to be in a 
panti as in their family environment. There are three million children of school 
age not attending school and we needed to push the demand side to get poor 
families to send their kids to school. The solution was not to grow the number of 
panti asuhan but to support families more… 
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We know that 80 per cent of children in panti asuhan have at least one parent 
alive so we wanted to put more emphasis on assisting families to access health 
and education through the conditional cash transfer scheme so they’d not have to 
send their children to pantis…  
 
Changing the paradigm on panti asuhan was important because if we didn’t 
prepare our children there would be no productivity bonus in the next ten or so 
years when the economy will need to be having sustained high growth. For 
pantis simply to rely on the government budget is not sustainable. Many studies 
showed that children in pantis have fewer advantages than those outside the 
pantis.   
 
(Interviewee GI-13) 
 
The decision to decentralise a range of political and administrative decision-making 
powers from Jakarta to sub-national levels of government in 1999 was also cited by 
some national government interlocutors as having hastened changes in national 
government thinking about panti asuhan. As discussed in Section 7.2, below, political 
and administrative decentralisation from Jakarta to sub-national levels after 1999 
represented a momentous change in policy from the highly-centralised State that had 
developed under Suharto. Faced with this new environment, some national government 
officials expressed concern that it was becoming more difficult for national government 
to exercise control over provinces and districts on matters such as child protection. A 
senior Ministry of Social Affairs official who was directly involved in policymaking on 
panti asuhan after the Asian financial crisis through to the mid-2000s (GA-13) stated:  
 
Another factor was that after decentralisation, districts were expected to play a 
greater role in direct service delivery to families and children. This meant that 
the role of the central government changed from that of delivering services to 
trying to generate ideas about new practices that the districts could adopt.  
 
As a result of these factors, we had to find a different policy on orphanages. 
Starting in 2002, we ran seminars and held discussions within the Ministry of 
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Social Affairs about increasing family-based support for children. But, we 
needed research to back up our plans to increase family-based care for children. 
 
(Interviewee GA-13) 
 
The head of a national government child protection authority (GC-12) discussed the 
dilemmas posed for national government officials in implementing national child 
protection law in the new era of decentralised administration:  
 
The situation on child protection in Indonesia developed since the 2002 law on 
child protection…but implementation at the district level was difficult as the 
districts were not bound by these agreements. In nine provinces KPAI [the 
Indonesian Commission for Child Protection, Komisi Perlindungan Anak 
Indonesia] developed agreements and there is provincial law on child 
protection…  
 
In cooperation with the Ministry of Justice we explained to the provinces how 
the law worked and discussed with them the meaning of children’s rights and 
restorative justice…  
 
The next challenge is law harmonisation between Jakarta and the provinces. In 
national law, for example, the minimum age for marriage is 18 years but the 
problem is to harmonise this across provinces. But, in some provinces, for 
example, the marriage age for women [in practice] is 16 years and for men is 18 
years. If we are to revise and harmonise [laws across all provinces on matters 
such as the age of marriage], it will be a huge effort and will be costly…We are 
also trying to get harmonisation across Indonesia on the age at which a child is 
subject to adult criminal law.  
 
(Interviewee GC-12) 
 
In the same vein, a social work academic (RD-12) commented on how the problems 
posed by decentralisation added weight to the case for a strengthened national role on 
child protection issues: 
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Decentralisation made it difficult for the provinces and districts to conform with 
national child protection and welfare laws because they lacked money. The 
national level has difficulty intervening in local policies. Most provinces and 
district levels either did not budget for child protection or the budget was not 
enough. Usually national level advocacy is difficult at local levels…  
 
Decentralisation funds from the national level [provided to provinces and 
districts] were not always spent on child protection. Districts and provinces are 
like kingdoms. There is a lack of capacity at district and province levels on child 
protection. It is difficult to get district and province government staff interested 
in child protection. International non-government organisations and local NGOs 
had to get together to lobby local governments…  
 
After decentralisation, we needed a national system [on children’s institutions] 
because we feared that the provinces and districts wouldn’t care about child 
protection. (emphasis added). 
 
(Interviewee RD-12) 
 
7.1.2 Academia and the UN. Reflecting on Indonesia’s political and economic 
environment in decade after the fall of Suharto and the implications for national 
government policy on panti asuhan, a senior academic specialising in child protection 
(RA-13) stated: 
 
During the economic crisis between 1998 and 2000, Indonesia was at its lowest 
point and there was an eagerness to embrace international norms. For example, 
in 1999, President Habibie adopted all the International Labour Organisation 
Conventions, making Indonesia the only country in Asia to adopt all such 
Conventions just to show that Indonesia was eager to become involved in the 
international community…  
 
After Suharto, there was a feeling of inferiority in Indonesia as a country, a very 
low feeling, we felt a bit embarrassed. This reaction happened in all sectors, for 
example, in giving independence to the central bank which followed 
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international practice…Also, Indonesia decided to establish an Ombudsman, 
following the Australian example.  
 
(Interviewee RA-13) 
 
An Indonesian academic (RA-12) discussed how the national government found 
decentralisation after 1999 a challenge in terms of implementing national approaches to 
child protection thus: 
 
Regarding deinstitutionalisation [of panti asuhan], the problem for the national 
government was disconnection between district and national policy making. The 
local level was not going to give up on adopting the new standards of care. The 
problem is the lack of money from Jakarta to the provinces. One of the 
challenges is district-level regulation which is not always compatible with the 
national level… 
 
The vertical system is there but it is difficult because of horizontal regulations 
and law. These need to converge. The difficulty for the national government is 
the mixture of laws implemented at the local level.  
 
(Interviewee RA-12) 
 
Interviewee UNA-13, a senior UN official, reflected on changes to bureaucratic 
arrangements within the national government that provided new and expanded powers 
to the Ministry of National Development Planning in the early 2000s to coordinate 
policy across government departments, leading to an expansion in government focus on 
children’s welfare issues. Interviewee UNA-13 also discussed how, compared with 
Suharto’s New Order, the early 2000s was a time of increasing public discussion about 
human rights within Indonesian society, greater openness in discussing domestic social 
problems, and increased governmental awareness of international thinking on children’s 
wellbeing and rights: 
 
Leadership [on the new policy on panti asuhan] did not just come from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, but also from the Ministry of National Development 
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Planning. The Ministry of National Development Planning put more pressure on 
Ministries, became more involved in technical matters, and played a greater 
coordination role across government, especially in relation to child protection…  
 
In 2004 or 2005 the Ministry of National Development Planning produced a 
document following the ‘World Fit for Children’ Summit which highlighted 
child protection [in May 2002, a Special Session of the UN General Assembly 
adopted a document entitled ‘A World Fit for Children’ which contained 21 
specific goals and targets for children for the subsequent decade (United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session 2002)]. The Ministry of National 
Development Planning realised that child protection had to be reflected in the 
national planning document and there were individuals in the Ministry of 
National Development Planning who showed leadership on this issue and 
recognised that Indonesia had to be accountable on this matter.  
 
UNICEF and the Ministry of National Development Planning put in place a 
child protection coordination mechanism under a five-year country program and 
this has been in place for less than 10 years…  
 
The Ministry of National Development Planning applied pressure to the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child 
Protection. The Ministry of National Development Planning has the authority 
through the national budget planning process to question these and other 
Ministries… 
  
There is now greater awareness in government about the impact of children’s 
institutions on children. This is not an easy task for government, especially the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, but gradually they changed. Also, now the world is 
changing and people are starting to realise that children’s institutions are not the 
best for children. But, it’s not just about children’s institutions but about a 
broader approach to prevention part of which is a change to children’s 
institutions policy. The Indonesian Government recognised that it needed to 
invest more in prevention and primary supports…  
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The Indonesian political environment is also conducive now and people are 
speaking their minds more. Faith-based organisations are trying to transform 
themselves to address the underlying causes of problems for families and 
children and also it’s expensive for them and society to run children’s 
institutions. 
 
(Interviewee UNA-13) 
 
7.1.3 An INGO view. In a similar vein to comments by UNA-13 above, one expatriate 
INGO manager (INE-13) discussed changes that began to occur during the early 2000s 
in Indonesian public discussions about children:  
 
Indonesians are very proud of Indonesia’s place in the world and its place in 
Asia. It’s the fastest growing economy in the region, the sixteenth largest 
economy in the world, and a middle income economy. Socio-political advances 
are lagging the economic advances but there’s a certain inevitability to it. People 
have got more money and they are demanding more things such as better 
education and better services. One of those things is taking care of our children 
better…  
 
There’s a lot of really interesting debate going about the Asian ‘youth bulge’. 
Indonesia is no exception. There’s a growing awareness that something needs to 
be done about how we take care of our youth…and a lot of that revolves around 
education…and cultural identity.  
 
Some of it is a knee-jerk reaction because, as Indonesia grows, there’s a lot more 
foreign influence and so people say we need to ensure that our children are 
educated in Indonesian culture and language.  
 
Part of that very macro-level pride is creating a demand for better lifestyle. 
There’s an understanding that whether kids are institutionalised or not there 
needs to be a certain level of care, education and health and identity.  
 
(Interviewee INE-13) 
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7.2 Analysis and discussion 
As shown above, a perspective expressed by several interviewees was that, starting in 
the early 2000s, panti asuhan were being seen by Indonesian Government officials as 
increasingly out-of-step with transformations that were occurring in other areas of 
Indonesian social, economic and administrative policy. This section draws upon 
secondary materials to discuss these claims. Following a brief review of economic and 
social policies under Suharto, it focuses on changes to national policies in response to 
the Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto in the areas of poverty alleviation, 
family strengthening and decentralisation which also influenced the dynamics of panti 
asuhan policy change.   
 
7.2.1 From the New Order to the Asian financial crisis. Chapter 4 noted that 
significant macroeconomic advances were made under Suharto’s authoritarian New 
Order. Yet, this overall picture concealed significant domestic economic and social 
inequalities. While experiencing strong overall economic growth, particularly from the 
1970s, the 1990s saw growing disparities in terms of Indonesian living standards and 
consumption expenditure. Using the percentage of the population spending below 50 
per cent of average per capita consumption expenditure to measure relative poverty, the 
percentage of Indonesians living in rural and urban areas in relative poverty rose from 
16 per cent in 1990 to 21.2 per cent in 1996. This effect was particularly noticeable in 
urban areas where relative poverty rates rose from 20.2 per cent in 1990 to 23.2 per cent 
in 1996. In Jakarta alone, the percentage of population spending below half of the 
average per capita consumption expenditure increased from 13.9 per cent in 1987 to 
22.1 per cent in 1996 (Booth 2000, pp. 84-87).   
 
During much of the New Order, social assistance programs did not specifically target 
poor families. Instead, social welfare assistance took the form of general subsidies 
available to all to help stabilise the costs of fuel and other goods, grants for 
infrastructure purposes provided to disadvantaged communities, and credit schemes for 
farmers (Perdana 2014, pp. 6-7). As well as being accorded relatively low levels of 
expenditure, the general lack of poverty alleviation programs during much of the New 
Order could also be observed in social security and health insurance schemes which 
covered military personnel, civil servants and employees in medium and large business, 
and excluded those who worked in the informal sector which accounted for around 65 
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per cent of the labour force (Sumarto 2006, p. 2). With the focus of government 
attention being on overall macroeconomic growth, poverty alleviation was thus not 
specified as a policy goal in any Indonesian five-year development plan (Rentjana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun or Repelitas) between 1969 and 1994 (Suryahadi et al. 2012, 
p. 370, Perdana 2014, p. 6). Only the sixth Repelita of 1994 stated that poverty 
alleviation would be a priority, apparently in response to growing concerns within 
government about the lack of reduction in the rate at which poverty was declining in 
rural areas, including eastern Indonesia and Kalimantan, compared with areas such as 
Java and Bali (Booth 2000, pp. 86-87).  
 
Education was one of the key areas where increasing relative poverty was reflected 
during the 1990s. In the two decades after the late 1960s educational opportunities in 
Indonesia grew markedly due largely to government and private sector investment in 
educational infrastructure and rising parental demand. However, starting in the 1980s, 
an increasing number of poor families struggled to meet the growing financial gap 
between public subsidises and the actual costs of education (Booth 2000, p. 93). Booth 
(2000, p. 94) concluded that ‘by the late 1980s, many parents decided that there was 
little point in keeping children in school beyond the primary level…Over the Repelita V 
period (1989-94), there was an absolute decline in numbers enrolled at both the lower 
and the upper secondary levels’.  
 
There has been no research into whether, and to what extent, the fall in absolute 
numbers of children in secondary education played a role in the rising numbers of 
children being placed in panti asuhan during the 1990s. However, it might tentatively 
be suggested that growing recognition amongst Indonesians of the importance of 
accessing education so their children could access higher paid employment, together 
with widening rates of relative poverty during the 1990s, may well have been significant 
factors in driving up rates of relinquishment of children into panti asuhan where poor 
families could at least obtain cost-free access to primary and secondary education for 
their children. The absence of social safety nets for most of Indonesia’s poorest families 
during most of the New Order period probably left these families with few options other 
than to place children who could not be adequately fed or educated in a cost-free panti 
asuhan. Indeed, the lack of specific national policy attention paid to poverty alleviation 
during most of the New Order may go some way toward explaining rapid increases in 
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the numbers of children entering these facilities, particularly between the 1980s and 
1990s when Indonesia macroeconomic growth was reaching record levels. (In Chapter 
9, other factors behind the growth in the numbers of panti asuhan and children living in 
them during the New Order are explored, principally the role panti asuhan played in 
advancing Suharto’s corrupt financial practices).     
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis wrought major negative 
consequences for Indonesia’s economy, society and politics. According to Wee (2002), 
the World Bank estimated that almost half of Indonesia’s corporations were technically 
insolvent by the end of 1998 (p. 2). During 1998, Indonesia’s inflation rate reached 100 
per cent and the value of the Indonesian currency, the rupiah (IDR), against the US 
dollar fell from 2,500 to 17,500 (Brown 2006, p. 956, Hill & Shiraishi 2007, pp. 132-
33). The number of people living in poverty increased by 40 per cent in 1998 alone, 
from 17.7 per cent to 24.2 per cent of the entire population (Hill & Shiraishi 2007, p. 
138). Figure 7.1, below, shows changes in Indonesia’s poverty rates leading up to, and 
immediately after the Asian financial crisis. 
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Figure 7.1 Indonesian population living in poverty, 1976-2002 (per cent) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Indonesia (2003, p. 9) . 
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The consequences of the Asian financial crisis for poor Indonesian families and their 
children were especially harsh. Rates of children’s participation in education and health 
care plummeted due to significantly lowered family incomes, the rising costs of 
services, and reductions in government spending (Alston & Tobin 2005, p. 69). The 
child malnutrition rate rose by 250 per cent, from eight million in 1997 to 20 million in 
2000, and infant mortality rates almost doubled, from 55 per 1,000 deaths in 1995 to 
100 per 1,000 in 1998 (Government of the United States of America 2002).     
  
The Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto ushered in far-reaching changes to 
Indonesian politics, economics and society. Fearing total crisis for the country, 
including a reversal of rates of people living below the poverty line, in late 1998, the 
government introduced a range of new social safety net policies that aimed to increase 
financial and other support specifically for the most vulnerable families and to offset 
disruptions caused by rises in fuel prices due to cuts to the fuel subsidy (see also 
Chapter 8) (Evans 1998, pp. 8-9).  
 
The first of two major social safety net waves ran from late 1998 to around 2000. Being 
known collectively as Jaring pengaman sosial, five main schemes were established 
specifically to assist the poorest families and households (Sumarto & Bazzi 2011, p. 2). 
First, and marking a departure from the general rice subsidies instituted in the 1970s, a 
new food security program offered subsidies for the purchase of rice at a heavily 
discounted rate to households in the two lowest officially-defined categories of poverty. 
In 2001, this scheme was modified and renamed Beras Untuk Keluarga Miskin (or 
Raskin or ‘rice for the poor’) (Irhamni & Nuryakin 2009, pp. 309-10, Perdana 2014, pp. 
8-9). Second, an employment generation program, padat karya, was established which 
included public works programs in return for food and basic wages. Third, under the 
Bantuan Siswa Miskin program, education scholarships were provided to children from 
the poorest families to encourage these students to stay in the schooling system. Fourth, 
a public health insurance scheme, Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat, or Jamkesmas, 
provided free medical and family planning services to poor families at government 
primary health centres. Finally, a community empowerment scheme was established 
under which grants were made to local communities to encourage activities such as 
credit schemes and infrastructure construction (Sumarto 2006, pp. 2-3).  
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In 1998 alone, the national government allocated IDR 3.9 trillion to Jaring pengaman 
sosial (the equivalent of US$390 million at prevailing average exchange rates) which 
was, in financial terms to that time, the Indonesia Government’s largest single initiative 
in social protection (Sumarto & Bazzi 2011, p. 2). The extent of these policy changes 
can be observed in expenditures on anti-poverty programs as a percentage of GDP, 
which rose from 0.29 per cent in 1997-98 to 1.39 per cent in 1998-99 before falling 
back slightly to 1.23 per cent in 1999-2000 and 1.05 per cent in 2000 (Daly & Fane 
2002, p. 311).    
 
After political turbulence during the Habibie and Wahid Presidencies, the election of 
Megawati as President (July 2001 to October 2004) saw a renewed policy focus on 
macroeconomic stability and growth. Indicative of the new emphasis on budgetary 
restraint and fiscal stability, Law 17/2003 directed the national government to ensure 
that the annual budget deficit was below three per cent of GDP and that total issued 
government bonds were below 60 per cent of GDP (Hill & Shiraishi 2007, pp. 128-29). 
In line with the strategy of maximising economic productivity, and to extend the first 
wave of social assistance programs, a second wave of social policy interventions 
commenced around 2002 to further assist the poorest families. In 2002, a conditional 
cash transfer scheme, Program Keluarga Harapan (‘Hope for families’), was 
established under which government provided cash to eligible poor families on the basis 
that expectant mothers in those families attended health checks and that children 
attended school on a regular basis (Perdana 2014, p. 10). The emphasis placed on 
conditional cash transfer programs by the Megawati and later Yudhoyono Governments 
reflected not only the influence of the World Bank, which supported similar schemes in 
Latin America, other parts of Asia and in Africa, but also the tendency of Indonesian 
governments to use cash transfer social assistance programs as populist devices to win 
electoral favour (Widjaja 2012, pp. 185-86).     
 
In 2003, the national government issued its Interim poverty reduction strategy which 
outlined plans to alleviate poverty amongst the poorest families. It noted that the Asian 
financial crisis meant that  
 
…millions of rural poor fell below the poverty threshold and significant 
numbers of people increased their vulnerability and clustered around the poverty 
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line because of political, economic and social turmoil as well as natural disasters 
in some regions. These factors indicated that there are some weaknesses in the 
efforts of poverty alleviation in the past that need a major improvement. 
(Government of Indonesia 2003, pp. 3-4).  
 
The Interim poverty reduction strategy (2003) also called for the delivery of supports, 
such as social insurance, to lift the productivity of the poorest families and reduce the 
costs faced by the poor in accessing basic needs such as education and health (p. 25).  
 
In 2004, Yudhoyono was elected President in the country’s first direct Presidential 
elections, holding power until the end of his second-five year term of office in October 
2014. Under Yudhoyono, and his Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Jusuf 
Kalla, even greater use was made of fiscal levers to increase government funding for 
welfare, health and education in order to further stimulate macroeconomic growth, 
poverty alleviation and workforce expansion (Hill & Shiraishi 2007, p. 130). Law 
40/2004 extended the social security system to cover all Indonesians in addition to those 
in the military and the civil service. The national government also cut the politically-
sensitive fuel subsidy several times in the early 2000s, with the savings being diverted 
by government to another new social protection and poverty alleviation initiative, the 
fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme. (The relationship between the fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation scheme and growth in the numbers of panti asuhan is 
discussed in Chapter 8). Commencing in 2005, an unconditional cash transfer scheme, 
Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (initially named Bantuan Langsung Tunai) 
provided 19.5 million of the poorest households with a direct and unconditional cash 
transfer on a quarterly basis to compensate for rises in the cost of fuel and other 
commodities that were affected by fuel price rises such as food, cooking oil and health 
services (Hill & Shiraishi 2007, p. 130, Widjaja 2012, pp. 185-88). The amounts 
transferred were significant, amounting in 2005 alone to about half the average monthly 
household expenditure of the median household (Sumarto & Bazzi 2011, p. 10).  
 
The Indonesian Government’s focus on poverty alleviation through the provision of 
greater support to families was further emphasised in the National Long‐term 
Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional) 2005-2025, as 
well as in the National Medium‐term Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan 
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Jangka Menengah Nasional) for the five-year period between 2004 and 2009. In 2005, 
the national government launched its National strategy on poverty reduction and 
announced a doubling of expenditure on social assistance activities. In 2006, it stated 
that, while there had been ‘challenges’, such as the 2004 tsunami and reductions in fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation, the National Medium‐term Development Plan 2004-09 
(Government of Indonesia 2006, p. 2) signified opportunities  
 
…to refocus policy and budget allocation to achieve better the Government’s 
poverty reduction targets, such as through using savings from the fuel subsidy 
reduction to finance more progressive social protection programs and improve 
the poor’s access to health and education.  
 
Of likely significance in terms of how government was thinking about panti asuhan, the 
National Medium‐term Development Plan 2004-09 listed three overarching national 
strategic policy priorities, namely, creating a safe and peaceful Indonesia, establishing a 
just and democratic Indonesia, and enhancing people’s welfare. For the first time in 
such a high level national plan, the National Medium‐term Development Plan 2004-09 
(Government of Indonesia et al. 2011) called for improved quality of life for women 
and for greater attention to the welfare and protection of children (p. 7). Under Law 
40/2004, the national government introduced a social welfare income support program 
specifically for neglected children, as well as for neglected elderly persons and persons 
with disability, Bantuan Kesejahteraan Sosial Permanen (Government of Indonesia 
2006b).  
 
Amongst the most notable features of Yudhoyono’s first five-year term of office 
commencing in 2004 was an emphasis on boosting economic growth and alleviating 
poverty through new government expenditures on health and education and other 
welfare schemes. However, the minor financial crisis of August 2005 led the 
Yudhoyono government to severely reduce government expenditures, including on the 
fuel subsidy reduction compensation, welfare and employment creating schemes. While 
the percentage of Indonesians living in poverty in 2004 returned to pre- Asian financial 
crisis levels at around 17 per cent, the absolute number of people living in poverty in 
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2004 was still higher than in 1996 (36.1 million in 2004 compared with 34.5 million in 
1996) (Hill & Shiraishi 2007, pp. 130-38).  
 
In 2007, the national government established a conditional cash transfer scheme, 
Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat, under which very poor families were 
provided with cash provided they met conditions such as attendance by pregnant 
mothers at primary health care facilities and school attendance for children aged under 
15 years.  The new level of prominence accorded to child protection and the 
deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions was further signaled when, in 2010, the 
subject of child protection and, specifically, Program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak (the 
Social Welfare Program for Children, an initiative that supported the transformation of 
panti asuhan into outreach centres to strengthen the capacities of vulnerable families 
and children within the community, see Chapter 4), were included in Presidential 
Instruction 1/2010 on Accelerating the implementation of the 2010 National 
Development Priorities (UNICEF Indonesia et al. 2012, p. 164). 
 
Taken as a whole, social and economic policy initiatives by national governments 
between 1998 and the mid-to-late 2000s represented a major break with social and 
economic policy directions under Suharto’s New Order. Instead of expecting the poorest 
families ultimately to benefit from the ‘trickle-down’ of national macroeconomic 
growth, the poorest families were specifically targeted by initiatives that aimed to 
enhance their productivity and resilience. For Sumarto et al. (2011, p. 3) the goal for 
government policymakers was ‘not merely to provide risk-coping mechanisms in 
response to economic shocks but also to institute sustainable programs that support 
intergenerational pathways out of poverty’.  
 
While there are few direct references to children and panti asuhan in high-level national 
government strategic policy documents in this period, we can infer that the major, and 
unprecedented, changes that occurred in macroeconomic and social policy had a flow-
on effect on government thinking about panti asuhan. The social and economic policy 
shifts that were signalled as early as 1998 under Habibie, and which continued beyond 
the mid-2000s under Yudhoyono, signalled a changed policy approach regarding 
poverty. By putting in place initiatives to boost educational attendance, improve 
maternal and child health, generate employment, improve the status of women, and 
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enhance child protection and welfare, the national government sent a strong message 
about the importance it placed on strengthening the economic and social wellbeing of 
the poorest families. The practice of sending of children to panti asuhan, which had 
become well-honed under Suharto, was thus increasingly out-of-step with changed 
directions in national social and economic policy. It would thus appear reasonable to 
conclude that, due largely to the effects of the Asian financial crisis, and the subsequent 
process of democratisation (Reformasi), by the early-to-mid 2000s the ground had been 
prepared for national government to turn its attention to aligning policy on panti asuhan 
with these new strategic directions.  
 
7.2.2 Decentralisation. Finally, there is evidence to support the claim that Indonesia’s 
decentralisation policies also hastened panti asuhan policy-change in the early-to-mid 
2000s.  
 
Numerous attempts have been made in Indonesia, even in the Dutch colonial era, to 
decentralise certain powers from the national to sub-national levels. The most far-
reaching of these efforts began shortly after the fall of Suharto (World Bank 2003, pp. 
2-3). In May 1998, President Habibie directed that regional autonomy should be 
initiated (World Bank 2003, p. 3, Lewis 2010, p. 648). In 1999, the People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, one of two elected national 
legislative assemblies that comprise the People’s Consultative Assembly, or Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the highest national representative body) passed two laws—
Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999—which provided greater autonomy to sub-national 
governments, that is, districts/municipalities in urban areas (kota) and regencies in rural 
areas (kabupaten) (Hatti & Sonawane 2010).  
 
These laws set the scene for what has generally become known as ‘big bang’ 
decentralisation in 2001 (Brodjonegoro & Asanuma 2000, pp. 112-19). According to the 
World Bank, the 2001 ‘big bang’ took Indonesia, on paper at least, from being one the 
world’s most centralised economies to being one of the world’s most decentralised 
economies (World Bank 2010). Between 2001 and 2002, for example, the total 
percentage of government spending by sub-national levels jumped from 17 to 30 per 
cent, and over two million public servants, or two-thirds of the total civil service, were 
transferred from national to sub-national government levels (World Bank 2003, pp. 1-
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2). During the 2000s, several other laws were passed that further refined the 
decentralisation of administrative, fiscal, financial and taxation functions (Firman 2009, 
pp. 143-45, Lewis 2010, pp. 648-57). 
 
Yet, ‘big bang’ decentralisation did not proceed without significant problems, one of 
which was inadequate capacity within national and sub-national institutions to 
undertake implementation effectively (Firman 2009, pp. 145-46). Particular challenges 
were posed by the opposition to decentralisation from national government ministries 
which sought to retain control over aspects of administration and policy directions, or to 
delay implementation altogether. According to the World Bank’s (2003, p. 23) analysis 
of Indonesia’s progress with decentralisation: 
 
It is not just the regions that must adjust to regional autonomy, but the center as 
well…until now, few of Indonesia’s central departments seem to have made this 
cultural change…several departments have actively opposed decentralization, 
and have successfully negotiated postponing the devolution of their 
responsibilities…Their internal organization remains largely as it was before 
decentralization. But perhaps more difficult to change is the culture of the 
ministries. They were used to instruct their own apparatus to get things done, but 
now they need to reach out to convince the regional governments of their 
policies, and influence resource allocation through the political process at the 
regional level.  
 
In the same vein, Booth (2005) pointed to the slowness with which national government 
departments relinquished budgets to sub-national levels. Even three years after 
responsibility for education and culture had, for example, been passed to regional 
governments, some 46 per cent of development expenditures in these areas remained 
with national departments (Booth 2005, p. 217). She concluded that central departments 
and agencies were 
 
…exploiting the lack of clarity in the legislation to retain control over important 
components of expenditure…[and] are still trapped in a Soeharto-era time-warp, 
refusing to believe that their powers to plan and implement projects have been 
severely curtailed. (Booth 2005, p. 217).  
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Thus, as with the momentous changes to macroeconomic and social policies after the 
Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto, there appears to be evidence to support 
perspectives offered by interviewees that decentralisation policies may also have 
impacted on the attitudes of national government policymakers towards panti asuhan. In 
short, by the early 2000s, the unfolding processes of decentralisation may have added 
impetus within national government circles to hasten the establishment of national 
policies, including in relation to panti asuhan, to mitigate any erosion of support for 
these issues by sub-national levels of government.  
 
It is important to qualify this point, however, by stating that the evidence presented from 
a few interviewees and supporting secondary materials does not tell us with certainty 
how influential these factors were in conditioning opinions about panti asuhan amongst 
policymakers. At best, it seems generally plausible that these domestic social, economic 
and administrative policy changes influenced the national policy landscape, thus setting 
the scene for a revision in panti asuhan policy thinking.      
 
7.3 Conclusions 
Based on the perspectives of senior officials and others which are examined in light of 
secondary materials, this chapter has added another dimension to the principal public 
narrative about panti asuhan policy change (outlined in Chapter 6), that is, policy about 
panti asuhan shifted because policymakers began to realise, largely on the basis of Save 
the Children’s research after the 2004 tsunami, that panti asuhan were incompatible 
with Indonesia’s international children’s rights obligations. In contrast to this standard 
portrayal, this chapter has shown that, from the early 2000s, Indonesian Government 
policymakers had begun to regard panti asuhan as being increasingly out-of-step with 
new national social, economic and administrative policies that were put in place as part 
of sweeping national reforms following the Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto. 
These new social, economic and administrative policies were not directly related to the 
care and protection of children in panti asuhan, but nonetheless set the broader policy 
environment in which government policymakers had to operate.  
 
The next chapter adds yet another, and so far obscured, dimension to the ‘pro-reform’ 
story line by discussing the concerns held by policymakers about the rising cost of 
subsidising panti asuhan in an era of Reformasi. 
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Chapter 8: The ‘pro-reform’ story line (iii): escalating costs 
 
‘Panti asuhan were very expensive. Many children’s homes relied on the fuel 
subsidy [reduction compensation scheme] for things like buildings and repairs. 
If we moved to a community basis [for the care of children], we could care for 
more children and do not need to have money for buildings and maintenance.’ 
 
A senior Ministry of Social Affairs official (GA-13). 
 
Overview 
This chapter discusses the third main narrative within the ‘pro-reform’ story line to the 
effect that, by the early-to-mid 2000s, escalating financial subsidies to panti asuhan had 
become increasingly unacceptable to the national government at a time of overall 
budget stringency. This perspective has previously gone unnoticed in the narrative that 
has been conveyed publicly to date by policymakers and policy advocates about panti 
asuhan.   
 
8.1 Findings from the field 
8.1.1 Views from national government. A theme that emerged in the course of several 
interviews with senior national government officials, NGO leaders and academics was 
that, by the early 2000s, national government officials began to be concerned about a 
rapid increase in the amount of financial subsidisation being provided by the national 
government to panti asuhan at a time of overall budgetary stringency sparked by the 
Asian financial crisis. A senior Ministry of Social Affairs official who was directly 
involved in policymaking on panti asuhan after the Asian financial crisis through to the 
mid-2000s (GA-13) stated bluntly how economic pressures weighed heavily on the 
minds of national government officials. Of particular relevance to the argument made 
elsewhere in this study, he signalled that panti asuhan would continue to be used as the 
principal mechanism for the delivery of support services to families under the new 
policy and that the new policy did not originate in revelations about panti asuhan after 
the 2004 tsunami, thus:  
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The general economic situation was a major factor. Starting in 2002, the costs to 
the government of supporting orphanages were increasing a lot due to the 
financial crisis. The number of neglected children also increased significantly at 
that time…  
 
We had a limited State budget. In Indonesia, 5.4 million children are neglected. 
There was not enough budget to build new institutions so we asked why do we 
not empower families to look after their children?  
 
We have to have a welfare society to empower families and communities, but 
not a welfare state like in the West. We used to promote subsidies to institutions 
but now we are providing assistance on a community basis, mainly through 
family support provided by orphanages. (emphasis added). 
 
[When asked about the role played by the national government’s fuel subsidy 
reduction compensation scheme in supporting panti asuhan] Yes, you are right! 
[the interviewee leaned forward to emphasise the point]. They were very 
expensive. Many children’s homes relied on the fuel subsidy [reduction 
compensation scheme] for things like buildings and repairs…  
 
If we moved to a community basis [for the care of children], we can care for 
more children and do not need to have money for buildings and maintenance. It 
was not Save the Children that made us change our policy [the interviewee 
stressed this point]… 
 
We [in national government] were shocked to learn that there were 5.4 million 
neglected children in Indonesia at that time [the early 2000s], and that this 
number was increasing. Up to the 1990s, Indonesia got a lot of revenue from oil 
but this declined in the early 2000s and then there was the financial crisis. 
Because of the decline, government had to use fuel subsidies to support 
orphanages, but this caused the number of orphanages to grow. 
 
(Interviewee GA-13) 
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Another senior Ministry of Social Affairs official, GB-13, was emphatic that, by the 
mid-2000s, the cost of subsidising panti asuhan had become a matter of serious concern 
within national government: 
 
The problem was that, between 1979 and 1997, the number of panti asuhan did 
not grow much. However, after the financial crisis of 1997 until the 2004 
tsunami, the number of pantis grew a lot because of fuel subsidies…  
 
The fuel subsidy [reduction compensation scheme] continued into the 2000s and 
was important because the people could see that the government supported 
children. Then the government conducted the PKH program [Program Keluarga 
Harapan or ‘Hope for families’ scheme] which gave conditional cash transfers 
to poor people. This was a return to the child welfare law of 1979 which 
mentioned that children need family support. 
 
(Interviewee GB-13) 
 
Similar concerns about cost were put by another senior Ministry of Social Affairs 
official (GK-13): 
 
If government did not change its policy the number of children in institutions 
would increase and that would have meant higher costs for government. If 
government did not provide more family-based care, there would be a higher 
social cost in the future…  
 
The cost of providing education and health care through orphanages is actually 
higher than providing it through the family so government will have to pay more 
to maintain institutions… 
 
Pantis are the last resort for children. Having the child in the family makes the 
family more economically active compared with a family that has a child in a 
panti. Parents think that institutions will look after their children and so they do 
not have to work hard… 
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Keeping a child in a panti is a high cost for government. For government, a 
panti costs US$1,000 per child per year. If there are five million neglected 
children in Indonesia, we cannot afford to have them coming into pantis at this 
cost.  
 
But, if we use more family-based care, the cost will be lower and the number of 
children the government can reach for better health and education will be 
greater. That means the government will no longer have to fund infrastructure in 
pantis as it did in the past. 
 
(Interviewee GK-13) 
 
A senior Ministry of National Development Planning official, GI-13, also spoke about 
the rising cost to government of subsidising panti asuhan: 
 
For pantis simply to rely on the government budget is not sustainable. As early 
as 2001, the Ministry of Social Affairs proposed increases in government 
funding for pantis, but there were other pressures on the central budget, such as 
for infrastructure and food security…  
 
One of the reasons behind greater government support to families raising 
children was that government was wary of increasing its funding to run pantis. 
For pantis simply to rely on the government budget was not sustainable.  
 
(Interviewee GI-13) 
 
8.1.2 A non-government perspective. From outside national government, the head of a 
national child welfare NGO (NC-13) observed that costs of supporting panti asuhan had 
increasingly concerned the national government after the Asian financial crisis: 
 
There have been orphanages since Dutch colonial times, but the problem for 
government since the financial crisis was a lack of funds and a lack of 
monitoring how government funds were distributed to panti asuhan…  
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Orphanages just said [to the Ministry of Social Affairs] how many children they 
cared for, but we really didn’t know if the money went to the children or was 
used for other purposes. Because of this, the government moved to establish a 
family-based approach and moved away from using panti asuhan [the 
interviewee stressed this point]. 
 
(Interviewee NC-13) 
 
8.2 Analysis and discussion 
Thus, a consistent theme amongst both government and non-government interviewees 
was that the rising cost of subsidising panti asuhan had become a significant financial 
burden to government after the Asian financial crisis. Drawing on previously 
unpublished primary sources as well as secondary materials, this section examines this 
claim. It commences by discussing the rapid growth of panti asuhan in the first few 
years of Reformasi, followed by an analysis of reasons for this growth in terms of the 
largely unregulated national government fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme 
and decentralisation grants to panti asuhan.   
 
8.2.1 Growth of panti asuhan: from the early 1990s to the Asian financial crisis. 
Apart from fragmentary information about Muhammadiyah-operated panti asuhan up to 
the 1940s (see Chapter 5), no national figures, or even estimates, of the numbers of 
panti asuhan and children living in them were available until Indonesia reported to the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2003 on its compliance with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. As summarised in Table 8.1, below, the 
Indonesian Government (cited in UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, p. 42) 
stated that the number of children living in panti asuhan rose from 55,627 in 1990-91 to 
68,919 on the eve of the Asian financial crisis in 1996-97, that is, an average annual 
growth rate of five per cent. Moreover, Table 8.1 shows that the number of children in 
panti asuhan rose from 68,919 in 1996-97 to 91,051 in 1997-98—a 32 per cent increase 
in one year alone, which in all probability was due to the massive influx of children 
from poor families who were impacted by the Asian financial crisis. From Table 8.1 it 
will also be noted that, according to the World Bank, the number of children in the total 
Indonesian population fell from 43.12 per cent in 1990 to 38.98 per cent in 1998 (World 
Bank 2015). Thus, increases in the number of children entering panti asuhan during the 
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1990s appears to be even more dramatic when seen against a decline in the percentage 
of children in the Indonesian population as a whole during much of this decade.
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Table 8.1 Panti asuhan, children in panti asuhan and children in Indonesia, 1990-98 
  
Year Total number of panti asuhan  
(source 1) 
Total number of children in panti 
asuhan  
(source 1) 
Percentage of total population 
aged below 18 years (source 2) 
1990-91 983 55,627 43.12 
1993-94 1,089 71,257  41.40 
1996-97 1,285 68,919  39.62 
1997-98 1,647 91,051 38.98 
      
Sources:  
1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, cited in UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003, p. 42). 
2. World Bank (2015). 
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8.2.2 Further growth of panti asuhan during Reformasi. Panti asuhan growth rates in 
the 1990s were exceeded, however, by those recorded in the first eight years of the 
Reformasi period after the fall of Suharto and the onset of the Asian financial crisis. 
Table 8.2, below, which is based on unpublished Ministry of Social Affairs data about 
the uptake of fuel subsidy reduction compensation by panti asuhan indicates that, 
between 2001 and 2007, the number of children in panti asuhan rose by 31 per cent, 
that is, from 115,035 to 150,075 children (fuel subsidy reduction compensation data are 
unavailable for the period between 1998 and 2001).  
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Table 8.2 Fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan and children in panti asuhan, and children in Indonesia, 2001-09 
 
Year Total number of panti asuhan 
provided with  fuel subsidy 
reduction compensation (source 1) 
Total number of children in panti 
asuhan receiving fuel subsidy 
reduction compensation (source 
1) 
Percentage of total 
population aged below 18 
years (source 2) 
2001 2,327 115,035 36.54 
2002 2,642 118,242 36.21 
2003 3,401 150,000 35.99 
2004 3,973 149,022 35.86 
2005 4,308 149,050 35.80 
2006 4,737 150,080 35.46 
2007 5,053 150,075 35.27 
2008 5,261 158,000 35.17 
2009 5,712 167,000 35.13 
 
Sources:  
1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Social Affairs (2013). 
2. World Bank (2015).
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When combined with Indonesian Government data in Table 8.1, the picture that 
emerges is that in the eight year period between the end of Suharto’s New Order in 
1998-99 and 2007 the number of panti asuhan rose from 1,647 to 5,053 and the number 
of children in panti asuhan increased from 91,051 to 150,075.  
 
Thus, it can be observed that, while the number of panti asuhan grew at an average 
annual rate of five per cent in the six years leading up to the Asian financial crisis, they 
grew at an average annual rate of eight per cent in the eight year period after the Asian 
financial crisis. Also, the number of children in panti asuhan grew at an average annual 
rate of 3.8 per cent in the six years prior to the Asian financial crisis, but almost double 
that rate, at 7.2 per cent, in the eight years after the Asian financial crisis. Appendix D 
discusses in detail the trends in fuel subsidy reduction compensation. Based on World 
Bank figures, Table 8.2 also shows that the percentage of children in the Indonesian 
population fell from 36.54 per cent in 2001 to 35.13 per cent in 2009 (World Bank 
2015). As was the case during much of the 1990s (see Table 8.1, above), increases in 
the number of children entering panti asuhan in the decade after the Asian financial 
crisis thus appear to be even more momentous when seen against the background of the 
continued steady decline in the percentage of children in the overall Indonesian 
population during much of this period. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the reliability of figures cited above using fuel subsidy 
reduction compensation data is open to question because not all panti asuhan applied 
for the subsidy. The extent of uptake of fuel subsidy reduction compensation by panti 
asuhan was canvassed in Save the Children’s reports on panti asuhan in 2006 and 2007. 
On the basis of projections based on a sample of panti asuhan, Save the Children 
presented a range of estimates about the number of panti asuhan and children in panti 
asuhan that were markedly different from national government figures for the period 
after 2001 (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, pp. 6-10, Save the Children UK et al. 
2007, pp. 18-21). I have combined Save the Children’s estimates with data from 
Indonesia’s 2003 report to the UN and fuel subsidy reduction compensation data in 
Table 8.3, below, to provide trend information on the number of panti asuhan and 
children living in them for the 17-year period between 1990-91 and 2007. Of particular 
note, the Indonesian Government claimed that the number of children in panti asuhan 
almost trebled between 1990 and 2007 (from 55,627 in 1990-91 to 150,075 in 2007), 
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whereas Save the Children estimated an almost nine-fold increase (from 55,627 in 
1990-91 to 516,600 in 2007). 
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Table 8.3 Panti asuhan and children in panti asuhan, 1990-2006 (numbers) 
  
Year 
 
Total number of panti asuhan Total number of children in panti 
asuhan  
1990-91 (source 1) 983 55,627  
1993-94 (source 1) 1,089 71,257  
1996-97 (source 1) 1,285 68,919  
1997-98 (source 1) 1,647 91,051  
2003 (Fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation data) (source 2) 
3,401 125,232 
2007 (Fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation data) (source 2) 
5,053 150,075 
2007 (Fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation data plus Save the Children 
estimates of non-fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation recipients) (source 2) 
5,250-8,610 225,750-516,600  
      
Sources:  
1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, cited in Report by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Indonesia (2003, p. 42).  
2. Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by Indonesian Government (Government of Indonesia 2013b). 
3. Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Indonesian Government and estimates in Save the Children UK et al. (2007, pp. 18-9). 
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Whether one accepts national government data in Tables 8.1-8.3 or Save the Children’s 
projections in Table 8.3, at the most general level, it seems clear that there were 
substantial increases in the number of panti asuhan and children living in them between 
1990 and 2007-08. Within that period, there was a burst in the number of children in 
panti asuhan, and the number of panti asuhan, during the half-decade after the Asian 
financial crisis. Even after the worst effects of the Asian financial crisis had abated by 
the early 2000s, data suggests that panti asuhan growth rates did not return to pre-Asian 
financial crisis levels; instead, they settled at rates that were significantly higher than 
those seen through the 1990s.  
 
Claims about rapid acceleration in rates of growth of panti asuhan during the 2000s are 
supported in general terms by other sources. UNICEF (2006) reported that the number 
of panti asuhan had risen at least to 7,000 by the mid-2000s (p. 30). In 2013, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs’ Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister of Social Welfare 
and former Ministry of Social Affairs’ Director-General for Social Services and 
Rehabilitation, Makmur Sunusi, stated that institutional care in Indonesia had been 
‘very much on the rise’, with 8,000 panti asuhan caring for up to half-a-million 
children. He added that 90 per cent of children in panti asuhan were not orphans, but 
had been relinquished into panti asuhan as a result of family poverty (Sunusi 2013).  
 
The substantial increase in the number of panti asuhan from the 1990s until the 2000s 
does not, in its own right, contribute much to explanations for the policy shift on panti 
asuhan. Rather, it is probable that the massive increase in number of panti asuhan 
resulted largely from individuals and organisations seeking to take financial advantage 
of easily-obtained government subsidies to panti asuhan, leading to a rapid increase in 
the financial burden on the national government at a time when it was attempting to 
institute overall national budget cost-savings.  
 
This point is best explained with reference to demand and supply factors. On the 
demand side, as noted in Table 8.1, above, using national government figures, a 32 per 
cent increase was recorded in the number of children in panti asuhan at the height of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1996-97 and 1997-98. Although the numbers of children in 
panti asuhan rose through the 1990s, it seems reasonable to infer that the jump in the 
number of children in panti asuhan in 1997-98 was associated with the social and 
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economic dislocation caused by the Asian financial crisis. As noted above, even after 
the worst effects of the Asian financial crisis had abated, the number of panti asuhan 
and children in them continued to rise at average annual rates that were around double 
those experienced during the 1990s.   
 
The strong demand for places in panti asuhan in the immediate aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis through to the mid-2000s was met by a rapidly expanding supply of 
children’s institutions. Perhaps paradoxically in light of Indonesia’s treaty obligations 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child to discourage the inappropriate or 
excessive reliance on children’s institutions, two national government policies actually 
propped up, and led to the rapid expansion of, panti asuhan during this period. These 
were, first, policies that were instituted after 1999 to assist with the decentralisation of 
financial and administrative authority to sub-national levels, and second, policies that 
aimed to counter the adverse impacts of cuts to regressive government fuel subsidies. I 
turn now to discuss each of these policy directions.  
 
A feature of Indonesia’s decentralisation efforts was the establishment in 2000 of a 
special ‘Deconcentration’ fund (Dana dekonsentrasi dari pusat ke propinsi or Dana 
dekon). These funds were channelled to, and were under the control of, provincial 
governments, ostensibly for the provision of social and other services. This included 
funding to support designated groups and individuals with special needs, such as 
children who were deemed by the authorities to be neglected and children living in panti 
asuhan. Provincial governments would decide on the allocation of dekon funds to 
district level authorities. There is no published official information about the extent of 
dekon funding provided to panti asuhan by provincial authorities during the period 
between 2000 and the change of policy on panti asuhan around 2007-08. However, we 
can gain a sense of the scale and growth of this form of subsidy to panti asuhan through 
data from the Ministry of Social Affairs regarding Acehnese panti asuhan as cited in 
Save the Children UK et al. (2006). According to that report, dekon funding rose from 
1,390 children in panti asuhan in 2000 to 2,300 in 2006. As shown in Table 8.4, below, 
the total amount of dekon funds disbursed directly to panti asuhan in Aceh rose by 59.3 
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per cent in two years between 2003 and 2005 (from IDR2.7 billion1 (US$314,795) to 
IDR4.3 billion (US$443,071)) (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, p. 27). 
 
                                               
1 One billion equals one thousand million, that is, 1,000,000,000. 
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Table 8.4 Dekon disbursements to panti asuhan in Aceh, 2000-06 
 
Year Total number of children in Aceh 
receiving dekon funding through 
panti asuhan 
Total amount of dekon funding 
provided to panti asuhan in Aceh 
(IDR billion) 
Total amount of dekon funding 
provided to panti asuhan in Aceh 
(equivalent US$) 
2000 1,390 Unknown - 
2001 2,740 Unknown - 
2002 2,440 Unknown  - 
2003 2,710 2.7 314,795 
2004 2,480 3.2 357,982 
2005 1,600 4.3 443,071 
2006 2,300 Unknown - 
 
Source: Save the Children UK et al. (2006, p. 27). Note: US dollar amounts in Table 8.4 vary from those contained in Save the Children UK et al. (2007) in 
accordance with World Bank exchange rate data issued for the period 2003 to 2005 (World Bank 2014). 
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No data are currently available concerning the amount of dekon funding provided to 
panti asuhan through provincial authorities for the remainder of Indonesia. A general 
sense of the magnitude of the funding can be gained, however, by estimating national 
dekon expenditure on panti asuhan using Aceh as a guide. Appendix E sets out the 
location by province and the amount of fuel subsidy reduction compensation provided 
to panti asuhan for 2007. While not all panti asuhan would have received fuel subsidy 
reduction compensation, Aceh accounted for four per cent of the national fuel allocation 
for panti asuhan. By applying the latter figure to dekon funding, the national dekon 
expenditure on panti asuhan based on dekon funding for Aceh, may have been of the 
order of US$11 million per annum in the mid-2000s (note that this calculation is 
indicative only: it assumes that Aceh is typical of other provinces in terms of the 
number of panti asuhan and that dekon funding is applied equitably across provinces 
based on the numbers of panti asuhan in each province). 
 
Another indication of the extent of dekon subsidisation by the Indonesian Government 
to panti asuhan was reported in Save the Children et al. (2007) which claimed that, of 
the total 2006 budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ Directorate for the Social 
Assistance of Children of US$19 million, US$17.6 million was allocated to social 
services under dekon (p. 29). Save the Children et al. (2007) also stated that US$9 
million of these funds went to ‘neglected children’ living in panti asuhan (p. 29). In the 
Indonesian context, according to Save the Children UK et al. (2007), the latter figure 
was substantial when compared with the entire Ministry of Social Affairs budget for 
2006 of US$251 million (pp. 28-29). Unfortunately, no data are available on dekon 
allocations to panti asuhan for other years that would enable comparisons to be made.    
 
The second major source of national government financial encouragement to panti 
asuhan during the early Reformasi period was the fuel subsidy reduction compensation 
scheme. A universally-available fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme operated 
during much of the New Order era to help stabilise the cost of fuel and other 
commodities. However, since 1998 national governments cut fuel subsidies on several 
occasions to better align the cost of fuel with its true economic cost, reduce fossil fuel 
usage, and free up funds for investment in social welfare programs. These cuts, in turn, 
led to rises in fuel costs. In 2001, 2005 and 2008, cuts to the fuel subsidy caused fuel 
prices to rise, respectively, by 30, 100 and 30 per cent (Perdana 2014, p. 7). On each 
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occasion national governments increased fuel prices during the first decade of 
Reformasi, they put in place, or extended, social protection measures to help buffer the 
effects of price rises on the most vulnerable households and communities. Of relevance 
to the story of panti asuhan policy change, in 2001, the national government established 
a fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme specifically to assist social welfare 
institutions, including panti asuhan, to help meet increases in the cost of food and other 
commodities and services due to fuel price fluctuations after government decisions to 
cut government subsidies on fuel and to raise fuel prices (fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation continues to be provided to registered panti asuhan at the time of 
writing). From 2006, the scheme, as applied to children’s institutions, became known as 
the Program Subsidi Tambahan Biaya Permakanan untuk Panti Sosial.  
 
Fuel subsidy reduction compensation was provided to any panti asuhan that registered 
to receive it. Any person, even those without professional competence in a field related 
to the care of children, could establish a panti asuhan. Registration did not require a 
panti asuhan to meet particular standards of care for children (National NGO Coalition 
for Children Rights Monitoring & Save the Children 2010, p. 53). Once a panti asuhan, 
or its parent organisation, was able to prove that it was legally registered as a social 
organisation, it could apply to receive fuel subsidy reduction compensation. Because 
many panti asuhan were registered in the name of their parent social organisation, the 
national government did not maintain an accurate record of the number, location and 
type of individual panti asuhan, nor keep information about the needs of, or quality of 
life for, children in these places. Fuel subsidy reduction compensation for panti asuhan 
was calculated annually by the Ministry of Social Affairs on the basis of an amount of 
funding per child. Both private and government-run panti asuhan gained access to fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation subject to being registered and payments were made to 
registered panti asuhan through their local post office. Fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation was not linked to any assessment of children’s needs or the needs of panti 
asuhan, for example, for infrastructure renewal or staffing costs.  
 
Insights into the role played by the fuel subsidy reduction compensation scheme for 
panti asuhan around the mid-2000s were provided in Save the Children UK et al. 
(2007), which found that all 36 panti asuhan assessed in the study’s sample group 
received the subsidy from the Indonesian Government (p. 73). They also stated that 
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most of the operational revenues for the 28 privately-owned panti asuhan in the sample 
group were derived from fuel subsidies (p. 73). Even amongst the nine panti asuhan that 
were government-owned, either by central, provincial, district or municipal 
governments, fuel subsidy reduction compensation played a significant role in 
supporting operations in addition to local government funding through dekon. Most 
panti asuhan in the sample group received fuel subsidy reduction compensation funding 
for 30 children, although that was not a fixed rule. Some panti asuhan with 100 or more 
children received fuel subsidy reduction compensation for 50 children. Save the 
Children UK et al. (2007) concluded that fuel subsidy reduction compensation may 
have funded between 50 and 70 per cent of children in each of the institutions surveyed 
(p. 73). The relative ease with which panti asuhan were able to be established in order 
to access fuel subsidy reduction compensation led Save the Children UK et al. (2007, 
pp. 29-30) to conclude that panti asuhan operators had 
 
…every reason to be going out to recruit children in order to receive the aid, and 
to keep these children longer-term within these institutions, whether these 
children have remaining parents or whether they could actually be supported 
within their families.  
 
Thus, the uncapped nature of fuel subsidy reduction compensation to registered panti 
asuhan and the lack of operating rules around the subsidy encouraged individuals and 
organisations to establish panti asuhan from the early 2000s.  
 
The magnitude of national government subsidisation to panti asuhan in the early 
Reformasi period was also revealed in Save the Children UK et al. (2013). That report 
claimed that fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan in 2007 was around 
US$12 million, which was a comparatively large amount when compared to the overall 
budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ Directorate of Children’s Services of US$19 
million (US$9 million of which was directly remitted to provincial governments under 
dekon to support neglected children, particularly through panti asuhan) (Save the 
Children Indonesia 2013, p. 66). In 2006, the equivalent of US$9 million in dekon 
funding was transferred to provincial governments ostensibly for these purposes. By 
contrast, fuel subsidy reduction compensation went directly from the national 
government to each registered panti asuhan through local post offices. Figures available 
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for 2006 indicate that fuel subsidy reduction compensation funding for panti asuhan 
(US$10.5 million) exceeded dekon funding (US$9 million).  
 
Taken together, the prospect of obtaining fuel and dekon subsidies with little or no 
regulation or monitoring meant that opening and operating a panti asuhan presented an 
attractive business opportunity for individuals and organisations disposed to exploit 
such provisions for their own commercial purposes. In that environment it is little 
wonder that there was a veritable explosion in the rate of uptake of fuel subsidy 
reduction compensation after 2001 and the number of panti asuhan. This is illustrated in 
Figure 8.5, below, which uses published national government data to show that total 
subsidies to panti asuhan increased by almost five-fold between 2001 and 2007, that is, 
from IDR25.77 billion to IDR125.99 billion (or in US dollar terms, from US$2.51 
million to US$13.78 million).  
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Table 8.5 Fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan, 2001-09 
 
Year Fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation to panti asuhan 
expressed as cost per child per 
day (in IDR) 
Total fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation to panti asuhan (in 
IDR billions) 
Total fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation to panti asuhan (in 
equivalent US$ millions) 
2001 270 31.06 3.11 
2002 585 70.00 7.52 
2003 2,250 123.19 14.36 
2004 2,250 122.38 13.69 
2005 2,250 122.41 15.36 
2006 482 72.26 7.89 
2007 840 125.99 13.78 
2008 913 144.18 14.87 
2009 1,095 182.87 17.60 
 
Source: Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Social Affairs (2013).  
Note: US dollar amounts in Table 8.5 are based on World Bank exchange rate data issued for the period 2001 to 2009 (World Bank 2014). 
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It is also noteworthy from Table 8.5 that, even after the change in panti asuhan policy 
direction became clear around 2007-08, fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti 
asuhan continued to increase strongly, from IDR125.99 billion (or US$13.78 million) in 
2007 to IDR182.87 billion (or US$17.6 million) in 2009, as did the number of children 
being assisted through the scheme, from 150,075 children in 2007 to 167,000 children 
in 2009 (Government of Indonesia 2013b). The fact that fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation to panti asuhan continued to grow after 2007-08 is further evidence that 
the policy shift was far less significant than has been portrayed in the standard account 
offered by international players. As discussed earlier, the new policy saw panti asuhan 
as continuing to play a central, albeit slightly adjusted, role into the foreseeable future. 
The continuation of fuel subsidy reduction compensation to them after 2007-08 
underlines my contention that the policy shift was far less radical than has been 
portrayed or might have been were no mitigating forces at work in the policymaking 
process (Chapter 9 discusses factors that impeded more radical policy change). 
 
Apart from fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan and dekon, panti 
asuhan receive government financial support in other ways, often in the form of short-
term relief measures. After the 2004 tsunami, for example, the Indonesian Government 
provided funding to panti asuhan in Aceh to assist with reconstruction work and day-to-
day operations. Local and district level governments disbursed funds to both 
government and privately-run panti asuhan. Community giving was another important 
source of financing for panti asuhan. As noted in Chapter 9, it is common practice for 
the Muslim faithful to make charitable donations to orphanages, particularly at the end 
of the holy month of Ramadan. Charitable gifts and bequests to panti asuhan are also 
made throughout the year by individuals, families, foundations, businesses and 
community groups, both from within Indonesia and overseas. The total amount of these 
donations to panti asuhan is unknown.  
 
One other publicly-available insight into the impact of broader national government 
policy concerns on services for children was provided in a speech in 2010 by Makmur 
Sunusi. Reflecting on the situation in the early-to-mid 2000s, Sunusi (2010) stated that 
national budgetary problems meant that spending on services for neglected children, 
including those in panti asuhan, was only able to reach 1.8 per cent of all neglected 
Indonesian children, though he did not explain why this was the case (p. 3). He added 
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that the Ministry of Social Affairs’ budget for neglected children fell by five per cent in 
2008 on top of average annual budgetary reductions for these purposes of 3.4 per cent in 
the three-year period between 2005 and 2007 due to ‘the economic crisis and fluctuating 
world oil prices’ (Sunusi 2010, p. 3). 
 
8.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has brought to light previously unrecorded concerns held by senior 
Indonesian Government officials and others about the rising cost to the national 
government of supporting panti asuhan in the decade after the Asian financial crisis. 
Other primary and secondary data support these claims, pointing to how national 
government policies to mitigate the worst effects of the Asian financial crisis and to 
encourage decentralisation stimulated a rapid, and largely unchecked, expansion in the 
numbers of panti asuhan, leading to increased financial costs to the national 
government during the early-to-mid 2000s. Not only were panti asuhan increasingly 
out-of-step with the Indonesian Government’s desire to conform with Indonesia’s 
international rights obligations (see Chapter 6) and new national social and economic 
policy directions set in the early-to-mid 2000s (see Chapter 7), these children’s 
institutions also came to be regarded as a growing financial burden to national 
government that, seeking to restore the economy after the catastrophic Asian financial 
crisis, needed to find savings and redirect expenditures towards areas of higher national 
importance, such as poverty alleviation schemes.  
 
Thus, as noted in this and the preceding two chapters, a range of concerns grew within 
early Reformasi administrations about the cost and appropriateness of panti asuhan that 
were largely absent during Suharto’s New Order. As we will see in the next chapter, 
however, such reformist views were far from universally supported within Indonesian 
politics and society.  
 
 
 
 
 
169 
Chapter 9:  The ‘status quo’ story line: ‘the friend of orphans’   
 
‘People will only donate to orphanages and not to families. During Ramadan, 
people offer food to orphans. If people donate to orphans they will get rewards 
from God—it is mentioned in the sayings of Muhammad that people must be the 
friend of orphans.’        
 
An Indonesian NGO social welfare worker (NA-12). 
 
‘After Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, we 
moved toward children’s rights-based policies. This was hard work because the 
institutions have been operating for a long time and people think that the 
institutions are good for children. It’s difficult to change people’s minds. It’s 
been quite a challenge.’   
 
A senior official of an Indonesian Government child protection agency 
(GF-13). 
 
Overview 
This chapter discusses the second of the two main story lines held by interviewees about 
panti asuhan, that is, the ‘status quo’ view whose basic message was that panti asuhan 
played a variety of useful, even necessary, roles in Indonesian social, religious and 
community life. Two principal themes or narratives were evident within the ‘status quo’ 
story line: first, that panti asuhan were sanctioned by Islamic teachings as a vehicle for 
charitable giving; and, second, to the extent that panti asuhan came to Indonesian public 
attention, that they were widely respected as a ‘time-honoured’ practice for the care of 
children.  
 
9.1 Findings from the field 
9.1.1 NGOs and researchers. Chapters 6-8 noted how several interviewees saw panti 
asuhan as increasingly anachronistic. However, others talked about how panti asuhan 
were regarded, both by organisations running institutions and by the community at 
large, as being beneficial on a number of levels in Indonesian society.  
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As outlined in Chapter 4, the majority of panti asuhan are privately run by the large 
socio-religious welfare organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. Only 
Muhammadiyah officials were prepared to discuss panti asuhan at length. Despite 
efforts to make contact with Nahdlatul Ulama, I was unable to interview a 
representative of this organisation. One of the key themes to emerge from interviews 
with an Indonesian social worker familiar with Muhammadiyah (NA-12) was 
Muhammadiyah’s strong contention that their panti asuhan had supported poor families 
in the absence of much national government support over many decades. Interviewee 
NA-12 said that panti asuhan were regarded within Indonesia society and the upper 
echelons of Muhammadiyah as performing important roles by helping poor families and 
that, sometimes after entering a panti asuhan, children did not want to return to their 
families. She also noted how ‘orphan’ was defined by Muhammadiyah leaders to 
include children from a poor family even if one or both parents were living, and how 
panti asuhan were routinely provided with financial support in the form of donations by 
community members as a mark of religious observance: 
 
Parents bring children to orphanages for food and education and also to abandon 
their responsibilities. The children do not want to go back home. For people 
running pantis, it’s a balance between spoiling them and sending them back to 
their homes.  
 
People will only donate to orphanages and not to families. During Ramadan, 
people offer food to orphans. If people donate to orphans they will get rewards 
from God—it is mentioned in the sayings of Muhammad that people must be the 
friend of orphans…        
 
Many people on the Muhammadiyah Central Board think that institutions are 
good places for children. Since 2008, as a result of the Save the Children studies 
there was a new understanding inside Muhammadiyah that 98 per cent of 
children in orphanages had at least one parent…  
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The Islamic Council of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah interprets the 
Qur’an [Islam’s principal holy book] and they have defined orphans widely as 
including children from a lot of difficult conditions, such as poor families…  
 
Two years ago [that is, in 2010], the Council’s Law Forum discussed the matter 
and were asked for a new interpretation of ‘an orphan’. But, the result was 
awful. [Instead of discussing how an orphan was defined] they asked why a new 
definition was being sought and said that they did not want to close the 
orphanages.  
 
They said there was no problem between Islam and the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. [The prophet] Muhammad said that family was the best 
place to raise children and they also agreed that orphanages were the last resort 
[if family placement failed]. The challenge [within Muhammadiyah] is to 
combine Islamic law and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
new government standards.  
 
(Interviewee NA-12) 
 
Another Indonesian social welfare worker (NB-12) discussed Muhammadiyah’s role in 
running panti asuhan, reinforcing the view put by interviewee NA-12 that many people 
in Indonesian society regarded panti asuhan as playing useful social and religious roles:  
 
The majority of orphanages are run by Muhammadiyah. The community 
believes that by supporting orphanages they will receive a blessing… 
 
Muhammadiyah’s problem is to explain Islamic law and the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child to our orphanages and how they sit next to each other. 
The situation is that so many regulations are needed and government, which 
lacks resources, has asked institutions to contribute to them.  
 
(Interviewee NB-12) 
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Interviewee IND-13, an Indonesian child protection specialist working for an INGO, 
perceived a general level of acceptance amongst some Ministry of Social Affairs 
officials, politicians and within Indonesian society more broadly about the role played 
by panti asuhan: 
 
In the Parliament, the politicians say ‘no, we cannot close panti asuhan’ because 
they know politically it is a problem in Indonesia. On the other side, pantis have 
been around for many years and are in the heart of the people who think ‘if you 
want to do the best for children you go to the panti’ and people share with them 
for charity…  
 
The problem is that many people abuse the panti asuhan for their own purpose, 
and it is also dangerous because we know that sometimes families bring their 
children to the panti and ask them for money [for the children]. The families use 
the children…to get money… 
 
Some staff and social workers in the Ministry of Social Affairs see these people 
[who want to reform panti asuhan] as experimenters and they still think that 
pantis are the best solution.  
 
Not all people in the Ministry of Social Affairs know why the shift away from 
pantis is taking place. They are ‘text literate’ not ‘content literate’, that is, they 
understand the letter of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but do 
not understand what it means in depth.  
 
That’s why the government got into difficulty when it reported to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. They thought the senior people in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs learned about deinstitutionalisation from Save the 
Children, but they really don’t all understand the meaning of 
deinstitutionalisation. 
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For many years the situation was that the Ministry of Social Affairs supported 
the existence of panti asuhan and also pantis became a way of making money 
for panti operators… 
 
Some families felt that if you wanted to be prosperous, they should put their 
children into pantis. But this violated the idea of the panti as strictly being an 
orphanage [that is, for children who had no living parents]. That was not the 
original purpose of pantis…  
 
Within government, they wanted the image of reforming the pantis but this was 
because it was an era of reform in general. In the Ministry of Social Affairs 
today they are reconsidering the policy shift on pantis put in place by former 
senior staff of the Ministry of Social Affairs.  
 
(Interviewee IND-13) 
 
Community reliance on panti asuhan as a means whereby poor families could gain 
access to education for their children was also noted by an expatriate manager of an 
INGO (INB-12): 
 
There have been improvements in Indonesia on child protection at the general 
level over the past 20 years. There have been some key laws put in place on the 
back of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
 
But, research on orphanages showed that 80 to 90 per cent of children in 
orphanages had at least one parent who could take care of them. Parents see the 
orphanages as a way that their children can receive an education.  
 
(Interviewee INB-12) 
 
A leading academic on child protection matters (RA-13) discussed how panti asuhan 
had come to be widely accepted in Indonesian society due largely to their introduction 
during the Dutch colonial era and their expansion under Suharto’s New Order regime: 
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Pantis or orphanages originated with the Dutch Christian missionaries. At the 
end of the Second World War, Sukarno needed pantis to take care of children 
who had been abandoned as a result of the war.  
 
Sukarno lobbied Christian churches to take care of abandoned children. As the 
problem of orphans became bigger after Independence, all community groups 
were asked to help with the care of orphans. In Islam, setting up an orphanage 
was seen as a way of caring for a child.    
 
Eventually, the pantis became a way of taking advantage of government money. 
Between 1998 and 2004, for example, there was what we call ‘red-plated NGOs’ 
[government vehicles have red number plates] that is, government officials who 
saw that government was about to fund NGOs to run pantis or other programs so 
they established their own NGOs to take advantage. This continues to this day. 
Many pantis are selling poverty programs.  
 
(Interviewee RA-13) 
 
9.1.2 Views from national government. Some national government officials also 
commented that Indonesian community attitudes tended to favour, or were at least 
equivocal about, panti asuhan despite the apparent contradiction between the practice of 
sending children who had living parents to these institutions and international children’s 
rights standards as enshrined in Indonesian law. Interviewee GA-13, a senior Ministry 
of Social Affairs official, said that ‘even though Indonesia has laws based on children’s 
rights, it is still common practice to send children to panti asuhan and for people still to 
stick to religious laws’. The head of a child protection taskforce within a national 
government children’s agency (GF-13) talked in similar terms about how panti asuhan 
had become widely accepted in Indonesian society because, even though they were a 
relatively new phenomenon (having been introduced by the Dutch colonial 
government), they received strong financial backing from post-Independence 
Indonesian governments, especially the Suharto regime. Also, contrary to views 
attributed to Muhammadiyah leadership by some interviewees (see above), he asserted 
(but without being specific) that Islamic teachings did not support the 
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institutionalisation of children and, indeed, supported the idea that children were best 
raised by their family. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’s encouragement 
for children to be raised in a family environment was, he contended, actually consistent 
with a strict reading of the Qur’an:  
 
The tradition of orphanages in Indonesia goes back to the time of the Dutch 
because there were many Indonesian children left after many Indonesians died in 
the wars between the Dutch and Indonesians.  
 
The orphanages were brought from Europe and Indonesia tried to replicate the 
model of European church-run orphanages. Muhammadiyah started its own 
orphanages in 1912. After Independence in 1945 there was an increase in the 
number of panti asuhan which cared not only for orphans but children from poor 
families. Panti asuhan were supported by subsidies from the Suharto 
government. It was easy to establish a panti asuhan and the government was 
appreciative of people who established them. The government supported panti 
asuhan. 
 
After Indonesia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, we 
moved toward children’s rights-based policies. This was hard work because 
institutions have been operating for a long time and people think that they are 
good for children. It’s difficult to change people’s minds. It’s been quite a 
challenge. Also, a number of government staff do not understand the reasons for 
the change of policy…  
 
The Qur’an mostly talks about the role of the family. But, [he emphasised] no 
part of the Qur’an teaches about children’s institutions. After Indonesia signed 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the government had a 
responsibility to socialise the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
idea of the family for the care of children matched with the Islamic view. We 
tried to discuss the link between the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Qur’an [on the importance of family-based care of children].  
 
176 
After the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, no-one tried to make a 
comparison between panti asuhan and family-based approaches. We tried to 
have discussions in small groups of people working on child protection issues. 
Actually, starting in 1990, the Council of Social Welfare in Muhammadiyah 
started to talk about social issues and to discuss community-based services. The 
issue of panti asuhan was on the agenda of the Muhammadiyah National 
Congress in 1999. But, because this was new, there was internal debate. Some 
people in Muhammadiyah were in favour and others were against. This issue got 
a lot of resistance from people. 
 
At that time, national government thought that panti asuhan were good and 
provided subsidies to them. But, because some NGOs advocated, government 
started to understand [the need to change its policy of supporting panti asuhan]. 
 
(Interviewee GF-13) 
 
The head of the same national government child protection agency (GD-13), reflected 
that Indonesian community attitudes toward children had been generally slow to align 
with international children’s rights thinking. She noted that the uptake of children’s 
rights thinking had lagged behind women’s rights in Indonesia, and had not captured 
public attention in the same way that gender equality issues had done:  
 
National politicians mostly resist new policies on children’s rights, but in 
general society there is quite a lot of resistance, for example, when [my 
organisation] supported children in conflict with the law, society thought that 
children’s rights were being introduced for these children. For example, we 
received criticism when we said that children’s problems were also caused by 
parents who did not take good care of their children…  
 
Opposition to children’s rights comes from so many levels of society. It’s 
common and not from any specific group. Children’s rights is a new concept. 
It’s not as sensitive as gender equality. The gender issue has greater sensitivity 
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among religious leaders, but the issue is progressing. Children’s rights are not so 
sensitive and, as a result, it is not progressing as fast as gender equality.  
 
(Interviewee GD-13) 
 
9.2 Analysis and discussion 
Thus, a theme that arose from several interviews with government and non-government 
representatives was that panti asuhan enjoyed a wide degree of support within the 
Indonesian community. Two principal themes or narratives were evident within this 
‘status quo’ story line: first, that panti asuhan were supported by Islamic teachings as a 
vehicle for charitable giving; and, second, to the extent that panti asuhan gain public 
attention in Indonesia, that they were widely thought of as a ‘time-honoured’ practice 
for the care of neglected or orphaned children as well as being a widely-accepted way 
for poor families to access education for their children. This section examines the 
grounds for these claims based on secondary data.  
 
Before proceeding, a cautionary note about over-generalising about religious and social 
attitudes in modern Indonesia. Hicks (2011) observed that, particularly over the past 
three decades, there has been an increase in the presence of Islamic symbols in 
Indonesian public arenas (p. 39). Some manifestations include, for example, increased 
use of headscarves amongst women, greater prevalence of religious imagery in the 
media, and greater public expression of piety. Yet, it is difficult to generalise about 
social values that lay behind the increased usage of such symbols. In the realm of 
politics, one of the challenging current tasks before researchers is to explain, on one 
hand, the declining political fortunes of major Islamic political parties while, on the 
other, increasing signs of religious devotion in social and economic spaces (Mujani & 
Liddle 2004, pp. 112-13, Hicks 2011, pp. 39-40). Thus, in view of Indonesia’s cultural, 
religious, demographic, ethnic, economic and political complexity, we need to proceed 
with care in making broad claims.         
 
9.2.1 Panti asuhan in religious and community life. With that caveat in mind, there 
appears to be compelling evidence to support claims made by interviewees, above, that 
panti asuhan have significance for many Indonesians as places that enable religious 
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obligations and other civil duties to be undertaken and that provide religious education 
to children and young people. I turn, first, to religious meanings that surround panti 
asuhan. Charitable giving or philanthropy occupies a central place of importance to 
followers of Islam, who comprise over 86 per cent of Indonesia’s population (Frederick 
& Worden 2011, p. xxxiii). The Qur’an contains 82 verses that encourage charity 
(Fauzia 2008a, p. 170). There are three basic methods of charitable giving: zakāt, 
sedekah and infak. One of the ‘Five Pillars’ of Islam, zakāt or obligatory offerings to the 
poor or other socially-beneficial purposes is generally considered to be mandatory for 
all followers of Islam with financial means (the other Pillars [arkān-al-Islām] are belief, 
worship, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi 
Arabia at least once in a lifetime) (Ali & Hatta 2014, p. 62). Zakāt takes two major 
forms: zakāt fitrah, that is, money or food given at the end of the fasting month of 
Ramadan; and zakāt maal, a percentage of a person’s total assets (usually 2.5 per cent) 
for those in a financial position to make such offerings. Infak and sedekah are voluntary 
donations (Sakai 2012, pp. 377-78).  
 
Providing assistance to orphans is widely considered in Indonesia to be an important 
way of fulfilling charitable obligations under Islam. There are 107 references to children 
in the Qur’an. Many of these relate to matters such as inheritance and the non-killing of 
children (Shakir 1982, Online Quranic Project 2013). There are 25 references in the 
Qur’an to orphans. These cover matters such as the importance of giving alms to 
orphans, the marriage of orphans, and the management of orphans’ property (Shakir 
1982, Online Quranic Project 2013). For example: 
 
And when We took a pledge from the Children of Israel: ‘Worship no one but 
Allah, do good to parents, relatives, orphans, and the needy, and speak kindly to 
people, and maintain the prayer, and give the zakāt,’ you turned away, except a 
few of you, and you were disregardful. [Chapter 2, verse 83]. 
 
Seest thou one who denies the Judgment [to come]? Then such is the [man] who 
repulses the orphan [with harshness], And encourages not the feeding of the 
indigent. So woe to the worshippers Who are neglectful of their prayers, Those 
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who [want but] to be seen [of men], but refuse [to supply] [even] neighbourly 
needs. [Chapter 107, verses 1-7]. 
 
Piety is not to turn your faces to the east or the west; rather, piety is [personified 
by] those who have faith in Allah and the Last Day, the angels, the Book, and 
the prophets, and who give their wealth, for the love of Him, to relatives, 
orphans, the needy, the traveller and the beggar, and for [the freeing of] the 
slaves, and maintain the prayer and give the zakāt.... [Chapter 2, verse 177]. 
 
They ask you as to what they should spend. Say, ‘Whatever wealth you spend, 
let it be for parents, relatives, orphans, the needy, and the traveller.’ And 
whatever good that you may do, Allah indeed knows it. [Chapter 2, verse 215]. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the Qur’an does not specifically mention places 
such as orphanages nor instruct followers to support orphans in any particular manner, 
such as through cash or in-kind donations. Noer (1973, p. 303) stated that the part of 
traditional Islamic law, Shari’a, that dealt with worldly matters imposed several 
responsibilities on practitioners, such as paying respect to parents and taking care of 
orphans, but considered these matters ma’qul, that is, ‘their execution is “left to us in 
accord with the period and circumstances in which we live, as long as it will lead us to 
that purpose” ’. Thus, the method of dispensing obligations, such as the care of orphans, 
is left to the judgement of the individual, and giving to institutions such as a panti 
asuhan is not specifically prescribed.   
 
Nonetheless, over the past century, charitable giving has become a highly organised 
activity in Indonesia and panti asuhan have been prime recipients. Organisations for the 
collection of zakāt for charitable purposes, including panti asuhan, were established in 
Indonesia in the early twentieth century and played a major role in growing social 
welfare and community development organisations, particularly Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (discussed further in Section 9.2.2, below). The number and size of 
private Islamic philanthropic organisations grew rapidly after the fall of Suharto. In 
1999, changes to Indonesian law permitted, for the first time, the official collection of 
zakāt (Law 38/1999), made zakāt tax deductible, and regulated the collection of wakaf 
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(Buehler 2008, p. 259, Fauzia 2008a, p. 173, Horowitz 2013, p. 247). For Latief (2012), 
the 1999 zakāt law and central government sponsorship of zakāt agencies at the national 
and regional levels, such as BAZNAS (the National Zakāt Board) and BAZDA (the 
Regional Zakāt Board), underlined official support for this form of charitable giving (p. 
10).  
 
According to Fauzia (2008), over 99 per cent of Indonesia’s 200 million Muslims 
engage in some form of charitable giving (p. 171). The total amount of funds collected 
by all zakāt agencies in Indonesia grew substantially during the 2000s, from around IDR 
80 billion ((US$8.4 million) in 2002 to IDR 414 billion (US$43.9 million) in 2006 (Ali 
& Hatta 2014, p. 66). Private zakāt agencies also grew substantially during the 2000s: 
one estimate was that the nine largest zakāt collection agencies increased their revenues 
from US$7.6 million in 2004 to US$25 million in 2008 (Sakai 2012, p. 378).    
 
As noted in Chapter 4, zakāt funds from Islamic faithful living in other countries such as 
Australia are also channelled to panti asuhan through zakāt collection agencies. There 
are no published data about the amount of revenues that these domestic and 
international agencies accumulate and channel to panti asuhan. However, two points 
arise. First, it underlines the fact that Indonesian Government financial subsidies to 
panti asuhan are not the only source of income to panti asuhan. This is a relevant factor 
when considering the leverage available to the national government to force panti 
asuhan operators such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to support the new 
panti asuhan policy. Arguably, had panti asuhan been totally reliant on government 
subsidies, such as fuel subsidy reduction compensation and dekon grants, they may have 
had little or no capacity to oppose new policy directions advanced by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs in the mid-to-late 2000s. In other words, the fact that most, if not all, 
panti asuhan receive some income from outside government probably meant that panti 
asuhan operators had (and have) greater scope to negotiate with the national 
government over any proposed policy changes. Second, that zakāt collection was 
sanctioned by State law after 1999 seems unlikely to have dinted public perceptions that 
giving to panti asuhan was an acceptable form of religious compliance; if anything, the 
organised, State-sanctioned nature of zakāt collection may have further encouraged this 
form of child care.   
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Even though there has been an increase in the total amount of charitable zakāt giving, 
the proportion directed to panti asuhan is unknown. Recent detailed analyses of 
charitable giving in Indonesia, such as that by Latief (2012), have tended to focus on 
health and education rather than on children. However, we may glimpse the importance 
placed on charitable giving to panti asuhan in Fauzia’s (2008) survey of 1,501 Muslims 
(70 per cent male and 30 per cent female) in ten Indonesian provinces in 2003-04. She 
found that giving to orphans was the second most favoured focus of charitable giving 
(63 per cent) after providing food (73 per cent). Fauzia (2008) qualified this finding, 
however, by noting that giving to orphans included children who were adopted by 
families in addition to children in panti asuhan (p. 179).      
 
Not only is charitable giving to orphans encouraged in the teachings of Islam and 
supported by large socio-religious organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama as well as the State, but panti asuhan appear to play other significant roles in 
community life, especially for women. Only a few English-language studies have been 
published to date about the scale, operations and experiences of children in Indonesia’s 
panti asuhan, and, as with Indonesian language sources, no other academic study of 
Indonesian attitudes toward these institutions has yet been produced. Thus, we proceed 
with caution in drawing conclusions about the extent of community support for panti 
asuhan. Nonetheless, the small body of evidence we do have points to panti asuhan as 
being seen by some communities as places that enable local community members, 
particularly older women, to perform care-giving tasks and even enhance and display 
their personal and family power and prestige. 
 
Skavelden’s (2007) anthropological study of three panti asuhan in Yogyakarta revealed 
a range of local community perceptions about panti asuhan. Building on 
anthropological research initiated by Hildred and Clifford Geertz in the 1950s, 
Skavelden sought to explore how Javanese family and kin relationships extended 
beyond the household. Skavelden claimed that panti asuhan were generally well-
understood and accepted within broader Javanese society, as well as amongst panti 
asuhan managers and staff, as playing important roles in promoting a sense of selfhood 
amongst Javanese children (p. 11). She stated that the panti asuhan she studied provided 
important opportunities for children from poor rural backgrounds to learn refined 
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behaviours, disciplines and social skills (in Java referred to as alus). Such learnings 
were often in contrast to the customs, behaviours and even religious beliefs of the poor 
rural families from which most of the children originated, and were regarded by panti 
asuhan staff as important in equipping children to succeed in modern Javanese life. 
According to Skavelden, the majority of children in the three panti asuhan studied 
originated from rural families who could be described culturally as abangan, that is, 
people who practiced a less orthodox and more syncretic form of Islam that integrates 
Hinduism, Buddhism and animism. 
 
With respect of the three children’s homes studied, Skavelden found that panti asuhan 
were generally considered by families and the broader community to be places that 
helped children from disadvantaged backgrounds to achieve a better life. She noted that 
the longer the time that children, especially girls, spent in panti asuhan the greater the 
social difference was between them and their families. The experience of living in a 
panti asuhan impacted on relationships between children and their birth families, yet the 
links between family and child were seldom broken in the course of a child’s residence 
in a panti asuhan. In contrast to popular representations of life in children’s homes in 
the Global North where child-parent links were often completely severed, Skavelden 
(2007) claimed that there were many similarities between panti asuhan and other 
Javanese households (pp. 64-86).  
 
For Skavelden, there were several features of panti asuhan that were dissimilar to 
children’s institutions in the Global North. First, children left the panti asuhan each day 
to attend school and were thus not completely isolated or sequestered from society. This 
meant that panti asuhan did not function as ‘total institutions’ in the same sense that 
Goffman described many institutions in the Global North to be (see Chapter 2). Second, 
panti asuhan were similar to normal ‘matrifocal’ Javanese households in that their 
operations were dominated by adult female staff and adult female volunteers. Adult 
female staff and volunteers would often help to arrange the wedding celebrations of 
women who, as children, had lived in a panti asuhan. Skavelden (2007, p. 84) stated 
that public attitudes were strongly supportive of the role played by panti asuhan in 
caring for children and in providing opportunities for (predominantly adult female) 
volunteers to serve in a good community cause:  
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People contribute to pantis by giving money, arranging activities for the children 
or working voluntarily at the pantis. Women in Javanese pantis use their power 
and prestige in order to influence the city’s inhabitants to help the children.  
 
In a similar vein, it is worth noting Fauzia’s (2008) contention that there has been an 
increase in involvement by Indonesian women in charitable activities in recent years. 
She noted, in particular, that panti asuhan received substantial support from women and 
that Muhammadiyah’s women’s branch, ‘Aisyiyah, was active in supporting 
Muhammadiyah panti asuhan. According to Fauzia (2008), the majority of ‘Aisyayah 
local branches ran orphan support activities even down to individual village level (p. 
180). The suggestion that there has been an increase in the levels of participation by 
women in the life of panti asuhan appears to resonate with other recent research 
suggesting that Muslim women in Indonesia and other predominantly Islamic countries, 
such as Egypt and Malaysia, are increasingly involved in Islamic learning and 
community projects (Gade 2004, Mahmood 2005, Frisk 2009, Millie 2011, pp. 151-52). 
In West Java, for example, Millie (2011) observed the high frequency with which 
groups of women, especially those aged over 45 years, attended mosque preaching 
events and how male preachers had altered their communication styles to be more 
responsive to female sensibilities. Millie (2011, pp. 153, 165) concluded that such 
female ‘spectatorship’ practices challenged the ‘stereotype that Islamic participation is a 
disciplinary activity managed according to men’s interests’, and suggested that 
women’s ‘frequent attendance is not an outright submission to patriarchal structures, but 
a pleasing and satisfying exercise in piety that is performed, to a large degree, on their 
own terms’. The role played by Muslim women in supporting panti asuhan, including 
as a vehicle for their expression of religious piety, is thus an area that would benefit 
from further research.      
 
Finally, Skavelden (2007, p. 67) noted that, far from severing connections with their 
families, children in panti asuhan maintained connection with them throughout their 
time in these homes:  
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Life inside the pantis reflect the traditional household organization because the 
children and youth remain close to their mothers. This is for example seen in the 
way the inhabitants talk about their mothers and other female relatives.  
 
Rather than being sequestered from the outside community and prevented from 
contacting their relatives, Skavelden (2007, p. 70) found evidence of extensive links 
between children living in panti asuhan and their families, especially their mothers: 
 
The tie between the mother and her child remains strong although they do not 
live in the same household. Hildred Geertz describes how the family works like 
a safety net for relatives who cannot take care of themselves. Parentless children, 
and others who for some reason need help, will be taken care of by their family 
of close kinsmen. Again we see how Geertz’ analysis does not move beyond 
family life, but the reality differs from Geertz’ description. Children do move 
away from their families because not all families have the resources required to 
function as a safety net for the family’s children. This does not mean that the 
matrifocal pattern ceases, because in most cases the solidarity between a mother 
and her child may remain strong despite the long distance which can be created 
when the child moves into a panti. The pattern of the traditional Javanese family 
organisation, where the mother is in focus, remains the same for a lot of children 
although they live in a panti.  
 
Skavelden’s sample group was small, comprising only three panti asuhan in a central 
Javanese city compared with many thousands that are believed to exist. Nonetheless, her 
study offers nuances that are generally absent in the publications of children’s rights 
advocacy groups which claim substantial negative effects of institutions on children, as 
seen, for example, in the Save the Children-led studies of Indonesia (2006 and 2007) 
and in other countries of the Global South and in the former Eastern Bloc, as discussed 
in Chapters 1 and 2. Skavelden’s study is suggestive of a greater degree of community 
acceptance of the role of children’s institutions and engagement with them than is 
generally admitted within INGO literature on children’s institutions in Indonesia.  
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In a broader sense, Skavelden’s work augments a small, growing body of scholarly 
literature that has appeared since the 1990s which suggests a picture that is far less 
clear-cut than that offered in the scholarly and INGO literature about the negative 
impacts of institutionalisation on children in the Global South (see Chapter 2). Some 
recent research about the Global South has been more equivocal about the effects of 
institutions on children. In examining Ethiopian orphanages, for example, Wolff and 
Fesseha (1998, p. 1319) observed that, in contrast to the ‘categorical conclusion that 
orphanages are necessarily the breeding grounds of psychopathology and must therefore 
be avoided at all costs’, there were better psychological outcomes for children in 
orphanages that were sensitive to the individual needs of children and where there were 
stable personal ties between staff and children. They concluded that the usefulness of 
orphanages could not be ignored in war-torn countries of the world where most 
unaccompanied and orphaned children lived.  
 
Adding weight to the hypothesis that orphanages in the Global South might differ in 
some important respects from those of the Global North, Whetton et al. (2009) 
compared the cognitive functioning, and emotion, behavioural and physical health of 
random samples of 1,357 children aged between 6 and 12 years who lived in 
orphanages compared with 1,480 children also aged 6-12 years living in family and 
community settings in India, Cambodia, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya. They found that 
children in institutions were not disadvantaged compared with those in community 
settings and, indeed, had better overall outcomes when compared with children cared 
for by a non-biological persons. These findings led the authors to disagree with ‘the 
hypothesis that institutional care is systematically associated with poorer wellbeing than 
community care’ for orphans and abandoned children in less wealthy countries 
(Whetten et al. 2009, pp. 1-10). They pointed out that the institutions surveyed were 
different in many ways to those in the Global North and that the unique social and 
cultural contexts in these institutions arose deserved closer examination to avoid making 
‘blanket’ judgements about institutions based on assumptions imported from the Global 
North (Whetten et al. 2009, p. 9).  
 
In the same vein, Akpalu (2007) noted the range of adverse psychological impacts of 
orphanages in Ghana, but pointed to the important bridging role they played in 
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providing essential safety and care for displaced children prior to permanent adoption 
(pp. 1070-84) . Claret’s (2008) qualitative study also concluded that while there were 
clear psychological deficits seen in a small sample group of institutionalised children in 
Maputo (Mozambique) when compared with non-institutionalised children, orphanages 
remained a valid alternative for some children provided improvements could be made in 
the quality of care provided (p. 42). 
 
Returning to Indonesia, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on broad social attitudes 
toward panti asuhan from the limited sample of panti asuhan analysed by Skavelden 
(2007). As noted in Chapter 4, beside Skavelden’s work, the other four academic and 
the four INGO-funded studies in English of Indonesia’s panti asuhan focused mainly on 
matters such as language development delays and conditions for children in panti 
asuhan and pesantren, and did not examine the extent to which communities supported 
or opposed these institutions (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, Save the Children UK 
et al. 2007, Mulyadi et al. 2009, Wanat et al. 2010, Mughni 2011, UNICEF Indonesia et 
al. 2012, Save the Children Indonesia 2013, Sandika & Yuwono 2014).  
 
It is possible, however, to gain a sense of general Indonesian community attitudes 
towards panti asuhan from other sources. UNICEF Indonesia et al. (2012, p. 171) stated 
that ‘The large number of institutionalized children is directly linked to a widespread 
belief in Indonesian society that the solution for disadvantaged children is to place them 
in institutional care’. The same study also presented the stories of three children (one 
aged 11, designated as ‘N’ and two aged 15 years, designated as ‘F’ and ‘H’) living in a 
panti asuhan in north Jakarta. ‘N’, an 11 year old girl did not attend school for a year 
while in the care of her father until neighbours took her to the panti asuhan where she 
accessed basic provisions such as education. ‘F’ worked as a thief before entering the 
panti asuhan where he was provided with shelter, food and education and receives 
pocket money. ‘H’ was neglected by his parents and dropped out of school. A friend 
invited him to visit the panti asuhan and he decided to stay, where he resumed his 
education.  
 
While UNICEF Indonesia et al. (2012) asserted that panti asuhan should be seen as the 
last resort for children, it found that circumstances had ‘generally improved’ for these 
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three young people. The study also pointed out that, whereas children living in panti 
asuhan were not required to work, that was not the case for some children living with 
their family, extended family or in foster care. UNICEF Indonesia et al. (2012) claimed 
that children in the panti asuhan included in their study were not required to work (p. 
171). However, that appears not to be the case in some, or perhaps many, other panti 
asuhan. From its sample of 37 panti asuhan, Save the Children UK et al. (2007, p. 197) 
concluded that:  
 
All of the children living in the childcare institutions were required to work. This 
work covered everything involved in the running of the institutions, apart from 
office administration…The requirement to work was a non-negotiable one 
(otherwise the operation of the childcare institutions would be interfered with – 
the children would not eat and the institutions would not be cleaned).  
 
According to UNICEF Indonesia et al. (2012, p. 171), the requirement for a child to 
work within their family setting was  
 
…often the case even if they lived with parents or other guardians who may be 
too poor or neglect their children, or if they lived with relatives who were unable 
to work, such as elderly grandparents.  
 
The role of panti asuhan in helping neglected, abandoned or orphaned children in the 
absence of other social supports was also suggested in my review of coverage about 
panti asuhan in the two major daily English-language newspapers, the Jakarta Post and 
Jakarta Globe, during a one-year period between May 2013 and May 2014. Only eight 
stories were carried about panti asuhan and these were almost evenly divided between 
those that were supportive of panti asuhan, particularly as a focal point for local 
community volunteering efforts, and those that reported allegations of child abuse in 
some panti asuhan2. 
                                               
2 See ‘A Place for Them to Call Home’, Jakarta Globe, 24 May 2013; ‘Charity Walkers Aim to Help 
Revamp Bekasi Orphanage’, Jakarta Globe, 1 June 2013; ‘Poverty Sees Kids Wind Up in Care Centers’, 
Jakarta Globe, 19 September 2013; ‘Local charity group banks on people to mobilize change for good’, 
Jakarta Globe, 3 November 2013; ‘Inmates of Serpong orphanage questioned’, Jakarta Post, 27 February 
2014; ‘Orphanage owner files lawsuit against Komnas PA chairman’, Jakarta Globe, 1 March 2014; 
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Further underlining the mix of community attitudes about panti asuhan, it is not 
uncommon to see stories in the English-language Indonesian press about visits to panti 
asuhan by high-profile celebrities and donations to panti asuhan by wealthy individuals 
and companies3, nor for panti asuhan to issue publications to mark the history of their 
operations (Panti asuhan Vincentius Puteri 1988). In a similar vein, Fauzia (2008, p. 
180) noted that donating to orphans had become a trend amongst celebrities: 
 
The primary example of such benevolence on the part of a celebrity is Dorce 
Gamalama (Dorce Ashadi), a celebrated artist and philanthropist, who 
established a philanthropic foundation to support orphans. The foundation was 
launched on 16 January 1992 and now assists around 1,600 orphans. Gamalama 
supports her own foundation, Dorce Halimatussa’diyah, drawing on 40% of her 
income. The motivation behind this is religious and social, and also strongly 
based on her own suffering as an orphan when she was a child. Thus her 
philanthropic activities are ‘positive revenge’ on her past.  
 
Thus, there is evidence to support perspectives by interviewees that panti asuhan have 
significance in Indonesian society as places that enable the performance of religious 
obligations, as well as other forms of care-giving and even status enhancement. Far 
from universal community opposition to panti asuhan within Indonesian society, there 
is clearly a spectrum of public perceptions about these places. Firmer conclusions on 
community attitudes toward panti asuhan will, however, require closer examination 
beyond that provided to date in a small number of studies and a sample of the media.    
 
9.2.2 Panti asuhan as a ‘time-honoured’ part of Indonesian society. Allied to their 
religious and other associations, the second main theme that arose from interviews was 
                                               
‘Putting Indonesia’s children first: orphanage abuse in spotlight’, Jakarta Globe, 3 March 2014; and, 
‘Tangerang orphanage owner charged with child neglect, assault, rape’, Jakarta Globe, 4 March 2014. 
3 See, for example, ‘Fanny celebrates b’day with orphans’, Jakarta Post, 31 January 2013 (a report on a 
visit to a south Jakarta panti asuhan by actress Fanny Fabriana to celebrate her 28th birthday); ‘Happiness, 
honesty captured by ‘A child’s eye’’, Jakarta Post, 18 June 2007 (a report on an exhibition of 
photographs of children inside panti asuhan which leads with the reporter’s statement that ‘love need not 
always come from parents, and sharing rooms with friends and lacking the luxury of junk food might 
spell happiness’); and ‘Ciputra marks eighth anniversary’, Jakarta Post, 25 October 2003 (a report on the 
visit to two local panti asuhan by Semarang Ciputra Hotel employees to mark the hotel’s eighth 
anniversary). 
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that panti asuhan were widely regarded within the Indonesian community as a 
traditional practice for the care of neglected or orphaned children. The following section 
suggests how such a perception has arisen in terms of the historical development of 
panti asuhan, particularly how Suharto used them to help children from poor families 
and to facilitate large-scale financial corruption.  
 
Traditional child-rearing practices. Prior to the nineteenth century, it was common 
practice for Indonesian children to be raised either within their immediate family setting 
or, if that were not possible, by members of their extended family, such as grandparents. 
Unlike European forms of child adoption, customary Indonesian child adoption 
practices were usually viewed as flexible arrangements that were reversible and non-
legally binding (Schrӧder-Butterfill 2004, p. 114). For van Klinken (2012), the adoption 
of a child by a relative was not necessarily viewed as detrimental or negative by the 
child’s biological parents, but rather as a potentially beneficial intra-family transaction 
that provided the child with greater opportunity to access education. Adoption 
sometimes occurred in response to a request for assistance from a childless older 
relative and was rarely seen as a permanent arrangement. The adopted child might even 
return to assist his or her biological parents as the latter progressed into old age (van 
Klinken 2012).  
 
In Java, kinship care and child adoption were well-established practices by the 
nineteenth century (Boomgaard 1989, p. 151). In some Javanese societies, adoption was 
rarely formalised by law, but was transacted in a variety of ways, such as through an 
informal agreement between the adopting and biological parents that was witnessed by a 
village leader (Kuncaraningrat 1985, p. 138). Although the extent of the practice is 
unclear, another custom in some areas of central Java was for a married couple to give 
their first-born child to the child’s grandparents when the child’s parents moved from 
the family home. In such circumstances, the child was regarded as the child of the 
grandparents and was raised in their household until the death of the grandparents when 
the child would return to live with his or her birth parents (Kuncaraningrat 1985, p. 
138).  
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Kuncaraningrat (1985) noted the practice amongst Javanese priyayi, or elite, families of 
formally adopting, as junior relatives, the children of other family members who 
struggled to maintain their children at home (p. 260). This custom, known as ngenger, 
extended beyond children to include other family members experiencing distress, such 
as widowed siblings of priyayi householders. Children joined to a priyayi household 
through ngenger practices were not, however, regarded as having been legally adopted 
by the priyayi family, and would often be treated as household servants in repayment 
for their place in the household. Yet, both the formal adoption of the children of poor 
relatives, as well as the practice of taking-in children through ngenger, were widely 
viewed as a boon to the social standing of priyayi families. The adoption of a child in 
Java was often marked by a ceremonial gift given by the adopting parents to the child’s 
natural parents. In order to ensure a spiritually propitious outcome for all concerned, 
such a gift would take the form of a small monetary payment (Kuncaraningrat 1985, p. 
138).  
 
There were numerous reasons for child adoption in traditional Javanese society. 
Schroder-Butterfill (2004, p. 115) claimed that it helped families to cope with crises 
such as divorce, sickness, widow-hood or ‘even metaphysical incompatibility of parents 
and children, as when the birthday of a child falls on the same day as that of a parent’. 
Poverty appeared, however, to be the main reason that parents gave up their children for 
adoption, usually to a wealthier relative or to relatives who lived in towns. Elson (1994) 
noted that a customary practice amongst villagers in some parts of Java was to respond 
to short-term crises, such as crop failure, by divesting themselves of property, livestock 
and even children (p. 126). If adoption occurred at an early age, the child would tend to 
be regarded as a natural child of the adopting parents and would usually be entitled to a 
share of the inheritance of the adopting parents. However, if the child were adopted later 
it would often be regarded as a household servant and would not normally be entitled to 
inheritance (Boomgaard 1989, p. 151).  
 
The adopted child was usually related to the adopting parents, but that was not always 
the case. Children and young people who were not able to be cared for within the wider 
family were either adopted by other non-biologically related families or, following the 
consolidation of Islam as the predominant faith across the Indonesian archipelago, 
191 
placed in pesantren alongside other children with families (van Klinken 2012) (see also 
Chapter 4, above). While the extent to which pesantren were used for the care of 
orphaned, neglected or abandoned children remains unknown, there is no record prior to 
the Dutch colonial period of the existence of places or institutions whose sole or main 
purpose was to receive and care of such children. As such, pre-colonial Indonesian 
practices for the out-of-home care of children differed markedly from practices in 
European countries where, in addition to kinship care, orphanages had become a widely 
prevailing form of out-of-home care over the course of two millennia (see Chapter 1).    
 
Dutch colonial practices. Orphanages as places specifically for orphaned, neglected or 
abandoned children first appeared in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period to help 
cope with massive social and economic dislocation associated with colonial policies and 
practices. Traditional Indonesian ways of caring for orphaned, neglected or abandoned 
children underwent a major transformation during the Dutch colonial era between the 
early 1600s and 1945. Dutch trade with the Indonesian islands commenced in 1596 and, 
in 1602, the Dutch United East Indies Company was established with a Dutch 
Government mandate that included the authority to use armed force to ensure continued 
Dutch trading success in the islands (Swart 2007). For two centuries following the 
defeat of Portuguese forces in the archipelago in 1605, the Dutch United East Indies 
Company’s administrative control over the islands steadily tightened. Although the 
Dutch United East Indies Company was dissolved in 1799 and the French and British 
temporarily ruled parts of the archipelago in the early nineteenth century, the 
Netherlands regained authority in 1816, and retained control over the Netherland East 
Indies (except during World War Two) until Indonesia’s Independence in 1945 
(Frederick & Worden 2011).  
 
By 1830, the Dutch introduced a new way of organising plantations to maximise their 
profits—the so-called ‘cultivation system’—under which Javanese peasants were 
obliged to use a maximum of one-fifth of their arable land to grow sugar, indigo and 
coffee (Boomgaard 1989, p. 35). While this system substantially increased revenues 
flowing to the Dutch, in many parts of Java it led to severe labour shortages and social 
dislocation (Boomgaard 1989, pp. 35-36). Elson (1994) noted that, by the 1840s in 
some parts of Java, the cultivation system had overloaded time-honoured methods of 
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managing short-term adversity, such as borrowing money, planting second crops or 
giving away land and children. In some areas, such as the Semarang Residency in the 
late 1840s, living conditions were so harsh that, with these traditional methods 
exhausted, peasants were left only with the alternatives of fleeing or committing suicide 
(Elson 1994, p. 126). Although the Dutch finally ended the cultivation system by 1870 
in favour of a so-called ‘liberal’ period that was characterised by an influx of private 
enterprise ventures, considerable damage had been caused to traditional ways of life due 
to the cultivation system, epidemics and famine, especially in Java, the most populous 
region in the Dutch East Indies (Boomgaard 1989, p. 36).  
 
With customary ways of managing village life and child-rearing practices under 
extraordinary stress, by the mid-to-late nineteenth century, the scene was set for the 
introduction of the European orphanage model by the Dutch authorities and Christian 
missionaries. From the early 1600s, the Dutch United East Indies Company’s increased 
power over the Indonesian archipelago enabled Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church 
missionaries to commence proselytising efforts. The rate of uptake of the Christian 
message amongst local inhabitants remained low until the mid-nineteenth century, 
however, when the Dutch authorities permitted other types of Christian missions to 
commence operations. In the 1840s, Dutch Rheinish missionaries started work in central 
Kalimantan; German Lutheran missionaries entered Sumatera in the 1860s; and by the 
late nineteenth century, Catholic Jesuits commenced missionary activities on the eastern 
islands of Flores, Timor and Alor (Frederick & Worden 2011, p. 122).   
 
To date, no comprehensive account has been published about the rise of orphanages in 
Indonesia during the colonial period. However, a reasonably clear picture emerges from 
histories of the colonial period that Christian missionaries imported the European 
orphanage model to advance their sense of Christian duty towards peoples whom they 
considered to be in need, as well as to help cope with social and economic dislocations 
associated with colonial rule. Steenbrink (1993, p. 24) argued that the consolidation of 
Dutch power was accompanied by a widely-held attitude of superiority amongst Dutch 
administrators and Christian missionaries that local religion and customs were based on 
superstition and ignorance and that it was their rightful duty to educate and provide 
other forms of moral improvement to the ‘natives’.  
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As well as helping to fulfil a supposed Christian duty toward those considered to be in 
need or less-civilised, the introduction of the European orphanage system to the 
Indonesian archipelago also appears to have been driven by the need to find ways of 
coping with the consequences of colonial policies. As early as the first decades of the 
1600s, the bloody struggle for Dutch control over the Banda Islands left an estimated 
two-thirds of local children parentless. In 1624, the Dutch United East Indies Company 
was recorded as supporting an orphanage—perhaps Indonesia’s first orphanage run on 
European lines—on the Banda Islands for the care of 100 such costkinderen or orphans 
(Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008, p. 114). Increased Christian missionary activity in the 
Dutch East Indies during the nineteenth century was accompanied by a rise in the 
number of orphanages (Titaley 2008, p. 75). In 1832, for example, the Dutch authorities 
allowed the Rev. Walter Medhurst from England to establish an orphanage in Batavia 
(present-day Jakarta) called ‘The English Orphan Asylum’ to care for children born 
from relationships between European men and Indonesian women (this orphanage 
continues to the present day under the name of Yayasan Parapattan in Jakarta) 
(Yayasan Parapattan Orphanage 2013).  
 
By the 1870s, numerous orphanages were established along European lines around the 
Indonesian archipelago. Orphanages were founded by the Franciscan Sisters of the 
Heythuizen Congregation in Semarang (on central Java) and by Dutch Mennonite 
missionaries in Pakantan (on present-day Sumatera) (Steenbrink 2003, p. 111, 
Aritonang & Steenbrink 2008, p. 535). Salvation Army missionaries from the 
Netherlands started orphanages within a decade of their arrival in Java in 1894, mainly 
for the care of children of Dutch soldiers and local women (Aritonang & Steenbrink 
2008, p. 679). Stoler (2004) also referred to the important role played by orphanages 
during the colonial era in taking care of abandoned children born of Indonesian and 
Dutch origins (p. 7) .  
 
In the last few decades of the nineteenth century, the numbers of children placed in 
orphanages in the Indonesian archipelago increased still further in response to 
worsening economic and social conditions. Significant welfare problems arose due to 
rising unemployment, famine and major outbreaks of diseases affecting humans and 
crops, especially in Java between the 1880s and 1910s. The seriousness of these 
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problems, plus a growing sense that the Netherlands had an unfulfilled humanitarian 
responsibility toward the people of the Dutch East Indies, were key factors in 
influencing the Dutch authorities to embark on policy from the early 1900s that aimed 
to deliver greater educational and economic opportunities to Indonesians—the so-called 
‘Ethical policy’ (Boomgaard 1986, Ricklefs 2001, pp. 193-205).  
 
Local organisations adopt the orphanage model. Having been introduced by the Dutch, 
the European orphanage model was replicated and expanded by local Indonesian 
Islamic organisations in the early twentieth century who were keen to establish 
themselves as providers of social welfare services. In the early 1900s, an Islamic reform 
movement grew in Indonesia inspired by the Cairo-based Modernist movement that 
sought to apply what it considered to be independent reasoning (ijtihad) to challenge 
uncritical acceptance (taqlid) of Islamic teachings, embrace modern scientific 
knowledge and technology, and purify Islam of a confusing multiplicity of local 
customary religious laws and practices (Alfian 1989, p. 5, Ricklefs 2001, pp. 212-18, 
Rabasa 2005, p. 98).  
 
One manifestation of this reform movement in Indonesia was the establishment of  
Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan (Federspiel 1970, pp. 57-64, 
Menchik 2011, p. 5). In 1917, ‘Aisyiyah, the adult women’s wing of Muhammadiyah 
was formed. From its beginnings, Muhammadiyah embraced non-politically 
confrontational methods and strongly espoused social welfare and educational goals 
(Candraningrum 2008, p. 74). These approaches reflected Dahlan’s belief that liberation 
from the Dutch would be more likely to flow from education of the masses (in the form 
of a combined European and Islamic curriculum) rather than outright opposition 
(Ricklefs 2001, p. 215, Fuad 2004, p. 403). Dahlan was also concerned to help the 
disadvantaged and, in particular, orphans. Nakamura claimed that Dahlan was so 
inspired by references in the Qur’an relating to the care of orphans and the needy that 
he established a student movement called Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum, or Assistance 
for the Relief of Public Suffering, which became a central pillar of Muhammadiyah’s 
operations in 1920 (Nakamura 2012, pp. 101, 371, Fauzia 2013, p. 151).  
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In keeping with its Modernist ideals, as well as for practical financial reasons, Dahlan 
forged friendly relations with Christian groups and appropriated the education, health 
care and orphanage models of the Dutch missionaries as motifs for Muhammadiyah’s 
own activities in these fields (Shihab 1998, Menchik 2011, p. 6). On the importance of 
European social welfare models in Muhammadiyah’s formative period, Noer (1973, pp. 
79-80) wrote:  
 
Muhammadijah activities, however, did not exclusively grow out of the creative 
mind of its leaders…the activities of the Christian missionaries…were not 
merely considered as a challenge to, but also served as an example for, the 
Muslim leaders concerned. At least the methods applied in the various activities 
were more or less copied from those of the missionaries…An orphanage was 
thus quite an innovation. (emphasis added). 
 
Fuad (2004) has argued, however, that Muhammadiyah’s uptake of Christian 
missionary models for schools and orphanages was motivated in large part by a desire to 
access financial support from the Dutch colonial authorities (p. 404). Mansurnoor 
(2004) has also suggested that the appropriation of European models for 
Muhammadiyah’s educational and social welfare activities carried another advantage, 
that is, of allaying any suspicions held by the Dutch authorities about the motives of the 
then fledgling Muhammadiyah organisation (p. 107). Another strategy that successfully 
facilitated Muhammadiyah’s rise to become a major provider of social welfare, 
education and health services was the establishment, commencing in the 1920s, of 
centres to collect zakāt (Fernandez 2009).  
 
Assisted by these new sources of revenue, the Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum arm of 
Muhammadiyah established its first orphanage in either 1923 or 1924 (Central Board of 
Muhammadiyah 2013, Fauzia 2013, p. 151). The date of establishment of 
Muhammadiyah’s first panti asuhan is unclear, at least from English language sources 
and Muhammadiyah itself. Latief (2012) stated that Muhammadiyah established a panti 
asuhan in 1918 (p. 109). Federspiel (1970) stated that in 1925 Muhammadiyah had one 
orphanage (p. 58). Fauzia (2013) put the establishment of Muhammadiyah’s first 
orphanage at 1923 (p. 151). However, interviewee NA-13, a Muhammadiyah employee, 
196 
referred to the establishment of Muhammadiyah’s first panti asuhan as 1921 (2013, 
pers. comm., 2 August). The Central Board of Muhammadiyah (2013) put the date at 
1924. All available sources agree, however, that Muhammadiyah’s first panti asuhan 
was located in Yogyakarta. In 1925, Muhammadiyah established its second orphanage 
(Noer 1973, p. 83, Ricklefs 2001, pp. 215-16).  
 
However, Modernist reforming impulses in general, and Muhammadiyah in particular, 
were strongly resisted by other Javanese leaders and teachers who sought to maintain 
popular support for orthodox Islamic teachings (Fealy & Barton 1996, pp. 9-11). As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, this resistance led to the formation in 1926 of the orthodox 
Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (‘Revival of the Religious Scholars’). Adhering 
to the traditionalist Sunni Syafi’i mazhab school of jurisprudence, in terms of 
membership size Nahdlatul Ulama is now the largest social welfare organisation in the 
Muslim world (Rabasa 2005, p. 97, Menchik 2011, p. 4). From its early days, Nahdlatul 
Ulama garnered strong support from conservative Muslim communities in East Java and 
in rural areas, and played (and continues to play) a major role in operating pesantren 
(Fealy & Barton 1996, p. xix, Ricklefs 2001, p. 223, Fuad 2004, p. 404). As with 
Muhammadiyah, another of Nahdlatul Ulama’s earliest stated aims was to care for 
orphans, an aim which led Nahdlatul Ulama to expand its operations beyond pesantren 
also to include panti asuhan (Noer 1973, p. 231). 
  
There is scant evidence (in English language at least) about trends in terms of numbers 
of panti asuhan established by Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama between the 
1920s and the present day. However, if the number of hospitals and schools both 
organisations established may be regarded as an indication of the expansion of these 
organisations’ social welfare outreach in general, the growth in panti asuhan may have 
been significant. In 1938, Muhammadiyah operated 1,774 schools and a number of 
hospitals (Ricklefs 2001, p. 216, Fuad 2004, p. 404). By 1959, it operated over 3,000 
primary and secondary schools and six tertiary-level colleges (Fuad 2004, pp. 405-06). 
 
Indonesia’s political independence from the Dutch was declared in August 1945. The 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia recognised the role of the State in caring 
for children who were unable to be raised in a family environment. Article 34(1) stated: 
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‘Impoverished persons and abandoned children shall be taken care of by the State.’ 
(Government of Indonesia 1945). The major Indonesian laws and Presidential and 
Ministerial Decrees relating to children since Independence are listed in Appendix C.  
 
The nature and scale of Indonesia’s panti asuhan during the Sukarno era cannot be 
accurately assessed due to the lack of published records. However, it seems plausible to 
suggest that orphanages continued to grow strongly throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
This conclusion may be drawn from the fact that, from running only a handful of 
orphanages in the 1920s, Muhammadiyah was believed to be operating some 350 
orphanages by 1970 (Peacock 1978a, p. 67). According to Peacock (1978), 
Muhammadiyah’s membership grew from 4,000 in 1923 to around six million members 
in 1970 when it had over 2,134 branches and over 2,500 sub-branches throughout 
Indonesia (p. 51). As one of the world’s largest Muslim organisations in the fields of 
social and welfare services, it ran 500 health institutions, 15,000 schools from 
kindergarten to high school, around 200 higher education institutions and 350 
orphanages (Peacock 1978a, p. 67). By contrast, and illustrating the problems of 
accuracy, Fuad (2004) stated that Muhammadiyah operated over 5,500 schools and 161 
tertiary-level colleges in 2000 (pp. 405-6). 
 
Expansion of panti asuhan during the New Order: 1950s to the 1980s. As discussed in 
Chapter 8, there was rapid growth in the numbers of panti asuhan and children in them 
during 1990s, the last decade of the New Order. In order to understand the reasons for 
this expansion, we need to delve into political and economic roles that panti asuhan 
played in supporting Suharto’s regime between the 1970s and 1990s. In short, panti 
asuhan grew because they played a key role in Suharto’s corrupt financial practices, or 
what became known as ‘KKN’, that is Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme or corruption, 
collusion, nepotism. There is also evidence that panti asuhan grew to help cope with 
social dislocation associated with government struggles to maintain sovereignty over 
Aceh, West Irian and East Timor. 
 
From the 1950s, both Suharto and his wife, Ibu Tien Suharto, are recorded as having 
been avid fundraisers for educational and children’s charities (Elson 2001, pp. 193-94). 
Ibu Tien Suharto was the patron of many orphanages and thought that a particular 
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model of residential care for children—the SOS Kinderdorf village or group homes that 
had been established in Europe after World War Two for the care of war-orphans—
should be widely adopted in Indonesia (van Klinken 2012). As an Army commander in 
Central Java in the 1950s, Suharto established military charities whose funds were used 
to generate profits via private business activities (Aditjondro 2000). Of relevance to the 
widespread use of charitable foundations during the New Order period, discussed 
further below, during the 1950s Suharto established links to prominent Chinese 
businessmen, particularly Bob Hasan (McDonald 1980, pp. 30-31). 
 
Yet, altruistic concern for vulnerable children was only part of the attraction of panti 
asuhan for the Suharto family and their associates. Recent scholarship points to the role 
played by panti asuhan in Suharto’s efforts to subdue the resource-rich, though 
politically fractious, areas of Aceh, West Irian and East Timor (Elson 2001, pp. 250-51, 
Brown 2006, p. 961). In the early 1960s, as commander of Indonesian forces in Dutch 
New Guinea, the then Major General Suharto established the Trikora Orphan 
Foundation and other charities for the care of orphans and poor children in that region. 
In 1969—the year of West Irian’s incorporation into Indonesia—Suharto told the 
Indonesian press that West Irian needed education in more advanced Indonesian ways 
of thinking and behaving in order to lift the Papuans out of their ‘stone age’ conditions 
(van Klinken 2012). To that end, Suharto asserted that 200,000 Papuan children should 
be adopted by Indonesian families. The plan for adoption on such a large scale was 
dropped due to press criticism within Indonesia, but several hundred Papuan children 
were placed in boarding schools and some were transferred to Java for adoption (van 
Klinken 2012).  
 
While Suharto’s plans to assimilate Papuan children into broader Indonesian society did 
not reach fruition, it was a model that he later sought to employ to help consolidate 
Indonesian rule over East Timor (Knudsen 2001, p. 12). The Portuguese established a 
trading colony in East Timor in the mid-eighteenth century and, apart from a period 
during World War Two, retained control until a unilateral declaration of independence 
by local political parties in 1975. Indonesia staged a military takeover later in 1975 and 
remained in control until East Timorese independence was declared in 1999. During 
Indonesian rule over East Timor (1975-99), Christian groups were permitted to continue 
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to operate orphanages, many of which provided care for children of locals who had 
either been engaged in, or had been killed during, the armed struggle against the 
Indonesian authorities. One of the first acts of the national government after its takeover 
of East Timor was to set about increasing the number of local schools. By 1980, more 
than 200 primary schools had been built or rebuilt (van Klinken 2012).  
 
To further consolidate its position and international image as working for local 
improvement, the national government introduced the panti asuhan model from 
elsewhere in Indonesia, augmenting an earlier boarding school system for the children 
of wealthy local families. East Timorese children began to be transferred to local panti 
asuhan as well as to other types of residential institution (such as pesantren) in other 
parts of Indonesia (van Klinken 2012). van Klinken (2012) estimated that, between 
1975 and 1999, with national government sanction and support, Muslim and Christian 
religious groups may have transferred approximately 1,000 East Timorese children to 
various types of institutions elsewhere in Indonesia. In 1975, Suharto, assisted by 
Cabinet Secretary (and future Chairman of Golkar) Sudharmono, oversaw the 
establishment of the Dharmais Foundation, ostensibly to raise funds for the care of 
orphaned children of Indonesia soldiers and East Timorese supporters of Apodeti 
(Timorese Popular Democratic Association) and UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) 
who had been killed whilst fighting for the integration of East Timor with Indonesia 
(Elson 2001, p. 211, Brown 2006, p. 969). With Dharmais Foundation funding, panti 
asuhan were established both in Dili, East Timor, and near Jakarta (both were called 
Panti Asuhan Seroja) (van Klinken 2012). From around 1976, charitable organisations 
allied with the national government, including the Dharmais Foundation and Christian 
groups, began to transfer children from East Timor to panti asuhan in Java that were 
operated by the Indonesian Government, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan 
Islam and Catholic groups (Knudsen 2001, pp. 12-13, van Klinken 2012).  
 
One of the institutions to receive East Timorese children was SOS Kinderdorf in 
Bandung, whose links to the Suharto family were noted above. In the late 1970s, 
Suharto is reported to have taken a personal interest in the selection of 61 children of 
slain pro-Indonesian East Timorese ‘martyrs’ for transfer to Java. In an act of apparent 
magnanimity, Suharto even supported the transfer to Catholic and Government-run 
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panti asuhan in Java of children whose families had been known anti-integration 
Fretilin fighters (van Klinken 2012). Summing up this period, van Klinken (2012) 
wrote: 
 
To the Indonesians, these martyrs and their children symbolised the New Order 
assertion that East Timorese wanted integration with Indonesia and were ready 
to die for it...Suharto demonstrated Indonesia’s concern for victims of the 
struggle and the benefits of surrendering to Indonesia.  
 
In Aceh, panti asuhan also assisted the national government to ease the social 
dislocation that arose from the conflict between government and separatist forces dating 
to the 1970s. Aspinall (2009) estimated that, between 1976 and 2005, the conflict 
between the Indonesian military and the pro-independence Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM) or Free Aceh Movement led to the deaths of between 12,000 and 20,000 people, 
including many civilians (p. 2). Between 1989 and 1998, the so-called DOM period, or 
Daerah Operasi Militer, Aceh was designated by the Indonesian Government as a 
‘military operations zone’. Operations against GAM and the civilian populace were at 
their height during the first four years of the DOM period during which time Amnesty 
International reported that 2,000 civilians, including many children and elderly, had 
been unlawfully killed (Amnesty International 2013, p. 14). The 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis further exacerbated Aceh’s economic and social woes: due to the 
ongoing military conflict it was the only Indonesian province to experience increasing 
poverty rates in the period between 2000 and 2008 (Thorburn 2012, p. 89). 
 
Despite a brief pause in the conflict after the fall of Suharto, fresh Indonesian military 
operations were launched in Aceh in 1999. Amnesty International (2013) noted claims 
of human rights abuses committed by both sides and the killing of over 1,300 Acehnese 
between 1999 and 2002 (p. 17). Between 2003 and 2004, a further period of military 
emergency was declared. Amnesty International (2013, p. 18) commented that, as with 
previous periods in the struggle between Indonesian and GAM forces, this period was 
one in which the ‘security forces forcibly displaced civilians from their homes and 
villages, carried out armed raids and house-to-house searches and destroyed houses and 
other property’. A more conciliatory approach on the part of the Indonesian 
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Government began after Yudhoyono’s election as President in October 2004. Peace 
talks were hastened after the devastating December 2004 tsunami. In August 2005, a 
peace agreement was signed between the national government and GAM.  
 
The extent of the harm to children from the conflict in Aceh between the 1970s and the 
2000s is not fully known. At the broadest level, however, it is clear that the effects were 
far-reaching. Amnesty International (2000) stated that thousands of children whose 
parents had been unlawfully killed or who had disappeared during the conflict were left 
as orphans. Schulze (2005) cited one estimate that, in the DOM period to 1998, 16,375 
children had been orphaned. These orphaned children become known as anak korban 
dom, or children of the victims of the DOM, and were often stigmatised for their 
family’s actual or perceived association with GAM (Amnesty International 2000, p. 3). 
One of the most tragic consequences of the loss of adult family members was that it cast 
many families into extreme poverty, leading to the removal of large numbers of children 
from schools (Amnesty International 2000, p. 5, Shie & Laurance 2003, p. 19). One 
indication of the numbers of orphaned children was provided by Thorburn (2012) who 
noted that post-conflict assistance through the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Board had 
been provided to 25,669 conflict orphans or conflict-affected children and young people 
out of a total target of 39,915 persons.  
 
In all likelihood, therefore, social dislocation experienced during three decades of 
conflict prior to 2005 played a significant role in driving strong growth in the number of 
Aceh’s panti asuhan. Possibly for reasons of political sensitivity, this explanation was 
downplayed in the 2006 Save the Children-led study. While that study noted dramatic 
growth in the numbers of panti asuhan in the 1990s, it did not extend its analysis 
further. Reflecting on the nation-building and consolidation purposes that were also at 
play in the introduction and extension of panti asuhan in West Irian in the 1960s and 
East Timor in the 1970s (discussed earlier), it remains open to speculation whether the 
national government’s financial support for panti asuhan in Aceh in the form of fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan after the fall of Suharto served as a 
convenient mechanism to help ease a parlous regional social welfare situation that had 
grown out of a struggle to maintain a unified Indonesian state. If that were the case, the 
explanation that compensation to counter the rising cost of fuel and to embed 
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decentralisation principally drove the rapid growth in the numbers of Aceh’s panti 
asuhan would only be partially adequate. Once again, the pattern that seems to emerge 
is that panti asuhan not only sought to assist children who were deemed to be in need of 
care, but also served the political and military goals of the State’s ruling elite as well as 
the money-making interests of panti asuhan operators.  
 
The charitable foundations, or yayasan, established by Suharto performed another 
important function: they acted as a conduit for State-sponsored financial corruption. As 
far back as 1970s, Suharto and his associates built their private wealth by manipulating 
their official powers to sanction the establishment and growth of yayasan. Under 
Indonesian law, yayasan were established to collect public and private donations for 
charitable purposes. Yayasan funds had tax-free status. As Suharto and his associates 
placed themselves on the Boards of the main yayasan, they were able to channel 
yayasan funds which had been ostensibly earmarked for charitable purposes to private 
businesses owned by Suharto and his associates without any form of independent 
external scrutiny (Aditjondro 2000, Elson 2001, p. 252).  
 
Suharto’s system of corruption was based on the establishment of numerous tax-free 
yayasan under the direct or indirect control of the Suharto and his associates, and the 
abuse of Presidential decrees to demand contributions to these foundations. In 1976, the 
year after the establishment of Dharmais, Suharto issued a series of Presidential Decrees 
that required public servants, companies and state banks to donate money to yayasan. 
The flow of money into Suharto’s yayasan were further boosted when he issued 
Presidential Decrees 90/1995 and 92/1996 which ordered all Indonesian individuals and 
companies earning over US$45,000 per annum to contribute two per cent of all taxes to 
Dharmais (for orphanages) and Dana Sejahtera Mandiri (for poor relief) (Wee 2002, p. 
9, Leith 2003).  
 
Having used Presidential powers to guarantee a substantial flow of funds, Suharto and 
his associates established and personally governed the key yayasan. In addition to the 
Dharmais Foundation, whose stated purpose was to support panti asuhan and other 
types of children’s institution, they operated Supersemar, ostensibly for educational 
activities, Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila, for the construction of mosques, Dana 
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Sejahtera Mandiri, to assist the poor, Dana Gotong Royong, to support co-operatives, 
Dakab, and Trikora. Suharto headed five of these yayasan himself, namely, Dakab, 
Dharmais, Supersemar, Trikora and Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (Aditjondro 2000). 
Leith (2003) noted how yayasan were frequently referred to as Suharto’s ‘retirement 
funds’ (p. 31). The military also operated several other foundations, such as Kobame 
(Korps Baret Merah) and Kartika Eka Paksi, which facilitated illegal activities, such as 
the transfer of bribes (Aditjondro 2000, Brown 2006, p. 969).  
 
The financial pay-off for Suharto and his associates came when yayasan funds were 
used to establish or invest in private business ventures, such as airlines, construction 
firms and hotels, run by Suharto and his associates. In 1978, yayasan chaired by Suharto 
gained 60 per cent control of the country’s fifth largest private bank, Bank Duta (Wee 
2002, p. 9). Yayasan were frequently used for illegal money laundering between the 
central bank, Bank Negara Indonesia, and private banks, and many yayasan owned 
shares in banks (Brown 2006, pp. 968-69). Aditjondro (2000) noted also how Suharto 
and General Bustanil Arifin transferred a large State-owned company, PT PP Berdikari, 
and Berdikari’s bank, Bank Duta, into companies owned by three of Suharto’s yayasan, 
that is, Dhamais, Dakab and Supersemar. The private companies that Suharto and his 
associates operated with yayasan funds were able to withstand heavy losses since 
revenue shortfalls were compensated by cash transfers from yayasan accounts. Thus, for 
example, despite declaring a loss of US$420 million due to foreign currency speculation 
in 1990, Bank Duta remained financially solvent due to bail-outs from the three Suharto 
yayasan that owned 72 per cent of its shares, namely, Dharmais, Supersemar and Dakab 
(Wee 2002, p. 10).      
 
Corruption-driven panti asuhan growth: 1980s and 1990s. While yayasan offered 
massive financial opportunities to Suharto, they also provided him with other 
advantages which help to explain the rapid rise in the number of panti asuhan during 
the last two decades of the New Order. Faced with growing opposition to his rule from 
the Indonesian military, during the late 1980s and early 1990s Suharto attempted to use 
yayasan to build a separate financial and political powerbase, as well as to enhance 
support amongst Muslim groups. To build a separate financial base, Suharto deepened 
his business connections by transferring yayasan finances to companies owned by 
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Chinese financiers such as the Salim Group and Nusantara Ampera Bhakti (Nusamba) 
Group which was run by Bob Hasan (Cotton 1999, p. 8). The Nusamba Group, which 
was involved in diverse interests such as mining, tourism and forestry, drew its 
operating capital from three yayasan: 30 per cent from Dakab; 25 per cent from 
Dharmais; and 25 per cent from Supersemar (Wee 2002, pp. 9-10, Brown 2006, p. 969).  
 
Suharto also used Dharmais to channel charitable funds away from military control, a 
step that exacerbated tensions between Suharto and the military (Brown 2006, p. 969). 
Aditjondro (2000) asserted that, in an attempt to drive a wedge in the anti-Suharto 
forces, in the early 1990s Suharto increasingly sought to portray himself as a defender 
of Islam. This took various forms, for example, his strong support for the establishment 
of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Se-Indonesia), a much-publicised pilgrimage to Mecca, an increase in donations 
for the construction of mosques and pesantren through Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim 
Pancasila, and attempts by Suharto’s brother-in-law, General Prabowo Subianto, to 
divide and therefore deflect growing anti-Suharto sentiment within Nahdlatul Ulama 
and Muhammadiyah (Hefner 1993, pp. 1-3, Aditjondro 2000). 
 
Taken together, the financial and political gains for Suharto and his associates by 
manipulating the yayasan strongly suggest that, by the 1990s, panti asuhan were 
inextricably linked to Suharto’s corrupt financial dealings, principally through 
Dharmais. The total amount of yayasan funds that flowed to their charitable goals is 
unknown, let alone the amount that flowed specifically to panti asuhan. It seems 
plausible to suggest, however, that if only for the sake of maintaining public pretence, 
some yayasan funds did find their way to various panti asuhan. For reasons already 
discussed relating to the importance under Islam of almsgiving to orphans, the Suharto 
regime’s support for panti asuhan, both symbolically and materially, would also have 
been exacerbated by Suharto’s efforts to portray himself as a supporter of Islam and as a 
builder of mosques and boarding schools. One insight into the relatively small amounts 
that probably did find their way to their intended charitable purpose was provided by 
Bob Hasan, the chair of Dharmais and Supersemar, who told Asiaweek (7 March 1997) 
that ‘Supersemar gives about $20 million to $25 million in scholarships annually, while 
Yayasan Dharmais helps 1,200 institutions for the blind, retarded children, orphanages 
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and senior citizens.’ (Wee 2002, p. 10). The figure of 1,200 institutions included not 
only panti asuhan but institutions for children with disability and institutions for adults. 
Thus, even if Hasan were truthful, the figure of 1,200 institutions he said were funded 
by Dharmais fell well short of 1,647 panti asuhan that the national government itself 
claimed to exist in 1997-98 (see Table 8.1). 
 
More directly, we can observe how Suharto facilitated the growth of panti asuhan 
through government decisions relating to the care of children during the New Order. 
Being in Suharto’s financial interest to ensure official sanction for panti asuhan as a 
worthy focus of public charitable support, throughout the Suharto era the government 
indicated its support for panti asuhan as an important form of care for children outside 
their family setting. Indonesian Law 4/1979 on child welfare was at best even-handed 
about the benefits of raising children in a family settings versus non-family or ‘special’ 
environments such as a panti asuhan when it stated that a ‘child is entitled to welfare, 
care, foster, and guidance based on love within the family or special environment to 
grow and develop’. Further reinforcing the legitimacy of a government role in caring for 
children in panti asuhan, Law 4/1979 affirmed that children without parents had a ‘right 
to be cared for by the State or other body’ (Government of Indonesia 1979, p. 6, United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 1993a). In such an environment of 
support for children’s institutions as part of Suharto’s corrupt financial practices, it 
seems hardly surprising that a national government document from 1992 acknowledged 
that 15 different types of institutions (or panti sosial) provided services to adults as well 
as children, usually on a residential basis. Of these different types of institutions, those 
providing care for children who were deemed to be neglected or abandoned, that is 
panti asuhan, were acknowledged as the most common in terms of the number of 
institutions and the numbers of children cared for (Save the Children UK et al. 2006, p. 
6).  
      
9.3 Conclusions 
As well as a ‘pro-reform’ story line, interviews with senior national government and 
non-government representatives revealed attitudes in support of panti asuhan, or what I 
call the ‘status quo’ story line. Two principal themes or narratives were evident within 
the ‘status quo’ story line: first, that panti asuhan were supported by Islamic teachings 
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as a vehicle for charitable giving; and, second, to the extent that panti asuhan came to 
Indonesian public attention at all, they were a widely respected, or at least widely 
tolerated, way of caring for neglected or orphaned children.  
 
This chapter advanced evidence in support of the claim that panti asuhan played, and 
continue to play, significant roles for many in Indonesian society as places that enable 
the Islamic faithful to fulfil their responsibility for charitable giving. They were, and 
are, also places that facilitate other forms of adult participation in civic life, as well as to 
display and enhance personal and family power and status. Historical analysis also 
showed that, over the course of two centuries, panti asuhan grew strongly in importance 
in Indonesian social and political life. Orphanages were introduced by the Dutch and 
were expanded in the early twentieth century by emerging local socio-religious groups. 
Already the object of broad community support and approval by the time Suharto came 
to power, panti asuhan grew spectacularly in number during the New Order, playing an 
important role as fake philanthropy and a chance for the corrupt garnering of resources 
and money laundering in Suharto’s financial schemes, and possibly also acting as a 
salve to social dislocation caused by the national government’s struggles to maintain 
territorial unity against separatist groups. The post-Suharto Habibie, Wahid, Megawati 
and Yudhoyono government thus inherited a booming panti asuhan sector that had 
strong degrees of official, community and religious backing and legitimacy.  
 
In Part III, I discuss how the ‘status quo’ and ‘pro-reform’ story lines mobilised the 
activities of two discourse-coalitions that vied to shape the new policy on panti asuhan 
in three phases between 1999 and 2009.   
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PART III: MAKING POLICY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
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Chapter 10:  From story lines to discourse institutionalisation 
 
‘Save the Children gave us the evidence. I went to parliament and lectured them 
about the need for family support…I made the argument that panti asuhan were 
very expensive…I had to re-badge child protection as a ‘social investment’ to 
win their agreement…I had to appeal to an economic argument. It was a 
powerful tool.’ 
 
A senior Ministry of Social Affairs official (GA-13). 
 
‘The Muhammadiyah Central Board…thought that Muhammadiyah was being 
smashed by government. They said they did not need government telling them 
what to do…The Central Board said ‘we still need institutional care’.’ 
 
An Indonesian NGO social welfare worker (NA-12). 
 
‘We don’t have any intention to close the pantis.’ 
 
A member of national parliament (NPA-13). 
 
Overview 
This chapter contains an interpretation of the events that led to the establishment of 
Indonesia’s new policy on panti asuhan around 2007-08. Contrary to the standard 
narrative about policy change, the discernible origins of policymaking lay in the 
cataclysmic Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto. During the following decade, 
coalitions of policy actors who held pro-reform and pro-orphanage ‘status quo’ 
perspectives vied to shape the new policy in three perceptible stages. Initially, the ‘pro-
reform’ discourse-coalition seized the policy agenda. ‘Status quo’ forces then entered 
the policy arena by voicing opposition to change. Finally, the national government’s 
desire not only to advance children’s rights issues but to align panti asuhan policy with 
the national government’s changed macroeconomic, social and administrative directions 
and to avoid a backlash from pro-panti asuhan interests generated the final policy 
outcome that amalgamated both the deinstitutionalisation and status quo positions.  
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The new policy represented a compromise under which panti asuhan would be allowed 
to continue playing a central, if somewhat changed, role in caring for the nation’s 
children while appearing to show (as per the standard narrative about events) that 
Indonesia had indeed complied with its children’s rights obligations under the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This finding adds important new dimensions to 
the dominant understanding of events as primarily a triumph for international children’s 
rights.  
 
10.1 Identifying a ‘discursive order’ 
Following Hajer, after identifying the key story lines expressed by policy players the 
next important task of discourse analysis is to examine linkages between story lines and 
final policy outcomes. It will be recalled that Hajer (2006) applied two terms for this 
analysis, that is, ‘discourse structuration’ when a particular discourse comes to dominate 
views within a policy area, and ‘discourse institutionalisation’ when a discourse 
becomes enshrined as new policy (p. 70). Hajer suggested that a discourse-coalition 
dominates a policy debate when both discourse structuration and discourse 
institutionalisation occur. He also noted that, while one story line might dominate 
particular policy outcomes, it was rare for policy decisions to reflect only one story line. 
It was more usual, he contended, for elements of several story lines, even those that 
appeared to be at odds with one another, to find their way into final policy because they 
had ‘discursive affinity’ or shared ways of viewing the world (Hajer 2006, pp. 70-71). 
To Hajer, this final step of discourse analysis involves the following: analysing how 
actors changed their positioning and the roles of other players; identifying key incidents 
essential to understanding the policy change; assessing whether and how the meanings 
of particular actors are reflected in changed policies; and specifying a ‘discursive order’, 
or an account of discursive structuration and the resulting changed policy. 
 
Using Hajer’s approach, this chapter highlights how the ‘pro-reform’ and ‘status quo’ 
story lines mobilised the activities of two discourse-coalitions that vied to influence 
policy on panti asuhan. Based on interview evidence, I argue that the ‘pro-reform’ 
discourse-coalition ultimately dominated the policy arena, with its perspective largely 
becoming institutionalised as new government policy. Victory for this discourse-
coalition was, however, far from the overwhelming and absolute triumph for 
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international children’s rights norms that the standard account of recent panti asuhan 
policymaking would suggest. As well as reflecting important international children’s 
rights concerns, final policy also took into account resistances by the ‘status quo’ 
discourse-coalition. The upshot was that the final policy incorporated calls by the 
‘status quo’ discourse-coalition for government to recognise the role played by panti 
asuhan. This resulted in the new policy putting panti asuhan at the centre of policy 
implementation arrangements into the foreseeable future; an instance of ‘old wine in 
new bottles’.  
 
Before proceeding, some additional data limitations should be noted. Hajer’s approach 
calls on the analyst to identify how policy actors changed their positioning, and the roles 
of other players. For Hajer, such data can be gathered in the form of transcripts of 
debates and discussions, for example, parliamentary proceedings, the reports of official 
inquiries, and records of meetings obtainable under freedom of information laws. In the 
Indonesian case, however, there were no such equivalent sources. For example, 
discussions about panti asuhan policy were (on the basis of interviews with a 
Parliamentarian and Ministry of Social Affairs officials) known to have taken place 
within the Komisi VIII or Commission Number eight, the committee of the House of 
Representatives which is responsible for welfare and social issues, but no transcripts of 
these discussions are available on the public record. Similarly, no records are available 
of public or private meetings involving key players such as policy makers, non-
government representatives and researchers. These gaps meant that other evidence, 
principally interviews, unpublished Indonesian Government papers and secondary 
resources, became the main sources from which conclusions were drawn in this study.  
 
Moreover, while interviewees represented both a wide range of perspectives from 
government and non-government sectors, and were in senior positions (some were the 
actual policymakers), not all organisations of interest agreed to be interviewed. For 
example, Nahdlatul Ulama representatives declined to be interviewed; this was a 
particular gap in light of Nahdlatul Ulama’s important role which, alongside 
Muhammadiyah, is a major panti asuhan operator. Also, only one interview was held 
with the manager of a government-run panti asuhan. Gaining greater access to panti 
asuhan personnel is, arguably, outside the scope of this study because they did not play 
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a direct role in influencing policy. However, they may have offered insights into how 
the prospect of new policy was viewed within their parent organisation.      
 
Other steps in the discourse analysis, such as identifying key incidents and identifying a 
‘discursive order’, posed challenges. As panti asuhan policymaking has not previously 
been explored in an academic study, there were few existing materials upon which to 
draw to help construct what Hajer would term the ‘discursive order’. Nonetheless, 
evidence gathered from interviews with a diverse range of policy actors and observers, 
as well as unpublished Indonesian Government documents and published secondary 
materials, enabled a detailed picture to be developed about the policy change process.   
     
10.2 Three phases of panti asuhan policymaking  
Chapters 6-9 observed that two main story lines emerged from interviews with 
policymakers, policy advocates (such as INGOs), and other close observers. Both the 
‘pro-reform’ and ‘status quo’ story lines, in turn, contained a range of inner narratives. 
The interviews revealed also that these story lines did not simply remain at the level of 
thought. Rather, they mobilised the actions of two distinct discourse-coalitions, one 
proposing and one opposing policy change. These discourse-coalitions used political, 
bureaucratic and public channels to try to influence policymaking processes on panti 
asuhan in the decade after 1999.  
 
The following section outlines and assesses how the final policy was formed, or what 
Hajer would term a ‘discursive order’, in a discernible three-stage process. As 
summarised in Table 10.1, below, the three stages were: first, in a move towards 
discourse ‘structuration’, a pro-reform discourse-coalition formed around the ‘pro-
reform’ story line, establishing and advancing a policy reform agenda; second, 
displaying discourse ‘argumentation’, a pro-panti asuhan discourse-coalition began to 
resist change, advancing the case that panti asuhan played a helpful role with respect to 
poor families; and, third, policy was finalised or ‘institutionalised’, but as an amalgam 
of deinstitutionalisation and status quo positions, not—as portrayed in the standard 
version of events—as a simple victory for international children’s rights forces.   
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Table 10.1 Key phases in the development of panti asuhan policy, 1999-2009 
 
Policy development phase Key events and developments Key actors 
1. Toward discourse ‘structuration’: the 
‘pro-reform’ discourse-coalition initiates 
policy change thinking, 1999-2007 
 Asian financial crisis (1997-98) 
 Fall of Suharto (1998) 
 Indian Ocean tsunami (December 2004) 
 Save the Children-led studies of panti asuhan in 
Aceh (2006) and of other Indonesian provinces 
(2007) 
 President and Cabinet 
 Ministry of National Development 
Planning 
 Ministry of Social Affairs officials  
 Save the Children 
 UNICEF 
 Komisi VIII (Indonesian Parliament) 
2. Discourse ‘argumentation’: the ‘status 
quo’ discourse-coalition pushes-back, 
2007-08 
 Meeting of the Muhammadiyah Central Board 
 Meetings between the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and panti asuhan managers 
 Muhammadiyah Council and officials 
 Minister for Social Affairs 
 Ministry of Social Affairs officials 
3. Discourse ‘institutionalisation’: policy, as 
modified, announced and implementation 
commences, 2008-09 onwards 
 Indonesia reported to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (2010) on its review of 
policies and practices concerning children in 
alternative care 
 National standards of care in Child Welfare 
Institutions (2011) issued 
 Save the Children  
 Ministry of Social Affairs officials 
 Provincial authority officials 
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10.2.1 Toward ‘discourse structuration’: the ‘pro-reform’ discourse-coalition takes 
the lead, 1999-2007. The first phase in the panti asuhan policy change story 
commenced with the cataclysmic events around the Asian financial crisis and the fall of 
Suharto from 1997 to around 1999. It was further stimulated, and focussed, by research 
initiated by Save the Children after the 2004 tsunami. Finally, in 2006-07, the ‘pro-
reform’ discourse-coalition members comprising the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
UNICEF and Save the Children (with two staff members embedded within the Ministry 
of Social Affairs) commenced work to refine key recommendations contained in the two 
Save the Children-led studies of panti asuhan (2006, 2007) into new national policy 
with its centrepiece being the new national standards of care in Child Welfare 
Institutions that were to be applied in all panti asuhan.  
 
The commencement of this first scene-setting phase can be traced to major 
transformations in the political, social and economic environment arising out of the 
Asian financial crisis. As outlined in Chapter 7, the Asian financial crisis prompted 
Indonesian governments to adopt a range of high-level economic, social and 
administrative policies between 1999 and the mid-2000s. New laws gave more 
prominence to human rights and children’s rights than at any time before and during 
Suharto’s New Order. During this period, there was increased scrutiny of the Indonesian 
Government’s children’s rights practices by the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, including in relation to the treatment of children in alternative care situations. 
Moreover, national governments in the early Reformasi era placed greater emphasis 
than at any time during the previous three decades on poverty alleviation programs that 
aimed to provide greater support to the country’s poorest families. These families were 
those most affected by the Asian financial crisis, and they were also those most likely to 
relinquish their children to panti asuhan in order to ease their financial burdens and to 
access free educational opportunities. Finally, the government’s new decentralisation 
policy may also have been a factor in promoting policy change on panti asuhan as it put 
pressure on some national-level agencies to establish systems and policies that would 
influence future funding decisions by sub-national levels of government.  
 
Changed national economic policy directions in the early few years of Reformasi 
provided support to panti asuhan. As outlined in Chapter 8, in a bid to reduce the 
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adverse impacts on panti asuhan of decentralisation and price increases resulting from 
reductions in fuel subsidies, national government subsidies to alleviate hardship not 
only helped financially to support existing panti asuhan, but precipitated a boom in 
panti asuhan numbers as setting-up a panti asuhan became seen as an open door to 
government funding with few, if any, restrictions or obligations such as government 
monitoring. Drawing on evidence presented in Chapter 10, this problem was, however, 
not entirely the making of early Reformasi governments as the number of panti asuhan 
had already been rising sharply during the final decade of the New Order, due mainly to 
the role that panti asuhan played in expanding Suharto’s corrupt financial practices and 
coping with the social and economic dislocations caused by the Asian financial crisis. 
By the early 2000s, however, the legacy of rapid growth of panti asuhan during the 
1990s and the Asian financial crisis, combined with the expansionary effect of financial 
subsidies after 1999, clearly became a matter of concern to national government 
officials, notably those within the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of 
National Development Planning.  
 
Finally, with the stage set for panti asuhan policy change, the international children’s 
rights narrative forcibly entered the policy arena after the 2004 tsunami. Rather than 
causing government to rethink its panti asuhan policy from scratch, Save the Children’s 
research initiative happened to bring to light information about the lack of quality care 
for children in panti asuhan as assessed in relation to international children’s rights 
standards. This publicly-available evidence, and the placement of Save the Children 
staff inside the Ministry of Social Affairs at a critical time in the policy development 
process, undoubtedly added pressure on the Indonesian Government to modify its policy 
on panti asuhan. Yet, Save the Children’s initiatives were given weight by pro-reform 
policymakers within the Ministry of Social Affairs who had been seeking to align panti 
asuhan with broader social, economic/budgetary and administrative policy directions 
since the fall of Suharto and before the Indian Ocean tsunami. Thus, we see a 
coincidence of events in which Save the Children presented evidence at a time when 
key policymakers were seeking ideas to help solve a range of economic and social 
problems. If the wider national policy environment had become more conducive to 
panti asuhan policy reform in the first few years of the 2000s, then the 2004 tsunami 
was a critical juncture in the policy change process in that it helped to fuse the interests 
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of those who expressed concerns around Indonesia’s poor compliance with international 
children’s rights standards with those who saw panti asuhan as being misaligned with 
new domestic policy directions.  
 
In earlier chapters, we saw how players allied with what I am terming the ‘pro-reform’ 
story line espoused the need for change. These several narratives did not necessarily 
express the problem in similar terms, but had enough in common (displaying what Hajer 
would term ‘discursive affinity’) to coalesce around a shared set of propositions that 
formed the core of this ‘pro-reform’ discourse-coalition. In other words, what turned a 
story line into a ‘pro-reform’ discourse-coalition was that holders of pro-reform 
narratives went beyond expressing their concerns to take action to influence policy 
outcomes. Thus, what interests us in this stage of policy analysis is how (as well as why) 
players worked to change policy and/or saw how other players responded or acted once 
policy change was being actively considered.  
 
In the initial phase of the policymaking process, these concerns were played out in the 
actions of a range of government policymakers, non-government policy advocates and 
other observers. The foundation members of this discourse-coalition were national 
government officials, especially a few senior officials within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, who began to view panti asuhan as an increasing drain on the central budget 
and inconsistent with the government’s new domestic social, economic and 
administrative policy directions framed in terms of the core values of Reformasi, such as 
greater democracy, empowerment and equity across Indonesian society. A senior 
Ministry of Social Affairs official ‘(GA-13)’ who was involved with the early phase of 
re-thinking panti asuhan policy soon after the Asian financial crisis talked about how 
the pro-reform story line was turned into action at political and bureaucratic levels. He 
related his role in promoting policy change around 2000 and how, as part of those 
efforts, Save the Children was invited to undertake research because that organisation’s 
work aligned with thinking within the Ministry of Social Affairs about the need for new 
policy on panti asuhan:    
 
In 2000, Presidential Decree on ‘Justice for All’ was issued on children’s rights 
and poverty alleviation. Also, in 2000, I went to Melbourne and visited the 
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Department of Community Services Victoria. They said that they had closed 
their orphanages and they showed me a model for foster and extended family 
care.  
 
I returned to Jakarta and said ‘we have to get family support programs’ but we 
needed research to do that. I wasn’t satisfied with the Ministry of Social Affairs’ 
internal research capacities…we didn’t have the research to back up our plans to 
increase family-based care for children.  
 
Save the Children came in later. I approached Plan International, then UNICEF, 
who introduced me to Save the Children to carry out the rapid assessment [of 
children’s institutions]… 
 
We decided to recruit a person from Save the Children and we got the Bandung 
Social Work School and staff of the Ministry of Social Affairs to assist. It was 
good research. But, it was not Save the Children that made us change our policy. 
(emphasis added). 
 
Save the Children gave us the evidence. I went to parliament and lectured them 
about the need for family support. I talked to Komisi VIII about providing 
greater family support and they agreed. But, even after that, there was not much 
Parliamentary focus on children’s issues. I made the argument that panti 
asuhan were very expensive (emphasis added).  
 
Many children’s homes relied on the fuel subsidy for things like buildings and 
repairs. If we moved to family-based care of children, we can care for more 
children and don’t need money for buildings and maintenance.  
 
I also made an argument that Indonesia should have a social investment model 
and that we need to invest in poor people and neglected children to help them 
return to the market.  
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I had to re-badge child protection as a ‘social investment’ to win their 
agreement. I had to appeal to an economic argument. It was a powerful tool. 
(emphasis added). 
 
(Interviewee GA-13) 
 
Of particular note, the above passage indicates how the definition of the policy problem 
was changed in an attempt to obtain political support for the policy shift, that is, from 
being portrayed by interviewee GA-13 as a children’s welfare problem to being 
presented or ‘re-badged’ as an economic problem. This conforms to Hajer’s 
expectation, mentioned in Chapter 3, that policy actors frequently change how a policy 
problem is defined in order to win acceptance of their policy objective (Hajer 2006, p. 
69).     
 
The role played by a few key individuals within the Ministry of Social Affairs in 
championing policy change was noted by several interviewees. An expatriate INGO 
worker (INB-13) closely associated with this stage of the policymaking process 
commented that Save the Children’s presence in the Ministry of Social Affairs would 
not have occurred without what she termed ‘a green light’ given by one or two key 
senior officials. She also highlighted the authorisation provided by the then Minister for 
Social Affairs:  
 
After the ‘Quality of care’ report [‘Someone that matters’. The quality of care in 
childcare institutions in Indonesia (2007)], it was initially hard to get a report 
that was critical, but he [the Minister] was able to recognise himself, having 
visited quite a few institutions, that they [panti asuhan] were a business as well. 
So he recognised that it would be good to do something about them [panti 
asuhan].  
 
(Interviewee INB-13) 
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A senior Ministry of Social Affairs social worker (GE-13) also highlighted the role a 
few senior officials played in maintaining the pressure for policy change within 
government: 
 
One reason for the new policy was because people within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs were willing to change, and there were external factors, namely, Save the 
Children. The main internal factor was having a champion in government to 
support the change. 
 
(Interviewee GE-13) 
 
Perhaps indicative of the fact that members of the broad ‘pro-reform’ discourse-
coalition were not homogenous in view was that there were disagreements amongst 
interviewees about whether the policy change was driven predominantly by those who 
argued that the Indonesian Government should align its policy on panti asuhan more 
closely with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or by those 
who argued that panti asuhan policy should conform more closely with broader national 
policy and cost-cutting goals. Senior Ministry of Social Affairs officials saw the work 
by Save the Children and UNICEF after the tsunami as helpful in providing evidence 
that they needed to build the case for policy change. On the other hand, Save the 
Children and, to a lesser extent, UNICEF, saw themselves as being the primary force 
behind policy reform. An INGO employee (INB-12) claimed that Save the Children’s 
success in getting the national government to adopt a new panti asuhan policy direction 
was due mainly to the development of close working relationships between Save the 
Children and the Ministry of Social Affairs, as well as Save the Children’s willingness 
to undertake activities to demonstrate how deinstitutionalisation based on family 
strengthening measures could work in the field:  
 
[Save the Children’s] success was due to cultivating relationships with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs right from the beginning. Save the Children staff were 
seconded to the Ministry of Social Affairs so they walked hand-in-hand with 
them.  
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The other big thing was building panti asuhan groups at the district level. The 
bupati [heads of regencies (kabupaten) which, along with cities, are Indonesia’s 
second-level administrative sub-division below provinces, each with a local 
government structure and a legislative body] were important to developing 
political and implementation support. Finally, it was important to have a 
laboratory in Bandung to trial and scale up the deinstitutionalisation model…  
 
Save the Children had success because it worked at multiple levels and at a 
national systems level. There were two key people who were allies within the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, and Save the Children had its own people in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. The Ministry of Social Affairs changed the funding 
to increase support for children who were not in institutions.  
 
This move was not beneficial to institutions. These were the most courageous 
civil service decisions I’ve heard of. Muhammadiyah was somewhat on board 
with it. For a bureaucrat to decide this was exemplary. Save the Children’s 
contribution was having one example of how it works…But the challenge is to 
make it happen with 8,000 institutions in a decentralised environment. 
 
(Interviewee INB-12) 
 
Thus, by around 2007, the ‘pro-reform’ discourse-coalition formed around three pro-
reform narratives, that is, around the promotion of children’s rights in keeping with the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the importance of aligning with new 
domestic social, economic and administrative policies, and the need to cut costs. While 
these narratives were disparate, all three shared an affinity around the higher goal of 
reforming panti asuhan. Following the critical event of the 2004 tsunami which opened 
the door for Save the Children to undertake the first-ever publicly available research 
into Indonesia’s panti asuhan, this discourse-coalition began to exhibit signs of what 
Hajer would term ‘discourse structuration’, or a tendency to dominate the policy arena.  
 
10.2.2 Discourse ‘argumentation’: ‘We got resistance from Muhammadiyah’: ‘status 
quo’ discourse-coalition push-back, 2007-08. Discourse ‘structuration’ was not fully 
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achieved, however, without resistance from pro-panti asuhan players, principally 
Muhammadiyah. In the second phase of the policymaking process, between 2007 and 
2009, proposed policy reforms started to be discussed outside government and INGO 
circles, with the result that a pro-panti asuhan ‘status quo’ discourse-coalition based on 
those holding a ‘status quo’ story line (see Chapter 9) began to voice opposition to 
change. Evidence of opposition in this phase of discourse ‘argumentation’ comes from 
interviews with INGO and national government circles, as well as from within 
Muhammadiyah itself.  
 
During 2007 and 2008, Muhammadiyah’s reactions to the prospect of policy change 
were starting to be noted within national government circles. One senior official of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (GB-13) discussed how Muhammadiyah’s opposition was 
seen within the Ministry of Social Affairs, thus: 
 
When government began to talk about introducing standards for care, 
Muhammadiyah said that they needed to discuss this move at the highest level. 
Then, they decided to create their own standards!  
 
Also, Muhammadiyah wrote a newspaper article explaining their position that 
government needed to keep supporting children’s institutions. 
 
Muhammadiyah resisted the government’s plans concerning pantis. They asked 
government ‘why do you only now want to change the policy?’ 
 
(Interviewee GB-13) 
 
A senior Ministry of Social Affairs social worker (GE-13) reflected on how managers of 
some Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama panti asuhan openly opposed the proposed 
changes: 
 
In meetings with Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama some people refused to 
accept the proposed changes. In Jogyakarta, some people from orphanages said 
that they would have to close, but they really didn’t understand the standards…  
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Save the Children has also started with deinstitutionalisation work in Bandung. 
In that place, one of the pantis was run by a very powerful person with a lot of 
influence over others. But, the government, including its local office, worked 
closely with him so that he could influence others…  
 
We noticed that Muhammadiyah have their own policies on child protection. I 
said to them that they had to obey the government rules and work with the 
government because this guideline is good. They said ‘No, we have our own 
regulations’. They don’t explain what their regulations are about. I really don’t 
understand.  
 
(Interviewee GE-13) 
 
An expatriate INGO worker (INB-13) reflected on Muhammadiyah’s opposition to the 
prospect of panti asuhan policy reform following the release of the ‘Someone that 
matters’ report in 2007:  
 
Muhammadiyah was going through some process of reflection…and was 
starting to work on some standards [in institutional child care]. But, they were 
not challenging institutional care… 
 
Muhammadiyah sometimes jokes that they are the Ministry of Social Welfare. 
They have more resources than the Ministry of Social Welfare and they see 
themselves as more powerful than the Ministry of Social Welfare. They are not 
entirely wrong, actually. So, at some level, there was the sense that, well, ‘who 
are you’ [referring to the government], and why are you telling us? We 
[Muhammadiyah] are the ones who have been doing it [operating panti asuhan] 
forever…  
 
Nahdlatul Ulama lives on, pretty much, without caring what the [national] 
government says. That’s also the legacy of the [Suharto] dictatorship, Indonesia 
having very fragile democratic institutions, and the government’s total lack of 
certainty about its role and mandate which still, in some level, continues…  
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Save the Children had a lot of push-back after their ‘Quality of care’ report, 
including from within Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah’s people would stand 
up in meetings and would say this was all lies. I always remember one of our big 
allies now was a guy in Bandung who stood up at a meeting and he was furious, 
saying that Save the Children paints institutions as really bad, but institutions in 
Bandung are absolutely not like that and are of much higher quality…  
 
You had a lot of people saying in meetings that Save the Children chose only 
negative institutions…there was also push-back from within the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, people who felt that Save the Children was really pushing the 
agenda.  
 
(Interviewee INB-13) 
 
One Indonesian non-government worker with close connections to Muhammadiyah 
(NA-13) said that, following the publication of the Save the Children-led studies in 
2006 and 2007, Muhammadiyah’s Central Board, the organisation’s supreme religious 
council, became concerned about the prospect of changes to government policy on panti 
asuhan. Particular concerns were that government was trying to ‘smash’ 
Muhammadiyah’s grip on panti asuhan and that Muhammadiyah had not been 
consulted before government started to draft the national standards for care of children 
in panti asuhan. One response by Muhammadiyah was to develop its own standards of 
care of children in its panti asuhan:   
 
The Muhammadiyah Central Board, which has many senior people, thought that 
Muhammadiyah was being smashed by government. They said they did not need 
government telling them what to do. So, the Central Board wanted its own 
policy…The Central Board said ‘we still need institutional care’… 
 
It would have been better if government involved civil society from the 
beginning. Muhammadiyah did not take too much of a part in government 
policymaking [on panti asuhan]. The players were Save the Children and 
UNICEF. It does not matter where the idea comes from, but the problem was 
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that the government considered UNICEF and Save the Children as the main 
players and not civil society…government did not involve us, but we knew the 
impact of polices on the ground…  
 
Muhammadiyah’s orphanages rejected the new government standards as 
impossible to apply. They said that they are helping children that the 
government cannot help…  
 
The national government was influenced by Save the Children and UNICEF, 
who were working with the Ministry of Social Affairs to develop policy 
guidance [on panti asuhan]. The Ministry of Social Affairs formalised the new 
policy quickly but within the Ministry there are a lot of different views and only 
a few believe in strengthening family support. The problem was that the 
Ministry of Social Affairs thought about the UN and international NGOs before 
they thought about Muhammadiyah. When the new standards were developed, 
Muhammadiyah was not consulted by government.  
 
Muhammadiyah reviewed its policies not because of government but because 
the global context told us orphanages were not good for children except as a last 
resort. The UN was critical of Indonesia in 2004. Muhammadiyah got data from 
UNICEF and it said: ‘this is our homework to change regulations and mind-sets, 
and it has been our focus for the past five years’.   
 
Muhammadiyah felt that government needed to talk with its people before 
getting an international consultant in. Muhammadiyah missed a step and now it 
is having to integrate the government’s new policy with practice in its 
orphanages.  
 
Many orphanages did not understand why the changes need to be made and 
Muhammadiyah’s job is to help them understand. But, after the government 
made the changes, it seemed that Muhammadiyah was no longer the owner of 
the policy about the standards of care in orphanages.  
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Muhammadiyah now has its own standards for child care institutions in draft 
form and will join these with the Indonesian Government standards in the future. 
It thinks that children are raised best in their family, but if that is not possible 
they should be raised in their community and, only in orphanages as a last resort.  
 
Muhammadiyah developed its policy after research in Surabaya and Tenggara. It 
found the data was interesting, especially that 90 per cent of children in 
orphanages have a parent alive. Muhammadiyah did not know that before. It 
learned that children were put in orphanages for two reasons – to get access to 
education and to help families with their cost of living.  
 
(Interviewee NA-13) 
 
In the face of opposition from pro-panti asuhan voices, in the course of 2007 and 2008, 
the national government decided on the main elements of the new panti asuhan policy. 
Rather than simply adopt all the recommendations of the Save the Children reports, it 
appears that the Ministry of Social Affairs shaped the final policy outcome to take into 
account opposition from panti asuhan operators. The result was that panti asuhan were 
to continue to play an important ongoing, though ultimately modified, role. In 
particular, it decided to continue to provide financial support directly to panti asuhan, 
albeit under a new registration and accreditation regime, and to utilise these institutions 
as the principal point of dissemination of funding for family support programs (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
A senior Ministry of Social Affairs official closely associated with policy deliberations 
within government at this time (GA-13) stated unequivocally that opposition from 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama caused government to decide on this policy 
course under which, instead of providing support directly to vulnerable families to 
reduce the incidence of relinquishment of their children to panti asuhan, it would 
continue to channel its support through panti asuhan. Alluding both to the opposition 
mounted by panti asuhan operators and to the huge numbers of children in panti 
asuhan, and thus the administrative and political challenges of re-designing the 
country’s alternative childcare system at once, he stated succinctly: 
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We got resistance from Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. That’s the 
reason we keep orphanages as the channel for family support (emphasis 
added)…  
 
There are 600,000 children in residential care. We need a diversity of models 
and we still need a residential care model. We need five or six models based on 
the situation of the beneficiaries…  
 
We are encouraging the pantis to outreach to families. The pantis get a 
government subsidy when they do that…  
 
We did not totally adopt Save the Children’s ideas 100 per cent. For example, 
concerning violence against children, we do not totally accept the children’s 
rights model and, when it comes to religious conflict, children’s rights is only 
general guidance and we need to translate it into local needs. (emphasis added). 
 
(Interviewee GA-13) 
 
The head of a national government child protection agency (GF-13) also affirmed that 
the national government decided to channel funding through the existing structure of 
panti asuhan because this course of action avoided the cost of establishing a new 
program delivery mechanism and potentially side-stepped opposition from panti asuhan 
operators about being denied government funding: 
 
The fuel subsidy enabled the government to monitor how the money was spent. 
It was to be channelled to the community through the pantis as a mechanism to 
monitor the funds. Government thought that it was going to be easier to control 
the money for family support by using the pantis in this way. It was a 
bureaucratic issue and it was the easiest way for government to deliver the 
money in the new paradigm…  
 
It’s a dualistic relationship. Government needs the pantis to deliver the funds for 
family-based support and pantis need government money to run them…If 
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government cut off the subsidy, there would be a negative reaction from the 
pantis.    
 
(Interviewee GF-13) 
 
Thus, in response to the ‘pro-reform’ initiative of the early-to-mid 2000s, a ‘status quo’ 
discourse-coalition emerged mainly in the form of Muhammadiyah resistance to policy 
change. A variety of tactics were used. These included a decision by Muhammadiyah to 
develop their own standards for child care institutions, seeking to raise public concern 
about government plans, and levelling criticisms at the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
even Save the Children staff in meetings convened to discuss the proposed new national 
standards. Importantly, while these tactics did not stop the pro-reform momentum, it is 
clear from interviews with government officials that this resistance, or the prospect of 
ongoing opposition, did shape the final policy in a fundamental way, that is, to have 
existing panti asuhan play a pivotal role in the delivery of family support services as 
well as in continuing to provide residential care for children.   
 
Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration was the changed political 
fortunes of organisations that operated the majority of panti asuhan, Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama. Interviewee RB-13, head of a non-government research centre, 
argued that any moves to change government financial and other support to panti 
asuhan were unlikely so long as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama retained a strong 
political power base within the national government: 
 
After Suharto, there was a change in political relationships between the 
government and Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. In Suharto’s time, these 
organisations would be allocated Ministerial positions.  
 
The position of Minister for Religious Affairs would be given to Nahdlatul 
Ulama and the position of Minister for Education would go to Muhammadiyah. 
They had an indirect guarantee that they would be part of government.  
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In Suharto’s time, there were three main political parties: PPP [Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, the Islamic United Development Party], Golkar and PDI [Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia, or Democratic Party of Indonesia]. Nahdlatul Ulama was 
a supporter of Golkar and PPP.  
 
Bachtiar Chamsyah [the Minister for Social Affairs between 2001 and 2009, 
who introduced the national government’s new panti asuhan policy] was aligned 
to the PPP. But, he was not part of the Nahdlatul Ulama faction within that 
party. Instead, he was aligned to the second largest faction, Parmusi. The 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Parmusi factions hated each other. Muhammadiyah is now 
more aligned to a new party, PAN. 
 
(Interviewee RB-13) 
 
The extent to which party political affiliations played a role in influencing panti asuhan 
policymaking processes is difficult to assess on the basis of this one perspective alone. 
Yet, it may have played a role in the policy change process. To discuss this possibility, 
we need to examine briefly the changing political fortunes of Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama during and after the New Order.  
 
Both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama played significant roles in supporting the 
struggle against the Dutch to achieve independence. In the 1950s, their political 
parties—Masyumi which represented Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama which was 
named after Nahdlatul Ulama—gained in political popularity (Mujani & Liddle 2004, p. 
111). Four political parties won the 1955 election, two of which were Masyumi and 
Nahdlatul Ulama with, respectively, 21 and 18 per cent of the vote (Hicks 2011, p. 41). 
Sukarno abolished Masyumi in 1960 because of its support for the anti-Sukarno army 
rebel group, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah 
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia). In 1960, Masyumi was replaced by a new political 
party called Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim’s Party).  
 
In 1973, Suharto forced the ten existing political parties, including Parmusi, to join two 
State-controlled parties (Suharto’s party, Golkar, was the third major political party). In 
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this move, the four Islamic parties—Parmusi, Nahdlatul Ulama, the Islamic Association 
Party of Indonesia and the Islamic Educational Movement—merged to form the 
government-controlled and monitored Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (or United 
Development Party). In 1984, Nahdlatul Ulama left Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
ostensibly to focus on social welfare and religious activities because they refused to 
accept the government ruling that all political parties adopt Pancasila as their 
ideological foundation (see also Chapter 6). In 1998, leading Nahdlatul Ulama figures 
formed the traditionalist Islamic Partai Kebangitan Bangsa (the National Awakening 
Party) whose leader, Abdurrahman Wahid (and grandson of Nahdlatul Ulama’s founder 
Hasyim Asy’ari), became President in 1999.  
 
Fealy (2009) has noted the declining share of votes cast in national elections for Islamic 
parties, such as Partai Persatuan Pembangunan and its predecessor organisations, from 
44 per cent in 1955, to 38 per cent in 2004 and to 29 per cent in 2009. Other scholars 
have advanced a variety of explanations for this phenomenon. Hefner (2000), for 
example, claimed that powerful religious figures were co-opted by the State throughout 
the Suharto era. Buehler (2009), in examining the first decade of Reformasi, pointed to 
changed laws that required political parties to have a nationwide network of local 
chapters, a condition that did not favour Islamic movements establishing themselves as 
political parties (p. 58). Mujani and Liddle (2004) sought to explain the increasing 
secularisation of Indonesian democratic politics largely in terms of the pluralistic nature 
of Indonesian Islam which originated as a syncretic blend of local animistic traditions 
and Hindu and Buddhist beliefs that pre-dated the arrival of Islam (pp. 584-85).    
 
In addition to changing political fortunes, Hicks (2012) contended that 
Muhammadiyah’s and Nahdlatul Ulama’s grip on the provision of a range of social 
supports diminished appreciably in the course of the New Order. As noted in Chapter 4, 
commencing in the early twentieth century, these mass socio-religious organisations 
came to play major roles in providing health, welfare and education services, and 
thereby built voter support for their associated political parties. Muhammadiyah became 
dominant in running hospitals, schools and panti asuhan whereas Nahdlatul Ulama 
concentrated on operating Islamic schools in the form of pesantren and madrasa.  
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Especially after Indonesia began benefitting from increased global oil prices after 1973, 
the national government expanded its investment in health and education services, either 
directly or indirectly through Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama entities. For 
example, the national government set up schools that duplicated Nahdlatul Ulama’s 
religious training functions in the form of Gabungan Usaha-Usaha Perbaikan 
Pendidikan Islam, or the Association for the Improvement of Islamic Education (Hicks 
2011, pp. 44-47). Nonetheless, given that government health and education was not 
cost-free, heavily-subsidised Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama health and 
educational operations continued to attract patronage as free or low-cost alternatives for 
poorer Indonesians (Hicks 2011, p. 47). 
 
While suffering a slow decline in political power over the course of the New Order, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama managed to maintain good links with both 
Suharto and all subsequent Presidents until the late 2000s. During all Reformasi 
administrations until the commencement of Yudhoyono’s second term of office in 2009, 
the positions of Minister for Religion and Minister for Education were bestowed, 
respectively, on those with Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah affiliations (in 2009, 
Yudhoyono broke this practice by appointing Ministers from Education and Religion 
who did not have strong ties with either Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, though 
other Cabinet ministers had affiliations to either Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama) 
(Hicks 2011, p. 48). Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Chairman Hamzah Haz served as 
Vice-President under Megawati (2001-04).  
 
In 2004, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ultimately backed Yudhoyono’s Presidency and 
was subsequently given a number of Ministerial positions. Bachtiar Chamsyah, who 
was aligned to Muhammadiyah’s Parmusi faction in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
served as Minister for Social Affairs between 2001 and 2009, thus overseeing the 
national government’s policy change on panti asuhan (in 2010, Bachtiar was gaoled, 
including for the corrupt importation of cattle from Australia). Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan was far from being the only political vehicle for the advancement of 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama interests. Muhammadiyah had close affiliations 
with the modernist Islamic Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party) and, 
as noted above, Nahdlatul Ulama had associations with Partai Kebangitan Bangsa 
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(Buehler 2009, p. 59). However, as with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, both these 
parties experienced political decline through the 2000s, as seen in reductions in their 
combined vote in the 2004 and 2009 elections from 17 to 11 per cent (Mujani & Liddle 
2009, p. 577).       
 
It may be tempting to suggest that pro-panti asuhan players took the increasing 
secularisation of Indonesian politics and apparent losses in Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama political power as opportunities to push for panti asuhan policy 
reform around the mid-2000s. Yet, the story is far more complicated than that, and 
conclusions are less clear-cut. Even after the fall of Suharto, representatives of 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama continued to occupy important political 
positions, most notably holding the positions of Minister for Social Affairs in the midst 
of the much-vaunted panti asuhan ‘paradigm shift’ and Minister for Religious Affairs. 
It is open to speculation, and further research, whether and to what extent Bachtiar and 
other political players in Parliament who were affiliated with either Muhammadiyah 
and/or Nahdlatul Ulama influenced that policy change process. At the very least, 
however, a moderating role played by pro-traditionalist political forces may be inferred 
from the final policy outcome, that is, as one that continued to view panti asuhan, which 
were the almost exclusive preserve of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, as central 
to new policy implementation.   
 
10.2.3 Discourse ‘institutionalisation’: policy announcement and implementation, 
from 2008-09 onwards. The final phase of policy making encompassed the 
announcement of the new policy to its early implementation activities. In this phase, 
discourse ‘institutionalisation’ occurred when the major objectives of the ‘pro-reform’ 
discourse became enshrined as new policy, albeit with the important modification made 
by government on the basis of pro-panti asuhan pressure, that panti asuhan would be at 
the heart of policy implementation arrangements.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the new panti asuhan policy was not the subject of one 
major national government announcement, but rather a series of announcements and 
activities that commenced around 2008-09. The low-key way that the policy shift 
entered force inside Indonesia—as distinct from how the Indonesian Government 
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represented the new policy outside Indonesia, such as in its formal reporting to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child—is perhaps indicative that government sought to 
avoid further inflaming opposition from panti asuhan operating organisations such as 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. The national government’s decision to ‘tread 
softly’ with its policy announcement may also have reflected a recognition of general 
domestic community support for, or at least acquiescence in, the panti asuhan model of 
child care for reasons discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
That government felt the need to launch its new approach to panti asuhan without 
undue fanfare was glimpsed from comments by a national parliamentarian (NPA-13), a 
leading member of the parliamentary committee on welfare. She offered an insight into 
the complicated domestic politics behind moves to scale-down panti asuhan and to 
adopt new family-based approaches aimed at discouraging families from sending their 
children to institutions. While supporting the new national government policy, national 
government would continue its support to panti asuhan; indeed, there were no plans for 
these to be phased out in the foreseeable future: 
 
If families can take care of their children there is no reason to take the children 
to panti asuhan. That’s the reason why Program Keluarga Harapan [the ‘Hope 
for families’ conditional cash transfer scheme, see Chapter 7] was supported…  
 
We should not close the pantis as long as they are needed by the community, for 
example, as places for the care of children in difficult circumstances.  
 
We still need pantis for orphans and children with certain problems. We don’t 
have any intention to close the pantis.   
 
(Interviewee NPA-13) 
 
Concerns about continuing objections to the new national standards by forces that 
favoured the status quo were indeed borne out as the national government, supported at 
times by Save the Children, sought to win support for the new national standards 
amongst panti asuhan managers and staff in various locations in the few years after 
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2008. The manager of a government-run panti asuhan in Bandung (LGB-13) cited 
opposition from privately-run local panti asuhan who were concerned that the new 
policy would reduce the amount of private donations to their institutions. Interestingly, 
he also stated that some parents of children who lived in the panti asuhan expressed the 
view that they were not yet in a position to take their child back into the family due to 
lack of funds that would enable the child to access education: 
 
At the beginning, the standards were rejected in this panti by the parents of 
children here. The parents felt that they were not ready to accept their children 
back at home with them. Some parents called me to complain since they could 
not afford to give their child an education.  
 
Gradually, however, through the socialisation process, the Red Book [the local 
name for the national standards] is being accepted. Sometimes, the child does 
not want to go back to their parents and the child does not want to return 
home…  
 
Some of the private pantis have rejected the new standards because they say that 
there will be less private donations to the panti. Nine children from this panti 
have been reunited with their family, and we monitor what’s happening to these 
children back in their homes.  
 
(Interviewee LGB-13) 
 
Opposition expressed by panti asuhan operators to new national government policy 
directions on strengthening family-based childcare, particularly the national standards, 
was another common theme in interviews with government officials at both the national 
and sub-national level, as well as with those closely associated with Muhammadiyah. A 
senior official of the Bandung District Government (LGA-13) referred to the challenges 
faced when introducing the national standards as well as strategies that his office 
adopted to encourage panti asuhan to adopt the standards:  
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At first, the pantis rejected the new standards of care but are now accepting 
them. They thought that they would be closed and there were too many new 
things required under the new standards. Seventy social workers from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs were deployed to speed up the socialisation process…  
 
At the beginning a few heads of pantis wanted the Red Book changed, but now 
they are starting to accept them. Our office is responsible for monitoring, but it’s 
step-by-step. We first work with the Muhammadiyah-run pantis, then the 
government pantis, and, finally, the privately-run pantis. We hold a monthly 
meeting of the heads of all Bandung pantis.  
 
(Interviewee LGA-13) 
 
In a similar vein, a district-level field worker for an INGO (INC-13), stated: 
 
When we speak to the heads of panti asuhan, they criticised us for the new 
standards. This was strange because orphanages were only brought to Indonesia 
by the Dutch and aren’t referred to in the Qur’an. It’s strange that they accuse us 
of promoting Western ideas when they, themselves, are working on a Dutch 
model. We say to them that we are supporting Islamic teachings by trying to 
strengthen the role of the family. 
 
(Interviewee INC-13) 
 
The head of a provincial office of the Ministry of Social Affairs or Dinas Sosial (GH-
13) similarly reflected on opposition from panti asuhan operators about the new 
standards. He highlighted concerns amongst these operators that the new funding 
arrangements would lead to reduced funding for panti asuhan: 
 
None of the panti asuhan said that they would not cooperate [with the new 
policy and standards] but after it was introduced they resisted. Dinas Sosial tried 
to explain but there was still difficulty because the pantis thought the standards 
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will make them do additional work to support families and children for the same 
amount of money as in the past. 
 
(Interviewee GH-13) 
 
A local social worker with close associations with Muhammadiyah (NA-13) stated that, 
even five years after the first signs of policy change on panti asuhan, ‘Muhammadiyah 
is not on the same page as the government and now maybe 10 per cent of its orphanages 
have the same understanding about the policy as the government’. Signalling that 
Muhammadiyah was far from being in full support of changed government policy, 
interviewee NA-13 complained:  
 
Muhammadiyah had no involvement in the development of the government’s 
new standards. Muhammadiyah thinks that working with families, one at a time, 
is better than issuing blanket guidelines… 
 
The government has said that orphanages will be assessed on how they meet the 
standards in 2014 and they will be closed if they do not meet them.  
 
But, many people support orphanages in private ways. So what will the 
government do if orphanages fail to meet the new standards? The government 
doesn’t have a strategy! 
 
(Interviewee NA-13) 
 
Resistance by some panti asuhan operating organisations to the new national standards 
led government officials to try to reassure panti asuhan that they would continue to play 
important ongoing roles. One local employee of an INGO (INA-12) explained how he 
tried to stress to panti asuhan staff that, rather than abolishing panti asuhan, the 
institutions would become important in new family support efforts as well as in 
continuing to provide residential child care (it will be recalled from Chapter 4 that the 
family support envisioned under the new panti asuhan policy included an assessment of 
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the needs of vulnerable families and children with a view to providing additional 
support so that children were not placed in institutions except as a last resort):   
 
I told them that the aim of the paradigm shift was not to abolish panti asuhan 
but to use them to deliver services to families. Getting the idea adopted at the 
local level was very difficult because of decentralisation. The idea is to get the 
ambassadors to apply pressure and to replicate in other places…  
 
When I held meetings to explain the proposed national standards with people 
who run panti asuhan, I got a lot of opposition. They said ‘you are trying to 
close our orphanages’. But, I said ‘no, we do not seek to abolish the children’s 
institution, but we would like to strengthen the institutions’ roles to make them 
part of a continuum of care for children. This [new policy] is not a full stop, but 
a comma’.    
 
The new policy will continue to use panti asuhan to channel funds for family-
based support, and the government has no intention of closing the institutions 
[the interviewee stressed this point]. 
 
Maybe in the next few years the money for family support will go directly to 
families and not through the residential child care institution.    
 
(Interviewee INA-12) 
 
The challenges of overcoming opposition were addressed by Save the Children in its 
efforts to establish a model family-strengthening project to illustrate how 
deinstitutionalisation could work in practice. One expatriate INGO manager (INB-12) 
highlighted this approach: 
 
Save the Children’s model is exemplary as it works at individual case level 
integrating professional Indonesian social workers. There is a lot of case 
management follow through and financial incentives to reintegrate children with 
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their families. About 100 children have been done so far in Bandung in 12 
orphanages.  
 
Save the Children is building support at the district and provincial level. At 
national level, Save the Children is now in the process of rolling the national 
standards to key stakeholders with the Ministry of Social Affairs in seven or 
eight provinces.  
 
Also, Save the Children works with the Ministry of Social Affairs on how they 
track child care institutions. The Ministry of Social Affairs sends a stipend for 
each child and institutions are working with the families and children. Save the 
Children convinced the Ministry of Social Affairs to deploy 400-500 additional 
social workers around Indonesia. This is leveraged off initial Save the Children 
work in Bandung. 
 
(Interviewee INB-12) 
 
Thus, we see that, even though modified to take into account concerns by pro-panti 
asuhan forces, the new policy came into force (or was ‘institutionalised’) amidst 
ongoing unease from panti asuhan operating organisations and staff. The low-key 
nature of the policy launch was in keeping with the government’s wish to ‘manage’ the 
ongoing opposition to its new policy. The way the policy roll-out occurred domestically 
was, of course, substantially different from the Indonesian Government’s portrayal of 
the policy at the international level, that is, as a triumph for international children’s 
rights.  
 
10.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has sketched the key phases in the development of Indonesia’ new policy 
on panti asuhan. Despite the standard narrative conveyed by the Indonesian 
Government and some international players that policy was fundamentally driven by the 
Indonesian Government’s decision to comply more fully with its international children’s 
rights obligations, it revealed the complex and multifaceted nature of the policy-change 
process. Children’s rights considerations were clearly of some importance to 
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policymakers, especially in light of Save the Children’s reports in 2006 and 2007. But, 
that factor alone was unlikely to have precipitated policy change. The scene was set for 
policy change when, after the Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto, early 
Reformasi governments embarked on new domestic social, economic and administrative 
policies that cast into doubt the Indonesian Government’s policy of support for panti 
asuhan that had been in an expansionary phase since Independence.  
 
Moreover, cost factors played a major role in precipitating policy change in the mid-to-
late 2000s. Panti asuhan grew massively in numbers during the latter stages of the New 
Order and from financial subsidies provided by early Reformasi governments to ease 
cost pressures on panti asuhan due to decentralisation and fuel price rises. This led to 
substantial increases in national government expenditure on panti asuhan at a time 
when, after the country was trying to get back on its feet economically after the Asian 
financial crisis, additional budgetary imposts were unwelcome. Policy reform was also 
clearly influenced by the personal commitment of key senior officials within the 
Ministry of Social Affairs whose actions appeared to spring from several motivations, 
including a concern about the rising costs to government of supporting panti asuhan.   
 
Yet, pro-reform forces did not have an unhindered path to policy change. They struck 
resistance in the form of a pro-panti asuhan discourse-coalition that comprised panti 
asuhan operating organisations and panti asuhan staff themselves. This opposition led 
the government to refine the shape of final policy in a way that ensured an ongoing, 
arguably even expanded, role for panti asuhan into the foreseeable future. General 
community support for, or at least, acquiescence in, panti asuhan as an ostensibly ‘time-
honoured’ method for the care of orphans and neglected children may also have played 
a role in shaping government thinking, although evidence that this factor weighed on the 
minds of policymakers is less clear. Moreover, it may be inferred that the big non-
government panti asuhan owners and operators, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, 
exerted some degree of political power through Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, a 
political party that secured several significant Cabinet positions, including as Minister 
for Social Affairs, in the first decade of Reformasi. While we do not have direct 
evidence about the role played by these political interests, it is noteworthy that, far from 
signalling a major reduction in the number of panti asuhan as might be expected of a 
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deinstitutionalisation policy, the policy that emerged around 2007-08 put panti asuhan 
at the centre of implementation arrangements well into the foreseeable future.      
 
The final chapter discusses the implications of these findings in terms of this 
dissertation’s principal research question. 
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Chapter 11:  Conclusions and implications for practice and research 
 
Overview 
This concluding chapter considers the study’s principal research question in light of 
case study findings. As well as suggesting practical lessons for policymakers and policy 
change advocates, it draws together implications for literature on deinstitutionalisation, 
interpretive public policy studies, and Indonesian social policy.  
 
11.1 A triumph for children’s rights or ‘old wine in new bottles’? 
This dissertation commenced with the overall aim of contributing understandings about 
factors that lead governments in the Global South to adopt—or not adopt—policies to 
deinstitutionalise children’s institutions. It did so through an in-depth examination, 
using interpretive policy research methods, of a recent Indonesian Government decision 
to adopt a deinstitutionalisation policy. Specifically, it asked: What factors led the 
Indonesian Government to adopt a policy during the 2000s to reduce reliance on a type 
of children’s institution known as panti asuhan?  
 
In Chapter 2 it was found that the existing research literature with regard to the 
deinstitutionalisation of institutions for adults and for children has not effectively 
explored policymaking processes, so cannot serve as a guide to investigating 
policymaking in settings in the Global South. To address the principal research 
question, Chapter 3 turned to the field of public policy for explanations about 
deinstitutionalisation policy change processes. Set within social constructionist thought, 
Hajer’s discourse analysis approach was selected as the dissertation’s primary 
methodology primarily because it clearly elaborated concepts and steps for conducting 
research and stressed the importance of identifying how policy formation occurs 
through competition between coalitions of policy actors with shared understandings 
about policy issues and solutions, or what Hajer termed ‘story lines’.  
 
Chapter 4 set the scene for the case study by showing how Indonesia’s recent policy 
shift on panti asuhan was depicted by both the Indonesian Government and 
international children’s rights organisations as a rare instance of deinstitutionalisation 
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policy change in the Global South based on the uptake of international children’s rights 
standards.  
 
Using Hajer’s methodology to look beneath the surface of this standard narrative, 
Chapter 5 introduced two main story lines about panti asuhan policymaking that 
emerged from interviews with key policymakers, policy advocates and observers. On 
one hand, those holding the ‘pro-reform’ story line—principally, national government 
officials, Save the Children and UNICEF—saw the need for policy reform not just 
because national governments in the early 2000s wished to comply with international 
children’s rights principles, but also because they were inconsistent with new domestic 
social, economic and administrative policy directions as well as being too costly for 
government to continue to support. On the other hand, the ‘status quo’ story line which 
was held mainly by panti asuhan operators such as Muhammadiyah regarded panti 
asuhan as useful in terms of helping poor families and as facilitating religious 
observances and other forms of community involvement. Chapters 6 to 9 critically 
examined these story lines and their constituent narratives.   
 
Chapter 10 drew the story lines together to advance a three-phase sequence of events 
that led to the policy change on panti asuhan by the late 2000s. I argued that the two 
main story lines went from being beliefs to driving the formation of two distinct and 
active discourse-coalitions which interacted and competed to shape the new policy on 
panti asuhan. In contrast to the standard explanation of policy development driven 
primarily by international children’s rights concerns, I argued that Indonesia’s policy 
change occurred primarily because the ‘pro-reform’ discourse-coalition began to gain 
political and bureaucratic ascendancy in the early to mid-2000s largely in response to 
the Asian financial crisis and the fall of Suharto. Rather than being based fundamentally 
on a concern to benefit children, as per the public depiction by the Indonesian 
Government and other international players, the final policy represented an attempt to 
appease both pro-reform and status quo audiences under which panti asuhan would be 
allowed to continue to play a central, if somewhat changed, role while appearing to 
show—as per the public version of events, noted above—that Indonesia had complied 
with its international children’s rights obligations.  
 
241 
Arguably, broad community support for panti asuhan and the fact that most panti 
asuhan were run by politically and socially influential socio-religious welfare 
organisations (Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama) meant that the reality of the new 
policy—with its recognition of an ongoing role for panti asuhan—was far less 
ambitious than conveyed in Indonesian Government rhetoric in overseas settings. (A 
more sanguine view would be, of course, that the new policy represented an important 
first step toward reform of Indonesia’s massive panti asuhan regime). This compromise 
over policy goes a considerable way to explaining why the Indonesian Government has 
presented the new policy to the international community principally as a case of 
adherence to Indonesia’s international children’s rights obligations under the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child while, domestically, it adopted a more gradualist 
approach to deinstitutionalisation that helped to assuage key pro-panti asuhan concerns.     
 
These findings shed light on the principal research question as follows. First, by 
utilising Hajer’s discourse analysis approach, the study uncovered the previously 
unidentified complex set of factors that led a major country in the Global South to adopt 
a policy to reduce the number of children living in orphanages and other types of 
institutions. The Indonesia case demonstrated how domestic political, economic, social, 
cultural and religious factors interacted with international factors throughout the 
policymaking process. The study revealed how the policy environment was primed for 
change from the early 2000s by the confluence of pro-reform forces into a discourse-
coalition in the context of a rapidly shifting political scene following the fall of the 
Suharto regime. These forces engendered a policy environment that was more 
conducive to a reconfiguration of policy than at any time in Indonesia since 
Independence. Even though pro-panti asuhan forces offered resistance, changes to 
institutional structures particularly after the fall of Suharto and in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis, as well as economic pressures on the national government in the first 
decade of Reformasi meant that momentum for change was simply too strong and 
policy change eventuated, albeit modified by status quo forces so that panti asuhan 
would continue to play a central role in implementation. Before this time, policy change 
was inconceivable because panti asuhan were strongly supported by Suharto as part of 
his corrupt money-making activities. The Indonesia case thus showed that contestation 
over policy resulted in a compromise solution in which panti asuhan operators received 
some degree of reassurance about the future of their operations.  
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11.2 Practice implications for policymakers and advocates 
Significant practical implications arise from the use of Hajer’s methodology in the case 
of Indonesia for other policymakers and advocates of policy change, such as INGOs, 
with regard to the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions.  
 
First, Hajer’s discourse analysis methodology revealed the inner dynamics of 
Indonesian policymaking, providing new understandings about factors that shaped the 
development of a new policy on panti asuhan during the 2000s. This enabled me to 
interrogate and challenge the standard narrative that concern for children’s rights was 
the primary driver of policy change. Recognition of how the final policy represented a 
compromise of domestic political, economic and social forces as well as international 
factors, provides a ‘tool kit’ for Indonesian Government policymakers and NGO 
advocates in order that they can understand, and navigate around or counter, potential 
road-blocks to policy implementation should they wish to do so. 
 
Going beyond the case of Indonesia, use of Hajer’s methodology may help to move 
beyond the current stalemated position, referred to in Chapter 1, in which the 
international community delivers little more than blame and calls for governments in the 
Global South to summon-up ‘political will’ to devise and implement 
deinstitutionalisation policies and programs in regard to children’s institutions. To help 
move past this rhetoric, government policymakers and policy change advocates need 
tools that assist them to build effective policies. The Indonesia case study indicates that 
Hajer’s discourse analysis methodology can improve understandings about factors that 
impede or advance progress on deinstitutionalisation policymaking. While case study 
findings from Indonesia cannot automatically be transferred to other countries with their 
own distinctly different political, social, cultural, social and religious characteristics, 
Hajer’s discourse analysis approach is applicable in other countries in the Global South. 
Such a way of analysing the policymaking process in relation to broader social, 
political, economic and other contextual factors seems highly likely to produce nuanced 
understandings about factors that make policy change more or less likely to occur in the 
first instance, as well as more of less likely to bear fruit in the implementation phase. It 
may also better enable policymakers and policy change advocates to craft 
recommendations for change that take into account the interests of groups that oppose 
change but who cannot be ignored. A challenge for non-government policy advocacy 
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organisations, in particular, is to invest sufficient time and money to develop and 
maintain such nuanced understandings as a standing element in their professional 
repertoire. Such an investment may lead to more effective outcomes in terms of 
advancing their advocacy objectives. 
 
Second, the importance of Hajer’s discourse analysis tool for policymakers and policy 
change advocates is heightened by research into the effectiveness of 
deinstitutionalisation policies and programs in the Global North. As will be recalled 
from Chapter 2, research about the deinstitutionalisation of institutions for adults in the 
Global North suggested an association between the reasons why deinstitutionalisation 
was undertaken in the first place and the resulting success or otherwise of 
deinstitutionalisation implementation. If, as some researchers argue with respect to the 
closure of adult mental institutions in the US that cost was a significant driver of 
deinstitutionalisation policy change, then parsimony also flowed through to policy 
implementation efforts with the result that community-based programs were poorly 
funded and often proved ineffective. With respect to the deinstitutionalisation of 
children’s institutions in the Global South, using the same logic, it seems important to 
more fully understand the factors that drive policy change in the first instance because, 
therein, may lay the seeds of the success or failure of policy implementation efforts.  
 
In the case of Indonesia, understanding that the new panti asuhan policy outcome 
envisioned an ongoing key role for existing panti asuhan may help government and 
non-government players to recognise issues that affect implementation and, if possible, 
put in place remedial actions. On the basis of other deinstitutionalisation literature 
relating to the Global North, it appears probable that the compromises embedded within 
Indonesia’s new panti asuhan, and particularly the importance of conserving public 
funds, may strongly influence the speed and comprehensiveness of policy 
implementation in meeting the Indonesian Government’s own stated policy goals, 
especially prioritising the care of children in family-like and community-based settings 
rather than in panti asuhan (see Chapter 4). Without the benefit of discourse analysis to 
delve deeply into the factors that underpin panti asuhan policy formation one could not 
have fully understood the factors that might also influence the pace and effectiveness of 
on-ground policy implementation. With a more detailed understanding of policy design 
factors through Hajer’s discourse analysis methodology, there would appear to be 
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greater scope to identify ways to meet policy goals than if one relied on generalised or 
simplified accounts about how policy regarding the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions was formed.  
 
11.3 Contributions to research 
Through this case study, contributions have been made to three research literatures, that 
is, on deinstitutionalisation policymaking, interpretive public policy, and Indonesian 
social policy.  
 
First, this study is one of the first to focus on the dynamics of policymaking about the 
deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in the Global South. Important work has 
been done by social workers and other professionals to assist governments and other 
organisations to establish effective on-ground deinstitutionalisation programs in the 
Global South. However, there has been a gap in research into why and how 
deinstitutionalisation policymaking occurs or does not occur. Concerns expressed by the 
international community over the pace of policymaking and policy implementation in 
relation to the deinstitutionalisation of children’s institutions in the Global South stand 
to be better informed by studies that more accurately pin-point the challenges and 
opportunities for policy change.  
 
Great care is needed if one were to try to draw lessons from the Indonesia case for other 
countries of the Global South. Differing social, cultural, political and other 
characteristics mean that such an attempt is fraught with challenges. Nonetheless, based 
on the case study, one might tentatively suggest that deinstitutionalisation policy change 
may be more likely to occur in the presence of two co-occurring factors. In the first 
instance, it seemed particularly important in terms of engendering a policy environment 
that was conducive to change that policy change advocates, such as Save the Children 
and UNICEF, marshalled and presented their arguments for change supported by 
evidence at critical junctures in Indonesian history, that is, in the aftermath of the fall of 
Suharto and the Asian financial crisis, the advent of the Reformasi era, and the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami. Moreover, it seems that arguments for deinstitutionalisation are 
more powerful when they are also seen as being helpful to government in terms of 
addressing other national political, economic or social problems that are not necessarily 
related to children’s issues. This study found that new policy directions on panti asuhan 
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became thinkable, if not necessary, in the context of change to broader national policy 
priorities concerning fiscal restraint and new social welfare policy thinking. Future 
empirical studies of deinstitutionalisation policymaking in other countries could 
usefully investigate and refine these contentions.  
 
Second, to date, methodologies from public policy studies have not been deployed to 
understand deinstitutionalisation policymaking in depth, either with respect to adult or 
children’s institutions in either the Global North or Global South. This study has drawn 
on interpretivist approaches that are helping to unearth more detailed understandings 
about the perspectives and motivations of key players and the complexities that shape 
policy change. Without the benefit of seeing the Indonesia case through a discourse 
analysis lens, we would have been left only with the standard narrative as advanced by 
the Indonesian Government and some international players that panti asuhan policy 
change was driven mainly by international factors, that is, as a beacon for international 
children’s rights compliance and a model for the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in the Global South. Without finer-grained analysis facilitated by discourse 
analysis techniques, we would not have seen that other factors, such as government 
concern over the rising cost of subsidising panti asuhan at a time of heightened 
sensitivity about overall government expenditures after the Asian financial crisis, also 
played a decisive role in precipitating policy change. And, we could not have 
understood the compromises in policymaking that, in all probability, will underpin the 
success or failure of policy implementation. 
 
As well as helping to illuminate substantive aspects of Indonesian policymaking on 
panti asuhan, the study has also provided an opportunity to critically assess possible 
limitations to Hajer’s discourse analysis approach. In Chapter 3 it was noted that Hajer’s 
methodology has become increasingly popular amongst epistemologically interpretivist 
researchers, especially in relation to environmental policy issues in the Global North. Its 
application has, more recently, also spread to other topic areas in these countries, as 
well as in relation to policy topics in some countries of the Global South. Yet, these 
studies have not discussed in any depth the pros and cons of applying Hajer’s 
methodology in non-Global North contexts, including whether or not Hajer’s preference 
for an examination of discourses in relation to written materials such as parliamentary 
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records in countries where these may not be as readily available reduces the 
applicability of his method.     
 
Applying Hajer’s approach to the case of Indonesia highlighted some important issues 
from the perspective of the researcher. It will be recalled that Hajer emphasised the 
importance of understanding how discourse-coalitions vied for policy dominance by 
analysing materials such as parliamentary hansard and written committee proceedings. 
These sources, he contended, had the potential to show how the argumentative discourse 
occurred as policy players each holding particular story lines engaged one another. In 
the case of Indonesia, however, such written information was scant. No written 
parliamentary or committee records were available for analysis. This led to a situation 
where the main primary source of information about discourses, story lines and 
metaphors came from interviews.  
 
Yet, I conclude that, even in the absence of written secondary materials such as records 
of parliamentary proceedings as Hajer might have preferred, Hajer’s discourse analysis 
methodology was clearly applicable in the case of Indonesia. A plausible chain of 
events the led to the policy change was discernible on the basis of interviews with a 
diverse range of policymakers, policy advocates and observers considered in light of the 
wider social, political, economic and cultural context in which policymaking occurred. I 
contend, therefore, that perceived limitations in applying Hajer’s methodology in 
countries which do not have extensive published parliamentary and other written 
sources are unlikely to hinder a thorough understanding of the policy development 
process provided that interviewees are selected from as wide a range of perspectives as 
possible and care is taken to analyse the broader contexts in which policymaking takes 
place. Thus, I contend that Hajer’s approach is highly likely to be applicable in 
understanding policymaking with regard to the deinstitutionalisation of children’s 
institutions in many other countries of the Global South. On this basis, I recommend 
that interested policymakers and policy advocates, especially INGOs, invest in 
developing and applying such policy analytic skills in other country contexts.  
 
A third main contribution made by this dissertation is to understandings about 
Indonesian social policy and, specifically, about panti asuhan. It has shed light on the 
reasons why Indonesia embarked on a policy change process about panti asuhan. Prior 
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to this study, there was no academic investigation of the processes behind the formation 
of this policy. Neither has any previous study brought together such a comprehensive 
account of the historical development of panti asuhan from the advent of the orphanage 
model under the Dutch to its major expansion under Suharto and beyond. Such an 
empirical study should thus interest scholars of Indonesia, and help to expand inquiry 
into social policy which stands relatively neglected compared with areas such as 
economics and security studies.  
 
Finally, the study has revealed important gaps in research about almost every aspect of 
panti asuhan, such as the short and longer impacts of institutions on children and nature 
and how communities interact with various panti asuhan across Indonesia. Future 
research could usefully focus on areas such as the nature and quality of care provided to 
children and young people living in panti asuhan, the emotional, psychological, social 
and physical impacts of institutionalisation on children and young people, evaluating the 
implementation of the new panti asuhan policy, especially in terms of the effectiveness 
of family support activities and rates of relinquishment of children to institutions, and, 
finally, the emotional, psychological, social and other consequences for adults who, as 
children, were placed in panti asuhan.  
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Epilogue 
By early 2015, some eight years after the Indonesian Government began to announce 
initiatives that signalled a new policy direction on panti asuhan, Save the Children 
Indonesia advised that, in total, only 250 children who had been living in panti asuhan 
in West Java and Yogyakarta areas had been reunited with their families and that 30 
children previously living in panti asuhan had been placed in foster care or had been 
adopted (2015, pers. comm., 2 March).  
 
Moreover, the pace of the Indonesian Government’s implementation of its new policy 
on panti asuhan has continued to attract concern at international levels. As recently as 
2014, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child considered Indonesia’s compliance 
with provisions in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child relating inter alia to 
children who live without parental care. The Committee (UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child 2014, pp. 9-10) expressed concerns about several matters, thus: 
 
Poor families who may still be unable to meet their children’s basic needs and 
who find themselves obliged to give up the care of their children…The small 
number of family-based placements of children and the continued widespread 
use of institutionalization…The very limited requirements for obtaining a 
license to run an alternative-care institution…The lack of compliance by most 
institutions with the standards introduced in the National Standard for Child 
Care; the absence of compliance monitoring; frequent incidences of violence 
within institutions; and children living in institutions lacking the possibility to 
meet their families…The lack of an adequate system of disaggregated data 
collection on children living in institutions.   
 
It is, of course, early days in terms of the implementation of the new panti asuhan 
policy in a country of Indonesia’s size. On the basis of this study, however, one wonders 
whether the new policy, which treads a cautious line between pro-reform and status quo 
agendas, can offer the clarity of purpose that is needed to realise a key policy goal any 
time soon, that is, in the words of the Indonesian Government to the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (2012b), ‘prioritizing family-like and community-based care as 
the first alternative’ to the placement of children in panti asuhan (p.23). Evaluating the 
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implementation of the new policy will, therefore, be an important next step, and one that 
may provide valuable insights not only for Indonesia but for other countries that are 
either contemplating or undertaking deinstitutionalisation policy reform. 
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Appendix A 
 
Organisations consulted, 2012-14 
In Indonesia Bahtera Foundation (Bandung)  
 
Dinas Sosial Kota Bandung/Social Affairs Office, Municipality 
of Bandung 
 
International Labour Organization (Jakarta) 
 
Komisi Perindungan Anak Indonesia/Indonesian Commission 
on Child Protection (Jakarta) 
 
Komisi VIII (Commission Eight) for People’s Welfare, House 
of Representatives (Jakarta) 
 
Kompas media (Jakarta) 
 
Lembaga Penelitian SMERU Research Institution (Jakarta) 
 
Muhammadiyah (Jakarta) 
 
Plan International Indonesia (Jakarta) 
 
Government of Indonesia, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional/National Development Planning Agency (Jakarta) 
 
Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Social Affairs (Jakarta) 
 
Government of Indonesia, Kementerian Pemberdayaan 
Perempuan Dan Perlingdungan Anak/Ministry of Women’s 
Empowerment and Child Protection (Jakarta) 
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Pimpinan Pusat ‘Aisyiyah Majelis Kesejahateraan 
Sosial/Social Welfare Council of Central Board of ‘Aisyiyah 
(the women’s section of Muhammadiyah) (Jakarta) 
 
Sekolah Tinggi Kesejahteraan Sosial Bandung/School of Social 
Work (Bandung)  
 
Save the Children Indonesia (Jakarta)  
 
UNICEF Indonesia (Jakarta) 
 
Universitas Atma Jaya (Jakarta) 
 
World Vision Indonesia (Jakarta) 
 
Yayasan Kesejahteraan Anak Indonesia/Indonesian Child 
Welfare Foundation (Jakarta) 
 
Yayasan Semai Jiwa Amini Foundation (Jakarta) 
 
Outside Indonesia 
 
 
Save the Children Australia (Melbourne) 
Former child protection/rights consultant to Save the Children 
UK/Indonesia 
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Appendix B 
Summary of interviews, 2012-14 
Sector Code February 2012 
Interviews held 
all in Jakarta 
except as 
marked (see 
explanatory 
notes, below) 
January 2013 
Interviews held 
all in Jakarta 
except as 
marked (see 
explanatory 
notes, below) 
 
March 2013  
Interviews in 
Australia 
August 2014 
Interviews in 
Australia 
Total 
number of 
interviews 
held except 
as marked 
(see 
explanatory 
notes, below) 
Number of 
interviewees 
National Parliament NP - 1 - - 1 1 
National government 
bureaucracy 
G 3 11 (but 2 
interviewed 
twice)  
(2*) 
- - 14 
(2*) 
12 
Local provincial or 
district government 
bureaucracy 
LG - 2 
(2*) 
- - 2 
(2*) 
2 
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INGO IN 3  
(1*) 
6 (but 2 
interviewed 
twice)  
(1*) 
(1^) 
1^ - 10 
(2*) 
(2^) 
8 
NGO N 2 5 (but 2 
interviewed 
twice) 
(1*) 
- 1 
(interviewed 
in Australia 
as well as 
twice 
previously in 
Indonesia) 
8 
(1*) 
5 
Academia  A 2  
(1*) 
2 (but 1 
interviewed 
twice) 
- - 4 
(1*) 
3 
Media/journalism J - 1 - - 1 1 
UN UN 2 1 - - 3 3 
Total  12 
(2*) 
29 (but 7 
interviewed 
twice) 
1 
(1^) 
1 
(interviewed 
in Australia 
43  
(8*) 
(2^) 
35 
254 
(6*) 
(1^) 
as well as 
twice 
previously in 
Indonesia) 
 
Explanation of symbols used:  
* indicates that interview was conducted in Bandung, Indonesia 
^ indicates that interview was conducted by telephone 
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Appendix C 
 
Indonesia: key laws, decrees and regulations relating to children and 
reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 
Laws, decrees and regulations 
1945-67 (Sukarno Presidency) Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 
(1945) (especially, Articles 20, 20A(1), 21, 
28B(2), and 34) 
1967-98 (Suharto Presidency) Law 4/1979 on children’s welfare 
Law 7/1984 on the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women  
Presidential Decree 36/1990 on the ratification 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child  
Law 3/1997 on the juvenile court 
Law 4/1997 on disabled persons 
Law 22/1997 on drugs 
1998-99 (Habibie Presidency) Law 5/1998 on the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
Regulation 2/1998 on social welfare efforts for 
children in crisis situations 
Law 20/1999 on International Labour 
Organisation Convention 138 concerning the 
minimum age for admission to employment 
Law 29/1999 on the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Law 39/1999 on human rights 
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1999-2001 (Wahid Presidency) Law 1/2000 on the ratification of International 
Labour Organisation Convention 182 
concerning the prohibition and immediate 
action for the elimination of the worst forms of 
child labour  
2001-2004 (Megawati Presidency) Law 23/2002 on child protection 
2004-2014 (Yudhoyono Presidency) Law 40/2004 on social security 
Law 11/2009 on social welfare 
Regulation of the Minister for Social Affairs, 
Number 107/HUK/2009, on the Accreditation 
of Social Welfare Institutions 
Regulation of the Minister for Social Affairs, 
Number 108/HUK/2009, on the certification of 
professional social workers and social welfare 
workers  
Decree of the Minister for Social Affairs, 
Number 30/HUK/2011, on National standards 
of care in Child Welfare Institutions 
 
Reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
The Indonesian Government has issued four reports to the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, as follows:  
 
First periodic report: UN doc. CRC/C/3/Add.10 issued in November 1992; and, 
UN doc. CRC/C/3/Add.26 issued on 8 March 1994. 
 
Second periodic report: UN doc. CRC/C/65/Add.23 issued on 5 February 2002. 
 
Combined third and fourth periodic reports: UN doc. CRC/C/IDN/3-4 issued on 
14 October 2010.  
 
In response, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has issued six reports with 
respect to Indonesia (in addition to working papers and summary records), as follows:  
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On the Indonesian Government’s first periodic report: UN doc. 
CRC/C/3/Add.10 issued on 14 January 1993; UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add.7 issued 
on 18 October 1993; and UN doc. CRC/C/15/Add.25 issued on 24 October 
1994. 
 
On the Indonesian Government’s second periodic report: UN doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.223 issued on 26 February 2004. 
 
On the Indonesian Government’s combined third and fourth periodic reports: 
UN doc. CRC/C/IDN/3-4 issued on 14 October 2010; and, UN doc. 
CRC/C/IDN/CO/3-4 issued on 13 June 2014.  
 
(United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 
2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2012b, 2014).  
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Appendix D 
 
Panti asuhan: prevalence and subsidisation 
 
This Appendix provides information about: (a) the amount of fuel subsidy reduction 
compensation paid by the Indonesian Government to panti asuhan between 2001 and 
2007; (b) the estimated number of panti asuhan between 1990-91 and 2006-07; and, (c) 
the estimated number of children in panti asuhan between 1990-91 and 2006-07: 
 
(a) The amount of fuel subsidy reduction compensation paid by the Indonesian 
Government to panti asuhan between 2001 and 2007. Three figures are provided: 
Figure D.1 on the amount of fuel subsidy reduction compensation funding to panti 
asuhan, 2001-07; Figure D.2 on the number of panti asuhan in receipt of fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation, 2001-07; and Figure D.3 on the estimated number 
of children who received fuel subsidy reduction compensation, 2001-05. These 
figures use unpublished data provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs about fuel 
subsidy reduction compensation provided to panti asuhan. In Figure D.1 it will be 
noted that the amount of fuel subsidy reduction compensation paid to panti asuhan 
rose from IDR25.8 million in 2001 to IDR126 million in 2007. Figure D.2 shows 
that the number of panti asuhan in receipt of fuel subsidy reduction compensation 
rose from 2,327 in 2001 to 5.053 in 2007. Figure D.3 indicates that the number of 
children who received fuel subsidy reduction compensation rose from 95,500 in 
2001 to 150,000 in 2007.  
(b) The estimated number of panti asuhan between 1990-91 and 2006-07. Two 
figures are provided: Figure D.4 on the estimated number of panti asuhan, 1990-91 
to 2006-07; and Figure D.5 on the estimated annual growth rate of panti asuhan, 
1991-92 to 2006-07. Both figures use the same data for the period between 1990-91 
and 1997-98 provided by the Indonesian Government to the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child in 2003 (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 
2003, p. 42). Figure D.4 provides three estimates for the decade after 1997-98: 
estimate 1, based on Indonesian Government data provided to the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child and fuel subsidy reduction compensation data; estimate 2, 
based on Indonesian Government data and thereafter Save the Children’s estimate 
259 
(2007) that known fuel subsidy reduction compensation recipients represented 82 
per cent of all panti asuhan (total panti asuhan 5,250); and, estimate 3, based on 
Indonesian Government data and thereafter Save the Children’s estimate (2007) that 
known fuel subsidy reduction compensation recipients represented 50 per cent of all 
panti asuhan (total panti asuhan 8,610). Thus, we see estimates that the number of 
panti asuhan rose from 983 in 1990-91 to either 5,053, 5,250 or 8,610 in 2006-07. 
Figure D.5 provides three estimates for the decade after 1997-98 based on the same 
parameters as in Figure D.4. Thus, we see estimates of the average annual growth 
rate in the number of panti asuhan rose from four per cent in 1991-92 to either 11, 
14 or 20 per cent in 2006-07. The strong rate of increase during the 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis will be noted.  
(c) The estimated number of children in panti asuhan between 1990-91 and     
2006-07. Two figures are provided: Figure D.6 on the estimated number of children 
in panti asuhan, 1990-91 to 2006-07; and Figure D.7 on the estimated annual 
growth rate in the number of children in panti asuhan, 1991-92 to 2006-07. Based 
on Ministry of Social Affairs and Save the Children data, Figure D.6 shows five 
estimates for the number of children in panti asuhan during the period 2000-01 to 
2006-07. It will be observed that all these estimates indicated increases, ranging 
from 95,458 to 161,302 in 2000-01 to 150,075 to 516,000 in 2006-07. Also based on 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Save the Children data, Figure D.7 shows five 
estimates for the annual rate of growth in the number of children in panti asuhan 
during the period 1997-98 to 2006-07. All estimates indicated substantial increases 
in annual rates for this period when compared with the decade prior to the Asian 
financial crisis. Between 1990-91 and 1996-97, annual growth ranged from 7.5 per 
cent to minus one per cent. In 1997-98 alone, growth peaked at 32 per cent. Between 
1997-98 and 2006-07, average annual growth rates ranged from four to 21 per cent.  
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Figure D.1 Fuel subsidy reduction compensation to panti asuhan, 2001-07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Indonesia Ministry of Social Affairs (2013).  
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Figure D.2 Panti asuhan in receipt of fuel subsidy reduction compensation, 2001-07 (number) 
 
 
Source: Government of Indonesia Ministry of Social Affairs (2013). 
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Figure D.3 Children living in panti asuhan supported through fuel subsidy reduction compensation, 2001-07 (estimated number) 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Indonesia Ministry of Social Affairs (2013). 
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Figure D.4 Panti asuhan, 1990-91 to 2006-07 (estimated number) 
 
 
Sources: 1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, cited in Report by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Indonesia (United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, p. 42); 2: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Government of Indonesia 
2013b); 3: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs and estimates by Save the Children UK et al. (2007, pp. 18-19).  
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Estimate 1: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data (sources 1 and 2).
Estimate 2: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data and Save the Children estimate that known recipients of fuel
subsidy reduction compensation represented 82 per cent of all panti asuhan (sources 1-3).
Estimate 3: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data and Save the Children estimate that known recipients of fuel
subsidy reduction compensation represented 50 per cent of all panti asuhan (sources 1-3).
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Figure D.5 Number of panti asuhan, 1991-92 to 2006-07 (estimated growth rates) 
 
 
 
 
Sources: 1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, cited in Report by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Indonesia (United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, p. 42); 2: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Government of Indonesia 
2013b); 3: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs and estimates by Save the Children UK et al. (2007, pp. 18-9). 
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compensation recipients represented 50 per cent of all panti asuhan (sources 1-3).
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Figure D.6 Children in panti asuhan, 1990-91 to 2006-07 (estimated number) 
 
 
 
Sources: 1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, cited in Report by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Indonesia (United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, p. 42); 2: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Government of Indonesia 
2013b); 3: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs and estimates by Save the Children UK et al. (2007, pp. 18-9). NB: 
data are unavailable for the period between 1998-99 and 2000-01. 
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Estimate 1: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data (sources 1 and 2).
Estimate 2: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that there
were an average of 43 children per institution in 5,250 institutions (sources 1-3).
Estimate 3: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that there
were an average of 60 children per institution in 5,250 institutions (sources 1-3).
Estimate 4: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that there
were an average of 43 children per institution in 8,610 institutions (sources 1-3).
Estimate 5: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that there
were an average of 60 children per institution in 8,610 institutions (sources 1-3).
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Figure D.7 Number of children in panti asuhan, 1991-92 to 2006-07 (estimated growth rates) 
 
 
Sources: 1. Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Religious Affairs, cited in Report by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Indonesia (United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 2003, p. 42); 2: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Government of Indonesia 
2013b); 3: Fuel subsidy reduction compensation data supplied by the Ministry of Social Affairs and estimates by Save the Children UK et al. (2007, pp. 18-9). 
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Estimate 2: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that
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Estimate 3: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that
there were an average of 60 children per institution in 5,250 institutions (sources 1-3).
Estimate 4: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that
there were an average of 43 children per institution in 8,610 institutions (sources 1-3).
Estimate 5: Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs data to 1997-98 and thereafter Save the Children's estimate that
there were an average of 60 children per institution in 8,610 institutions (sources 1-3).
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Appendix E 
Location and number of panti asuhan receiving fuel subsidy reduction compensation, 2007 
Province Population 
according to 
2000 census 
(Source 1) 
Number of panti 
asuhan receiving fuel 
subsidy reduction 
compensation, 2007 
(Source 1) 
Number of people 
per panti asuhan  
(Source 1)  
Number of panti 
asuhan per 
100,000 people 
(Source 1) 
Percentage of poor 
rural and urban 
people, 2007 
(Source 2) 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 3,930,905 187 21,021 4.8 26.65 
North Sumatera 11,649,655 90 129,441 0.8 13.90 
West Sumatera 4,248,931 93 45,687 2.2 11.90 
Riau 4,957,627 63 78,692 1.3 11.20 
Jambi 2,413,846 55 43,888 2.3 10.27 
South Sumatera 6,899,675 100 68,997 1.4 19.15 
Bengkulu 1,567,432 14 111,959 0.9 22.13 
Lampung 6,741,439 149 45,245 2.2 22.19 
Bangka Belitung 900,197 23 39,139 2.6 9.54 
Jakarta special capital region  8,389,443 87 96,430 1.0 4.61 
West Java 35,729,537 652 54,800 1.8 13.55 
Central Java 31,228,940 380 82,181 1.2 20.43 
Yogyakarta special region 3,122,268 55 56,769 1.8 18.99 
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East Java 34,783,640 794 43,808 2.3 19.98 
Banten 8,098,780 169 47,922 2.1 9.07 
Bali 3,151,162 50 63,023 1.6 6.63 
West Nusa Tenggara 4,009,261 211 19,001 5.3 24.99 
East Nusa Tenggara 3,952,279 102 38,748 2.6 27.51 
West Kalimantan 4,034,198 95 42,465 2.4 12.91 
Central Kalimantan 1,857,000 38 48,868 2.0 9.38 
South Kalimantan 2,985,240 67 44,556 2.2 7.01 
East Kalimantan 2,455,120 96 25,574 3.9 11.04 
North Sulawesi 2,012,098 43 46,793 2.1 11.42 
Central Sulawesi 2,218,435 98 22,637 4.4 22.42 
South Sulawesi 8,059,627 268 30,073 3.3 14.11 
Southeast Sulawesi 1,821,284 59 30,869 3.2 21.33 
Gorontalo 835,044 21 39,764 2.5 27.35 
Maluku 1,205,539 20 60,277 1.7 31.14 
North Maluku 785,059 24 32,711 3.1 11.97 
Papua 2,220,934 78 28,474 3.5 40.78 
Total Indonesia  206,264,595 4,305 47,913 2.1 16.58 
 
Sources: 1. Save the Children UK et al. (2007, p. 20); 2. Government of Indonesia, Statistics Indonesia, number and percentage of poor people, poverty line, poverty 
gap index, poverty severity index by province, March 2007 (Government of Indonesia 2013a).
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